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Food Riots, Food Rights  
and the Politics of Provisions
Thousands of people in dozens of countries took to the streets when world food 
prices spiked in 2008 and 2011. What does the persistence of popular mobiliza-
tion around food tell us about the politics of subsistence in an era of integrated 
food markets and universal human rights? This book interrogates this period of 
historical rupture in the global system of subsistence, getting behind the head-
lines and inside the politics of food for people on low incomes.
The half decade of 2007–2012 was a period of intensely volatile food prices 
as well as unusual levels of popular mobilization, including protests and riots. 
Detailed case studies are included here from Bangladesh, Cameroon, India, 
Kenya and Mozambique. The case studies illustrate that political cultures and 
ways of organizing around food share much across geography and history, indicat-
ing common characteristics of the popular politics of provisions under capitalism. 
However, all politics are ultimately local, and it is demonstrated how the historic 
fallout of a subsistence crisis depends ultimately on how the actors and institu-
tions articulate, negotiate and reassert their specific claims within the peculiari-
ties of each policy.
A key conclusion of the book is that the politics of provisions remain essen-
tial to the right to food and that they involve unruliness. In other words, food 
riots work. The book explains how and why they continue to do so even in the 
globalized food system of the 21st century. Food riots signal a state unable to meet 
a principal condition of its social contract, and create powerful pressure on a state 
to address that most fundamental of failings.
Naomi Hossain is a political sociologist at the Institute of Development Studies 
at the University of Sussex, UK. Her most recent book is The Aid Lab: Under-
standing Bangladesh’s Unexpected Success (Oxford University Press, 2017).
Patta Scott-Villiers is a political sociologist and convenes the Power and Popular 
Politics Cluster at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of 
Sussex, UK. She is lead author of Precarious Lives: Food Work and Care after the 
Global Food Crisis (Institute of Development Studies, 2016).
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1 Introduction
Patta Scott-Villiers and Naomi Hossain
Food riots in the contemporary context
Unruly subsistence protests in low-income countries
The ten years from 2007 were marked by a tectonic shift in the tenor of relations 
between rulers and ruled across the world, specifically in relation to the degree to 
which each polity made provision for its citizens to have access to the essentials 
of life. In this book, we argue that the roots of the global shift in citizen-state 
relations lie in the politics of subsistence and struggles for natural rights, played 
out virtually everywhere, in different ways to be sure.
While much has been written about this shift in western democracies, a great 
deal less has been said about how it worked and is still working out in low- and 
middle-income countries. Yet, of protest events reported in international media 
during the period, more than half were in emerging economies (Ortiz et al. 2013), 
and it is to a selection of these that we are turning our attention in this book. 
Although references to protests and riots in these economies were relatively com-
mon in 2007–2008, by 2011 reporting had been eclipsed by events in richer parts 
of the world, in particular by the extraordinary mass occupations of public squares 
across western cities. When they were reported on, protests by poor people in 
low- and middle-income countries were generally labelled as ‘food riots’, in a way 
that assumed that their motivations, demands and implications were obvious: 
they came across as the uncontrolled spasms of hungry mobs demanding food. 
While the basic characterisation may be accurate – food (or at least subsistence) 
did come up as a vital component in all the events we study in this book – there 
is a great deal more to be understood about the political nature of the protests and 
how they link to economic change at multiple levels.
Given the ever-increasing degree of integration – or at least interrelation – of 
global economic and political systems, there is no country that is not a player 
in the economic changes that we are witnessing today or that was not touched 
by the economic crises of 2007–2008 and 2011. In 2008 in particular, at the 
same time as commodity prices were spiking on global markets and the finan-
cial crisis was taking hold in the high-income economies, people took to the 
streets to protest government failures to protect the provision of basic essentials 
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in country after country. Their protests were suffused with the urgency of crisis 
and a widespread impression that politics-as-normal was excluding them as legit-
imate participants and ignoring their subsistence needs. Thus were the protest 
events sometimes uncivil, taking forms that were strident, disruptive of the social 
order and occasionally violent. Many met violence or uncivil responses from 
authorities. Some were potent, forcing official attention onto a broken moral 
economy: the justified belief that markets should not be allowed to eviscerate the 
poor. A smaller number contributed to political transformations, while others 
fizzled out with apparently little change to show for the risks taken. These riots 
and protests encapsulated a powerful popular sense of entitlement and political 
awareness.
The rule-breaking nature of protest events offers insight into the ways of doing 
politics open to people who are not part of the establishment. The defining struc-
ture of many of the protests was political society in the sense that Partha Chat-
terjee might have it, an opportunist, emotional and disorderly realm of social 
structuring, rather than civil society, its legal and more privileged relative (2004). 
The actions that people took often moved outside the formal modes of making 
claims on government and authorities to challenge the laws and policies that 
were failing to protect people on low incomes from hunger and to include them as 
persons with standing in the political system. Their protests called into question 
the legitimacy of ruling elites and were as often repressed or denigrated as they 
were appeased. In this book, we understand this mode of political agonism was 
part of the ‘politics of provisions’, a field of politics defining ‘the ways in common 
people interacted with their rulers over subsistence, . . . permitted and shaped 
by pre-existing social and political networks, both among rioters and between 
them and their rulers’ (Bohstedt 2016: 1036). We look here at episodes of citizen 
protest in relation to food and basic provisioning in five countries: Bangladesh, 
Cameroon, India, Kenya and Mozambique, between 2007 and 2012. The exam-
ples demonstrate the variation in repertoires and modes of unrest and in the 
moral economic arguments put by protesters and show how this variety was a 
function of the specificity of regimes of politics and authority in each case (Tilly 
and Tarrow 2015; Hendrix and Haggard 2015). They also reveal the global eco-
nomic and technological forces that linked one protest to another and connected 
them into a global wave of contention, suggesting that the commoditisation of 
the essentials of life had created horizontal connections between protestors across 
disparate polities (most often through global economic linkages) which had, in 
effect, generated a single world crisis and a politics of provision that operated at 
local, national and international scales.
In Chapter 1, we introduce the key terms that we use throughout the book to 
analyse the politics of subsistence protest in low- and middle-income countries. 
Situating local ruptures within global economic events of the period and broader 
processes of economic change, this chapter argues for why food riots are a use-
ful focus for analysis, why they have such a powerful effect on the imagination 
and how they play an important role at multiple levels. The chapter ends by 
considering the moral underpinnings of food riots and their politics, pointing to 
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another, more profound reason for paying attention to the voices of those who 
suffer chronic subsistence stress and hunger.
Why are we looking at food riots?
From a world historical point of view, the decade from 2007 may prove to be a 
turning point in the global economy and its politics. In 2007, the extraordinary 
growth in financial speculation that had marked efforts to restore the fortunes of 
the leading capitalist agency of the epoch, the United States, precipitated the cri-
sis that affected commodity prices and set off financial meltdown and price vola-
tility across the world (Arrighi 2010). The political ramifications are still playing 
out. If Arrighi is right that the 2007–2008 financial turmoil marked the ‘terminal 
crisis’ of the US economic and political domination and the potential for a shift 
to another site of capital accumulation, possibly in Asia, then the unrest in many 
other countries can be read also as a part of this process. It may even be that many 
of those who protest, riot or demonstrate sense that this is a moment in which 
they should act if they are to stake their place in a new socio-economic regime. 
Whether this is reading too much into it, the commodity and financial crises 
certainly did unleash hitherto quiescent stresses among masses of informal and 
low-income workers and peasants in a wave of unrest across the world. While, in 
part, an expression of grievance at immediate conditions, we believe that they 
were also attempts to assert a political subjectivity that had long been denied.
The protracted crisis of subsistence brought millions of people out onto the 
streets. The Global Platform on Participation and Protest1 records protests 
against corruption, unaccountability and failures of representation in 2007–2008 
in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Slovenia and Tunisia; and food related protests in Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Kenya, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, 
Somalia and Uzbekistan. The number of protests then increased year on year 
(Ortiz et al. 2013). Chapter 2 of this volume, A world in protest by Sara Burke, 
draws on the Global Platform to describe the evolution of protests from 2007–
2012, observing an evolving pattern as different political economic phases and 
geographical manifestations succeeded one another.
A key task is to clarify meanings. What assumptions are we making when we 
talk of ‘food riots’ in the early 21st century? What judgements are applied to 
labelling an event as a ‘food riot’? What are the political effects of this labelling? 
Sara Burke’s chapter suggests that protests came in many forms and types during 
this period, usually combining material and political demands. There was a geo-
graphical divide: we have already noted that what were called ‘food riots’ were 
usually recorded in low- and middle-income countries, the latter often under 
authoritarian regimes. Yet the characteristics of some protests against austerity 
in Europe, such as the 2011 riots in the United Kingdom for instance, closely 
resembled struggles in poorer countries over food prices. And wage struggles in 
the south were more like the industrial disputes of the north than they resembled 
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a struggle over the moral economies of grain in the south. Many food-related 
collective actions in the south tended to be neither violent nor particularly trans-
gressive, more protest than riot and often involving participation of people close 
to power and advocating policy reforms. The Right to Food social movement in 
India is one such example.
So what then do we mean by ‘food riots’? We mean the unruly actions of the 
crowd to assert to ‘authorities’ a right to food. We mean political actions that 
counter the usual order and whose participants legitimate their claims with refer-
ence to a moral economy; specifically, a shared understanding that food markets 
should work for people. It is these individual moments, spikes of civil transgres-
sion, on which we centre our analysis in this book, because they function, in 
the systems by which poor people do politics, as signals of distress and of a need 
for recognition in the formal register of politics. These units of analysis build up 
into episodes and processes, many of which combine into wider struggles over 
the responsibilities of state and the rights of markets and people. These episodes, 
when they affect the food system, comprise the politics of provisions. So we talk a 
great deal about food riots in order to make sense of them in light of the negotia-
tions, interests and repertoires at stake in bringing about and maintaining rela-
tions between rulers and ruled that are functional for human wellbeing and social 
reproduction. The media play an increasing role in shaping this relationship and 
shaping our ability to understand what is happening, a subject to which we will 
now turn, and which we delve into in Chapter 3.
Why media framing matters
Much of what we understand about food riots is drawn from the framing provided 
to us by the media. The ‘spasmodic’ view, though roundly criticised by Thompson 
(1971), Bohstedt (2010) and C. Tilly (1975), resonates widely in the reportage 
of the international media; this may be a function of the brevity with which 
the story ‘hungry-angry-crowd’ can be told through the term ‘food riots’. This 
term has an impressive English-language communicative capacity to telescope 
complex politics into a newsworthy event. Initial analysis suggests this is a key 
framing used by the international media.2
The term ‘food riot’ in the international media carries a powerful external 
accusation, based on a reading of the conditions and a rough knowledge of his-
tory, that enables an assumption that ‘food riots’ signal a precarious regime, eco-
nomically and (therefore) politically. It highlights to an international audience 
in geopolitical space the apparently fragile legitimacy of a regime in which the 
events have occurred. The name also sends another, more powerful signal to the 
international political economy. As Chapter 3, Media framing by Hossain et al., 
suggests, the siren call of global economic and financial agencies is that freedom 
works; they seek to mobilize support for freer trade and agricultural industrializa-
tion as the surest route to food security, with emergency food aid to fill gaps. Mar-
kets need to be enabled to provide. In stories of riots such agencies may also read 
a threat to the long-term viability of their economic models, recalling perhaps 
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the ‘IMF riots’ of the 1980s in Latin America and elsewhere (Walton and Seddon 
2008). This perception of a threat is accurate enough: protestors protest about 
the results of neoliberal food economics, even if they do not always point a finger 
towards the specific global or regional agency.
The labelling of some, but not other, events as food riots also distinguishes 
between the complex social and political and economic realities of riots or pro-
test struggles in the north and the (implicitly simpler) rumbles of the belly in the 
south. This is a largely false distinction between these waves of economic protest 
that northern activists also often ignore. There is an interesting difference, for 
instance, between the moderately sympathetic view of the international media 
towards food riots in southern countries uncovered by the review in Chapter 3 
and the generalized media hostility towards the London youth riots of summer 
2011 (Cooper 2012; Bassel 2012). But in the reported looting of trainers and 
tech goods, young people were protesting their inability to possess the things that 
they must have, as citizen-consumers, in order to be a member of 21st century 
society. Perhaps there is no moral equivalence between the destruction or looting 
of private property for consumerist ‘loot’ rather than in order to eat. But what this 
distinction between necessities for a socially-determined good life effectively does 
is to certify one kind of protest (around food, among poor people in the south) as 
morally necessary, and justified by the corruption of those regimes. By contrast, 
broadly parallel events, by people in similarly constrained and unequal circum-
stances in London, were scorned as the result of crass consumerism at its most vio-
lent. The London rioters were thus de-certified as legitimate actors in a struggle.
It is important not to discount the importance of food vs. trainers as a moral 
matter in these events, but also to recognize that if there is a moral difference 
between the two cases, it is not very important in practice. We know this because 
even if some food rioters were actually hungry, many were managing food one 
way or another, and it was not usually the hungriest groups or even those hardest 
hit that protested. So while food does matter, and it may make a moral difference 
to the politics at play, we have to steer clear of assuming that is because the belly 
rumbles. Food matters here, but in a political and not a physiological way. Other 
basic needs of everyday life may matter equally, and in the same ways.
Professional reportage (rather than social media) tends to take a strongly 
moral stance, which reflects and shapes the political mood. This influence is not 
confined to the broadcast or press media, but also applies to scholarship, whose 
interpretations of events always contain a degree of normative rightness and 
wrongness, admiration and denigration, however nicely worded. Understand-
ing what threats, entitlements, and meanings are involved are vital in shaping 
response to protest claims, complaints and challenges. This is particularly impor-
tant in relation to notions of security to which we will now turn.
Food and other securities – the riot in imaginary
In development policy research, food riots are causally and consequentially asso-
ciated in the relationship between food security, conflict and human security. In 
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the surge of studies of food riots that followed 2008, many situated explanations 
within debates about violent conflict, studying associations between protests, 
demographics and food prices across economic and political settings (Demarest 
2015). Brinkman and Hendrix include food riots among the list of forms of (vio-
lent) conflict associated with food insecurity, the full list including civil conflict, 
interstate war, democratic and authoritarian breakdowns, protesting and rioting, 
and communal violence (2011).
O’Brien notes that the ‘food riot is an important marker of insecurity and dis-
content’, blending ‘different forms of insecurity, combined with a desire to seek 
redress for perceived injustices’ (2012:44–45). His analysis views rioting within 
the wider continuum of political struggle and its relationship to human and food 
security. The continuum suggests that food riots may unleash further unruliness, 
particularly if they elicit state repression, but also if they raise and dash mass 
expectations. As Hendrix and Brinkman note, even positive responses to food 
riots create ‘expectations that food price interventions will continue, and encour-
age consumers to evaluate the government explicitly in terms of their ability to 
stabilize consumer prices’ (2013: 9). However, this is not necessarily always the 
case, as the five examples in this book will show.
Specific episodes of struggle such as the Egyptian ‘bread riots’ of the price spikes 
era have been linked to ‘threshold’ price rises beyond which violent conflict, or 
mass political struggle, is believed to be more likely (Lagi, Bertrand and Bar-Yam 
2011; Bar-Yam, Lagi and Bar-Yam 2015). The ‘threshold price’ argument reso-
nates with Bellemare’s conclusion that price rises create the conditions for protest 
(2015). Although she notes cautiously that ‘interesting associations between food 
prices and social unrest . . . are just that, and in no way do they imply that food 
prices actually cause social unrest’, Bellemare goes on to conclude that high – 
but not volatile – prices probably do lead to social unrest (2015: 12). Demarest 
observes that the conflict-food riots literature embeds ‘an implicit assumption 
that the causal chain between increasing international food prices and conflict 
runs through food insecurity’. With a reference to the ‘spasmodic’ view of food 
riots, Demarest critiques correlational analyses of insecurity and food, noting that 
these are embedded in an ‘image of a rise of the hungry poor’ (2015: 15). As she 
notes, broad correlations between conflict and food security give us some associa-
tions with wider social, economic and political processes associated with food 
riots, but get us little closer to any mechanisms of cause and effect that might 
justify an interpretation of food riots as leading directly to problems of national 
security. Bush and Martiniello argue that:
The conjunctural reason for conflict may be a spike in food prices but it 
is a mistake to see famines and food insecurity more generally without the 
important historical framing that highlights the structural and longer-term 
reasons behind persistent protest.
(2017: 104)
Localized struggles can diffuse into wider conflicts across a number of mecha-
nisms, including through commercial and popular media, which may disseminate 
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accounts from one discontented population to another, or it can be imagined hav-
ing such an effect. This gives reasons to governments to suppress unrest, through 
appeasement or repression, and will also give a degree of priority to broad food 
security measures. Riots are always dangerous, as E.P. Thompson (1971: 120–122) 
pointed out, involving risk to individuals and often decades of problems for com-
munities. People and authorities usually try to avoid them.
The politics of provisions
National subsistence settlements
This section of the introductory chapter unpicks some of the essential work-
ings of the politics of provisions and ties them into broad processes within the 
global economy. We can think of the politics of provisions as arriving at ‘sub-
sistence settlements’, borrowing from understandings of how more or less inclu-
sive economic growth may be enabled by ‘political settlements’ (Hickey 2013). 
Powerful contending groups agree in some manner on the terms and manner of 
the distribution of power and resources; in this case, subsistence resources. The 
overall balance of power is shaped by the ‘holding power’ of different groups in 
the ever-contested equilibrium, which may include mediating demands from 
constituents who are less powerful individually, but together and with leader-
ship constitute sources of power. Whether the overall settlement is a competi-
tive one or is dominated by a single party will affect who it includes, and how 
it enhances or constrains change and in which domains. The extent to which 
relations between rulers and ruled are clientelistic or impersonalized also shapes 
these outcomes, affecting which policies are chosen and how they are imple-
mented. In addition, the extent to which the substantial powers of the market 
are unleashed or controlled within the settlement affects its stability; for exam-
ple, the degree to which economic regulation or other protectionist activities 
are included.
We have suggested that states have a general interest in ensuring the popula-
tion is sufficiently well fed to reproduce itself. There have been populations for 
whom this was not true, including rebel populations, and that has been the story 
behind a number of famines in the recent past (Biafra 1970, Ethiopia 1973–1974, 
among others [See, in particular, De Waal 1997]). But the general point is that 
states prioritize food security, and will make arrangements to protect it if they can 
because politics are built on these foundations. Not only do subsistence crises 
have a wide range of undesirable political economic impacts, from the point of 
view of elites – they may lead to population displacement as people look for food 
or work elsewhere, depopulating political constituencies and raising the cost of 
agricultural labour — but they also often lead to civil unrest, including violence, 
particularly in urban sites where affected populations are in close community and 
are quick to feel the effect of ‘triggering’ events such as policy announcements or 
police crackdowns. Urban unrest is associated with politicization among affected 
groups and shifts in elite power bases. For essential populations to suffer would 
also signal a state unable to honour its most basic functions, inviting geopolitical 
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interventionists, while food riots can give the appearance of regime vulnerability, 
an invitation to contending elites.
Charles Tilly has shown how the modes by which western elites historically 
sought to manage subsistence challenges changed with the growing complexity of 
the state and society, including the expansion and extension of markets and the 
state (1975). Army provisioning was a major drain on the food system, but in war-
time doubly so. Bureaucracies, the middle classes and, as de-agrarianisation pro-
ceeded, the urban masses all needed to be fed, regularly and well. As economies 
developed, state priorities tended to move towards greater food industrialisation 
and market integration. Agricultural productivity rises and market integration 
meant that progressively, the food system was able to improve people’s access, and 
the old forms of food riot died away with the peasantry. With more urbanisation 
and food trade, blockages and price riots came to be more common forms of food 
contention, reflecting the more commodified relationship between people and 
food, and (therefore) how the state-society relationship had changed.
The marketing of grain, changing with agricultural production methods and 
demand, is a node of conflict throughout European histories of food policy. Lou-
ise Tilly has shown how conflict in France was linked to specific changes in the 
marketing of grain (1971). E.P. Thompson’s ‘English crowds’ similarly contested 
changes in the rules of markets for staples, or the failure by the public authorities 
to abide by them (1971). The present-day association of contemporary food riots 
with global price spikes speaks similarly to this theme of a politics of provisions, 
which is a politics of how food markets should work.
Charles Tilly periodizes the varieties of food contention in Europe, but others 
find it less easy to identify a sequence of food protest repertoires in the global 
system, rather finding them more plural in nature, reflecting the diversity of rela-
tionships to food markets, of political modalities and contingencies, and uneven-
ness in the degree of integration into the global food system (Taylor 1996). The 
sample reviewed here in Chapters 4 (Bangladesh), 5 (Cameroon), 6 (India), 7 
(Kenya) and 8 (Mozambique) reveal no clear pattern of protest repertoire: there 
are price riots, wage strikes, blockages and ‘classic’ food riots (taking over the 
market itself), as well as more polite forms of civic action and media activism 
identified in this recent sample. The politics of provision is affected by capa-
bilities, notably horizontal relationships between those who are suffering food 
shortage, and vertical relationships between the people and authorities (Bohstedt 
2016). The Chapter 6 case study on India by Joshi, Patnaik and Sinha shows 
an example of a vertical relationship in transition, when the waning powers of 
the Communist Party (Marxist) (CPM) that had ruled the state of West Bengal 
for decades was the political moment for a series of intense protests by farmers 
and people on low incomes around the management of the food subsidy system, 
a structure infused with CPM politics across the state. This case is contrasted 
with an example of a remarkable ‘horizontal’ relationship, whereby Adivasi 
tribal groups in Madhya Pradesh, threatened with rising levels of malnutrition, 
protested in alliance with community organisations, larger civil society groups 
and lawyers to generate state responsiveness to their exclusion from welfare and 
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essential services. The story of the Right to Food movement in India shows the 
politics of provisions encompassing ruly and unruly approaches, arriving at and 
sustaining an evolving subsistence settlement.
The kind of responses to crisis that indicate that politics of provision were at 
work were evident on a national scale in all our cases, from repression in Mozam-
bique (Chapter 7) to rapid response in Bangladesh (Chapter 4). Equivalent 
mechanisms of response were also visible at a global scale, for instance, in the 
way the global food aid system was substantially mobilised in 2008 (Bohstedt 
2016; Clapp 2012; Lentz and Barrett 2013). In addition, individual countries 
took specific actions in the global economy – as we show, for example, in the cut-
ting of import tariffs by Cameroon in Chapter 5 and Kenya in Chapter 7; while 
India, as we note in Chapter 6, cut rice exports to protect internal supplies. These 
kinds of action demonstrate the degree to which a given politics of provisions 
has achieved an automatic right to protection for a country’s entire population. 
Understanding how this has come about in each case involves historical analysis, 
including contribution or acquiescence to economic trends over the long term. 
In the following sections, we will look at some of the major driving forces in the 
global economy that have been the result of decades – if not centuries – of back-
and-forth political bargaining within and between states and market actors and 
which are arguably key to even the most local issue of provisioning.
Global food regimes
Food regime theory offers the most systematic explanation of the struggles gener-
ated by contradictions in the corporate food regime, and of the implications of 
global food price spikes, inflation and price volatility for different populations. 
Food regime analysis explains the evolution of the world’s food system in rela-
tion to the needs of capital expansion, identifying the associations of capital 
to ‘particular configurations of geopolitical power’ (McMichael 2009b, 2009a, 
Friedmann 1993). In the historical analysis required by food regime analysis, 
there are distinctively different arrangements for the production, finance, distri-
bution and use of foodstuffs over different parts of the world, depending on the 
needs of labour, war or security and technological development. The food sys-
tem, the foundation of social reproduction, was structured around core economic 
functions like the industrialization of cereal production, the green revolution 
and agricultural intensification, commoditisation of food crops, and the provi-
sion of cheap goods for the low-waged (McMichael 2009b). The first global food 
regime was colonial, with food production outsourced to colonies to feed growing 
European industries. The second regime saw the growth of transnational agri-
business between national farm sectors based on the national model of economic 
development. The third is the corporate food regime, in which mass produc-
tion, standardised foods and global supply chains dominate. Philip McMichael 
claims with considerable justification that each regime and its transitions has 
reshaped the politics of development as well as influencing the direction of tech-
nological and social change. He argues that when, for instance, millions of small 
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farmers are forced to leave the land as it no longer pays in competition with 
global agri-business, they become a ‘reserve army of labour’ for such new com-
plexes as export processing zones, and thus the food regime illuminates not only 
the history of capitalist food relations, but also the history of capitalism itself 
(McMichael 2009a: 281).
Predictably, the precise nomenclature and periodisation of regimes is under 
continuous development, but the idea remains useful to us nonetheless. A post-
2008 food regime has been characterized by an ‘end to cheap food’ (Moore 2014; 
Patel 2012). What has this meant in practice? High and rising food prices wors-
ened the imbalance between work and earnings among the already low-waged. 
Rising fuel prices also increased the costs of farming and provided a source of 
particular grievance to people on low incomes who had to travel for their liveli-
hoods (Hossain, King and Kelbert 2013; Hossain et al. 2015). Volatility and low 
wages are built into the corporate food regime, evidence of the ‘freedom’ of global 
markets at work (McMichael 2009a). This fundamental contradiction, whereby 
‘free markets’ exclude and/or starve populations dispossessed by their very imple-
mentation, characterizes the corporate food regime and is one of the sources of 
today’s food riots. The argument is that the era of globalization has been premised 
on the food regime’s generation of cheap labour for manufacturing, service and 
industrial agricultural sectors, and its supply of relatively cheap industrial foods 
to subsidize labour costs (Patel 2012).
Global food price crisis
In mid-2008, the world wholesale price of a tonne of wheat stood at USD $140, 
triple its price of the previous year. Food prices were 83 per cent higher in 2008 
than they had been in 2005 (Bush and Martiniello 2017). The dramatic rise of 
food prices on global markets that began in late 2007 and peaked in mid-2008 
was followed by an equally dramatic plunge. In 2010–2011, commodity prices 
spiked again. The causes of global food shortages were attributed to poor harvests 
in the main producing areas of Ukraine, Russia and the United States, high fuel 
prices that affected fertiliser use, and diversion of cropland to biofuels (Holt-
Giménez 2008). The price volatility that turned these shortages into a crisis of 
food availability appears to have been caused by the enmeshment of global agri-
cultural systems with the global financial system (Ghosh 2010).
It has been plausibly argued that the reason for the sharpness of the 2008 
spike was not only because of production problems in key producer regions, 
but also because, with deregulation of commodity markets in the early 21st 
century, capital was able to flood out of unstable subprime housing markets and 
into commodity futures and spot pricing as investors looked for new markets 
to which derivatives could be applied (Holt-Giménez 2008). The volume of 
this move raised prices of food and energy with startling rapidity, and when the 
money was shifted out of commodities with the banking collapse, prices fell 
with equivalent force.
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It was the concatenation of food, fuel and financial turbulence that transmit-
ted to retail prices in the developing world. Prices shot up almost everywhere, 
even in countries that depended only to a small degree on food imports, and, 
unlike prices on global markets, retail prices then tended to stay high (Dawe and 
Morales-Opazo 2009; Ghosh 2010; Scott-Villiers et al. 2016). While the global 
food and financial crises seemed to be over by 2012, at national level the crisis 
continued in a new guise of chronic subsistence stress and sustained political 
unrest. This was the case in the global south and north alike, manifesting differ-
ently in each political economic context. The spikes had indicated not merely an 
immediate price problem that could be managed by protection measures (regu-
lating banks, protecting industries and people), but also a deep structural crisis 
in which mechanisms of social reproduction were fractured (McMichael 2010). 
The protests that followed indicated veritable fear that the political economy of 
provisioning had come adrift from natural justice (Patel 2012).
In the period leading up to the crises of 2007–2008, the world economy had 
become increasingly tightly integrated. Trade between industrial economies and 
emerging markets increased dramatically (IMF 2007) and international remit-
tances from rising numbers of migrant workers criss-crossed the planet.3 When, 
in 2007, commodity prices began to peak worldwide and labour remittances fell, 
the effects were transmitted from one country to another. The economic links 
emerged in the country contexts elaborated in this book in different ways. For 
instance, Bangladesh, became the second largest exporter of cheap ready-made 
garments in the world in 2011 (Ahmed and Nathan 2014). In 1998 the industry 
represented 15 per cent of the country’s exports, but by 2011 garments comprised 
50 per cent of exports (ibid.) and by 2013–2014 it had reached 81 per cent.4 The 
contracting world economy exerted downward pressure on wages and conditions, 
while worker struggles and western consumer concerns created a counter pressure. 
In Africa, meanwhile, Mozambique, Kenya and Cameroon posted increasing lev-
els of international investment in energy and agriculture and, with continued 
dependence on export of basic commodities, felt the effects as prices rose and 
fell (UNCTAD 2015). In particular, the volatile prices of food had deleterious 
effects: even though larger producers and traders benefited when prices shot up, 
the majority of the populations in developing countries suffered a dramatic loss 
of purchasing power.
It appears ironic that as the global crisis worsened, aspects of market integra-
tion deepened among the less strong players. Local industries had to make price 
concessions in their struggles to survive wildly volatile prices, falling demand and 
increased competition. Increased integration with global markets at a national 
level was mirrored in the reaction of millions of people on low incomes who, 
faced with rising prices of essentials, went out to raise cash in any way they could, 
through taking on every kind of work regardless of conditions (Scott-Villiers et al. 
2016). With little time, space and energy, they also turned to the market for the 
cheapest food. Their consumption and labour became, in effect, commoditised 
through the effect of the crisis on their bodies and lives, in a process by which 
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‘the struggle to contain the consequences of commodification [led] to the further 
extension of the market’ (Burawoy 2015: 24).
Labour value
As analysed by Farshad Araghi (Araghi 2009: 114), the crisis of global value 
relations is expressed in new time disciplines and demands and lower wages: the 
very value of labour is at stake. How do people experience these moments in 
the process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ that dramatically alter the balance 
between work and the basis of life? The present authors have been exploring these 
issues in related research in ten countries, some of it spanning the years 2009–
2015. This research tried to gather interpretations and accounts of the changes in 
people’s lives after the period of spiky and volatile food prices. This work covered 
three years after the last major global price spike, and listened closely to the views 
of people about how they had adjusted to the realities of considerably higher real 
prices. Some of that research conveyed a very strong sense of squeeze: a combina-
tion of high food costs across all categories, other demands (school expenditures, 
rent), and stagnating or insufficient rises in wages (Hossain, King and Kelbert 
2013). Although in 2017 the popular complaint against inflation has dissipated, 
it has not disappeared but has been channelled into complaints about labour 
value and opportunity (Scott-Villiers et al. 2016). Life has substantially adjusted 
across broad swathes of very diverse populations, and people do more and differ-
ent types of work than in the past, often travelling and juggling considerably to 
keep it all going.
During the years of crisis, low income wages did not automatically adjust to 
the higher prices; rather, it took time and collective action for change to come 
about – and it is arguable that wages never caught up with the rising cost of liv-
ing for the poorest. Much depended on how people were differentially affected 
by macroeconomic forces. Groups like public administration staff, with generally 
strong organizational and strategic presence, were in most countries relatively 
better protected against inflation than those in the more precarious parts of the 
private sector. The evidence on how people viewed inflation suggests a mixed 
story: that poorer people in general disliked inflation but the extent depended 
on the relationship between inflation and unemployment, and how it affected 
their country and their individual efforts. Easterly and Fischer argue that infla-
tion more often tops the list of major national problems for poorer than for 
richer people, and that there are good reasons for this: poorer groups in general 
suffer more from its effects (Easterly and Fischer 2001). Evidence from twenty 
advanced countries took a cyclical view of popular macroeconomic priorities: 
rising and volatile inflation was ‘more costly, and the public put greater emphasis 
on low inflation as prices increase more rapidly’, with great national variation, 
depending on the aggregate costs of these macroeconomic policies under differ-
ent governments. But people similarly became more concerned with unemploy-
ment when that was on the rise (Scheve 2004: 2). Scheve concludes that ‘[t]he 
role of distributive conflict among groups in society is central to debate about 
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this question [of inflation]’ (ibid.:29). In our terms, how much inflation a society 
would tolerate was one of the macroeconomic issues negotiated as part of the 
politics of provisions.
Still other evidence concludes that poorer groups dislike unemployment rela-
tively more than they do inflation, unlike the rich (Jayadev 2008). Jayadev argues 
that this can be explained by class conflict theories of inflation aversion, reflect-
ing the class interests of the rich and the poor. But time horizons also appear 
to matter, because how people judge the present relates to what they expect to 
happen in the future, based in turn on their knowledge of what has happened in 
the past. Analysis of Gallup World Poll data leads Gandelman and Hernandez-
Murillo to conclude that inflation and unemployment
depress the evaluation of the present relative to the evaluation of the future. 
In other words, higher current inflation or unemployment creates the effect 
of improved optimism, not because the future is assessed as more favorable 
but because individuals believe the present looks grimmer.
(2009:119)
It was understandable that high levels of unemployment and inflation, as these 
went together during the global food crisis, should create a sense that the present 
was particularly grim. But the implication of Gandelman and Hernandez-Murillo’s 
findings is that people would view unemployment and inflation as necessarily tem-
porary situations. Perhaps this reflects the intolerable nature of a life living squeezed 
on low pay and ever-higher costs, the impression that society cannot go on indefi-
nitely in such a way. For individuals interviewed in the Life in a Time of Food Vol-
atility project5, the sense of a squeeze included important elements of economic 
psychology: that higher real expenditure made it impossible to save or to plan; a 
sense that wage rises were illusory, as wages bought less than in the past; and a sense 
of not getting better off, despite working harder. Very few people could say their 
earnings were keeping pace with price rises, even as late as 2012 (Hossain, King and 
Kelbert 2013). People who had been involved in protests and riots explained that 
they rioted not because they felt at a dead end, but because they needed to speed up 
the pace of their incorporation into a rights-bearing position in society.
Where wages and earnings proved ‘sticky’, some groups had to struggle to bid 
up wages. Rickshaw pullers in Bangladesh, for instance, reported daily arguments 
over fares as prices rose and passengers sought to keep transport costs low; at one 
time during the 2011 price spike, they went ‘on the rampage’ when their rights 
to ply certain main roads were removed (Rashid, Hasan and Hossain 2012). 
Chapter 4 shows how garments workers’ protests in Dhaka were closely linked 
into the problem of inflation, which had seen their real wages shrink during the 
2000s. There were similar expectations of having ‘to come down to the street’ to 
demand lower food prices, suggesting in addition, an expectation that to do so 
might be effective, if feasible.
It is a tenet of economic theory that ‘wages adjust’ with inflation, and so – 
hopefully before long – everything turns out all right for consumers, but the 
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invisible hand of the market is not always very quick or very fair in its distribu-
tion: wages take time to adjust; how they do adjust – whether through statutory 
inflation-indexing pay or through piecemeal bargaining on the road or the plant 
floor or through riots – may reflect their political or economic importance more 
than how workers’ needs may be changing as a result of higher real costs of living. 
And of course, there is a growing excess: the neediest and most informal may not 
be sufficiently empowered to bid their wages up, and may have already been dis-
possessed of the land, assets and education they might use to achieve their aims. 
Add to this the possibility that it has become harder for the billions of people at 
the base of the pyramid of global inequality and their governments to achieve 
any leverage on a highly financialised economic system (Standing 2016) and it 
appears that perhaps wages do not really adjust for everyone. For one thing, the 
costs of wage adjustments are recouped by employers in the colonisation of the 
workers’ unpaid time: work today can involve more time, less freedom, harder 
labour, more risky migration, more waiting around and higher physical and moral 
risk (ibid.). The costs of such adjustments are real and enduring, and may be 
adverse for long-term wellbeing. For instance, as Sneyd explains in Chapter 5 
and we also learned through our work on the Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility 
project (Hossain et al. 2015; Scott-Villiers et al. 2016), some of these adjustments 
indicate moves towards reliance on increasingly industrialized, low-nutrition 
foods – suggesting a potential hazard, now or soon.
The double movement: protection of the social
Struggles over the key elements of the subsistence settlement – food regime, 
labour value, inflation, unemployment – and political conditions, histories of 
contention and structures that have built up as a result help us to make sense of 
food riots, and how and under what conditions they ‘work’ (Tilly 1975; Bohst-
edt 2010). We think it is only possible to see the change such events bring to 
the marketing of food and to state arrangements when we consider them within 
long economic cycles which themselves contain cycles in the relations between 
protestors and public authorities. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) make a per-
suasive case for exploring longer and wider periods of contention through study of 
how individual events shift, confirm or widen the focus of contention, connect-
ing protestors of similar profiles with each successive articulation of grievance. 
Chapter 9 uses this insight and looks back over the evidence presented in the 
book to uncover the mechanisms that work to bring about such change, and how 
these sequence and interact with one another and with processes of social and 
economic change (such as urbanisation and de-agrarianisation). These processes 
and events are embedded in varying combinations into long haul struggles over 
the distribution of power and resources.
Are we witnessing, in this wave of protests, a resurgence of Karl Polanyi’s 
double movement in response to the dangers of economic liberalism (Block and 
Somers 2014)? Polanyi argued in 1944 that a nation that hoped to govern by 
free markets was a ‘stark utopia’, which ‘could not exist for any length of time 
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without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have 
physically destroyed man and transformed his natural surroundings into a wil-
derness’ (Polanyi 1957: 3). In the light of this, there would be either backlash or 
adjustment to protect this substance. Since liberal markets could not by them-
selves provide the necessities of social reproduction such as good food, air, water, 
education, health and other care, fair treatment in work, and social and personal 
security, this would be done through politics. Money, labour and nature, said 
Polanyi, are false commodities, not things that can be ceaselessly exploited with 
the ebb and flow of demand. When these elements of the lifeworld are subjected 
to market principles, he proposed, social relations are threatened and major cri-
ses to economy and environment will ensue. Polanyi believed that a movement 
towards protection would result, originating in suffering, urged on by disaster 
and riot, and occasioned by the fears (or foresight) of industrial leaders. States 
would move to institutionalise redistribution, recognition and representation 
(Fraser 1997), in part because the suffering multitudes would force attention to 
their needs.
Some have questioned Polanyi’s optimism that a double movement is auto-
matic. As each phase of capital integration succeeds the last at a higher scale of 
complexity and global integration, it becomes less obvious how a single state or 
group of states could evade the logic of the rapacious market and enforce regula-
tion and social protection. Burawoy, for instance, suggests that while Polanyi was 
right to point out the inherent instabilities of laissez-faire and impulses to counter 
movement, the likelihood of state intervention in setting matters to full rights 
never was a given (2015). Polanyi thought that states acted on ideas. Burawoy 
argues that they act on the needs of the moment. He points out that today, ‘a 
countermovement would have to assume global proportions, even as it is built on 
local and national grievances’. States, as market players, are embroiled in keeping 
the markets happy, and ordinary people are also enmeshed in markets for their 
survival. This requires of us an inquiry into what actually might make the double 
movement work in today’s circumstances, a question to which we will turn in 
Chapter 9, the concluding chapter of the book.
The moral economy
A key puzzle is: why were people in all sorts of places not known for mass protest 
suddenly in the streets when prices spiked, often despite the likelihood of state 
repression? What is it about food that might make the double movement begin 
to function again to protect the people from the ravages of a feral economy? 
As a first step, we may turn to the classic work of E.P. Thompson on the moral 
economy of the crowd. His exploration of food protests in 18th century England 
demonstrates that ‘the men and women in the crowd were informed by the belief 
that they were defending traditional rights or customs; and, in general, that they 
were supported by the wider consensus of the community’ (1971: 78). Food riots 
then were triggered by soaring prices and real or perceived malpractices by deal-
ers or millers. The impetus to break rules was grounded in the crowd’s view of 
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social obligation between rich and poor in that society, an obligation that was 
largely shared by the nobility, if not by the industrialists who were benefiting 
from the flood of labour into their newly built factories and the plutocrats and 
dealers who were engaged in international trade in corn and causing prices to 
rise at home. Thompson’s research shows that the behaviour of the crowd tended 
to have clear objectives to draw attention to rights and customs, and acceptable 
degrees of unruliness; in other words, it had its own morality. It was deemed to be 
part of a greater morality relating to fair distribution of the essentials for life. The 
notion of a moral economy that informed protesters and rioters shows up in our 
case studies as applying as much today as it did then, even as the notions of what 
is fair; what part must be played by citizen, market and state; and what tradition 
of governance and law is being called upon has changed and varied with each 
successive era of capitalism and in each of its conquered territories. It is a marked 
feature of moral economic protests that there is often a call for reinstatement 
of an old way of controlling the rapacity of the market, not recognising that 
capital has already moved on and a new phase of relations is now in formation. 
Nonetheless, it would seem that the moral economy serves as the engine for the 
politics of provisions, in which the crowd enunciates both its power and its sense 
of rightness, to authorities that are, in some senses at least, ‘the prisoners of the 
people’ (ibid.:79).
If we are to understand why the moral economy persists through repeated 
cycles of change and across so many different polities and may have the power to 
call forth the double movement at a global scale, we need to go deeper. Beneath 
the straightforward rightness of a morally regulated economy lies a deeper moral 
issue relating to the value of life and its future reproduction. Morality in the end 
is always about what is good for all, not only some. Contemporary protestors, 
north and south, are aware that nature, of which people present and future are a 
part, cannot be infinitely exploited for the benefit of some small part of itself, a 
few well-endowed human beings and their capital arrangements (Moore 2015). 
The moral idea of ‘good for all’ justifies a primordial righteousness when this 
natural law is violated to excess. In the industrialised countries, this was revealed 
in opposition to the primacy of financial capital over social and environmental 
life. In emerging economies, it showed itself in noisy protests calling for fair treat-
ment within a fairly modulated economy.
Damage to people and environment has been a feature of the decline in each 
successive capitalist regime, as Polanyi (1957) pointed out. When the exhaus-
tion of the worker and her lifeworld reaches extraordinary proportions, some-
thing has to give. This seems to be a description of the contemporary moment, 
the time of signal crisis of the neoliberal age (Arrighi 2010). Exhaustion is the 
declining ability to squeeze more productivity out of the industrial workforce, 
the dwindling of new sources of unabsorbed labour and the worn-out worker 
herself, who provides labour to multiple jobs as well as contributing impossi-
ble amounts of unpaid effort to caring for family, home and community, and 
to administering the conditions of her precarious job arrangements (Standing 
2011; Arrighi 2010: 224).
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The moral power of critical events
The signal crisis is a critical event, in the sense that it has generated mass suffer-
ing and will institute new modalities of political action (Das 1995). In country 
after country, the stresses on access to food and employment have changed the 
geography of ordinary life. What was once local for many of the people met dur-
ing the research undertaken for this book – the neighbourhood, the local shops, 
the farm, the town, the city – was suddenly juxtaposed with much more distant 
markets forcing prices up and wages down, leaving people hungry and sweeping 
away traditional social protections. National institutions were forced into the 
arms of global institutions in more or less intricate ways: India did battle with the 
WTO to be entitled to subsidise its agriculture as the United States and Europe 
are allowed to do by its arcane rules; Bangladesh was heavily subsidising its ready-
made garment export industry to keep it internationally competitive; Cameroon, 
with international help, flooded its urban food markets with subsidised Thai rice; 
Kenyan leaders tried to avoid the indictments of the international criminal court 
for post-election violence fuelled, at least in part, by international land grabbing; 
and Mozambique came to tacit agreement with international donors to subsidise 
bread and fuel and with international companies to lease out large tracts of valu-
able agricultural land.
New identities emerged as people moved to protest loss of once-secure assets, 
dwindling patronage and erosion of traditional identity: in rural West Bengal, 
farmers and labourers contested their bureaucratic categorisation and insisted on 
new political identities. Meanwhile, in Madhya Pradesh, a civil society move-
ment to implement a constitutional right to life and its corollary right to food 
was joined by malnourished tribal castes whose identities were transformed from 
isolated and dispossessed categories to deserving citizens of a state that connected 
rural villages to the Supreme Court. In Cameroon and Mozambique, rioters were 
treated as enemies of the state, consolidating their growing identity as an embat-
tled urban class.
Veena Das argues that suffering acts as a narrative trope during such critical 
times, by which the state appropriates the suffering and claims the moral ground 
(ibid.:18). It labels, categorises and eventually, in some way, blames the victims. 
They may be assisted, relieved, reviled, punished or promised (and we give exam-
ples of all of these in this book), but the truth of their experience is attenuated. 
During the global food crisis, millions of people on low and precarious incomes 
experienced and continue to experience hunger and a daily struggle to maintain 
families, houses, farms and employment. Their experience has been abstracted 
into global reports and nutrition figures, their status as human beings and politi-
cal citizens reduced, and their voices silenced. Their poor performance in the 
economy has been ascribed to a failure of will and skill, rather than a massive 
structural disadvantage.
Thus comes the logic of the riot: not beseeching, nor complaining, but a dem-
onstration of presence of ‘the inexistent’ and a reminder of the truth (Badiou 
2012). Riots carried the pain of the common people and the cry for protection 
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into the public space. They also brought, to be sure, the internal power dynam-
ics and violence that flocculate around leadership and voice as much among the 
dispossessed as among any other surging group of humanity. Issues of moral right, 
repertoires of unruly behaviour and episodes of internal and external coercion 
and violence played out in the riots and protests. The ‘community’ (those who 
were suffering) became a new political actor influencing the acts of individuals 
within it (those who protested and those who did not), and in contention with 
other political actors, including those in the market, affecting prices and access, 
as happened in Cameroon; in the courts, by raising claims regarding the right to 
life, as in India’s and Kenya’s public interest cases; and in the state itself, when 
activists found political opportunities to push for changes to constitutions, laws, 
policies, programmes and political discourse.
Das calls for public rituals that would allow the reality of suffering to be prop-
erly incorporated into politics, a move that could make the double movement 
more likely to come about and the moral economy moral once again. She does 
not believe in the ‘simulation’ provided by newspaper articles, government 
reports, legal judgements or statistical categories, but instead calls for incarnation. 
She gives an example. In 1990, six years after the Bhopal poison gas tragedy, the 
incoming Janata government, bypassing (but not contravening) the labyrinthine 
legal and bureaucratic structures that had been set up to categorise victims (and 
ended up blaming them), establish their entitlements and make claims on Union 
Carbide (the company responsible for the fatal leak of methylisocyanate), made 
available a stipend to each of the 106,000 households affected for a period of 
three years. Das explains:
[A]t a stroke the victims were transformed from incompetent, irresponsible 
people to those whose needs for survival were of paramount importance. 
Above all, the limits of judicial and bureaucratic rationality were recog-
nized by the state and it decided to absorb the uncertainties itself rather 
than make victims bear the costs. . . . It was a rare instance of a politically 
humane moment that needs to be recovered, for it affirms existence by its 
very ‘irresponsibility.’
(Das 1995:172–175)
In the chapters that follow this one, we will hear how people called for this 
political humanity in waves of protest. We begin by looking at protests across the 
world during the period in question in order to understand the larger scope of the 
signal crisis of which local riots are a part. Then we turn to a consideration of 
media framing in order to demonstrate not only the considerable power of media 
in the politics of provision, but also the tendency to miss the point about what 
truth the riots offer – a tendency that we hope to overcome in this book. Our five 
country cases show instances when the ruptures prompted instances of political 
humanity and demonstrated the attempts to give birth to a new moral economy. 
They also show how moves towards recognition and redistribution were counter-
acted by other measures that favoured the free market, in part because of vested 
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interests and political calculus, but also because most sections of society in our 
five case countries depended on the market.
Notes
 1 See the “Global Platform on Participation and Protest” (GPPP) http://global-platform.
org, an evolving global documentation of contentious politics between 2006–2013 
based on news and analysis openly available on the internet and still a work in progress.
 2 Dangers of telescoping notwithstanding, news sources can be very useful, as Burke’s 
study shows in Chapter 2. The database created by Burke and her colleagues involved 
careful hand searches to build up an account of particular events within their wider 
struggles, keeping in mind the advice of Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam to develop interac-
tive and dynamic models of contention (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2008; C. Tilly 2008).
 3 Financial integration in 2007 was not universal. Industrialised economies were highly inte-
grated, and the banking crisis transmitted rapidly from one rich country to another. Middle- 
and low-income countries were far less exposed, and felt the effects of the financial crisis 
primarily through its volatile effect on commodity prices including energy and food.
 4 Bangladesh Financial Express, 17 May 2015, http://print.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/ 
2015/05/17/92935/print (accessed 13 March 2017).
 5 The Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility project was a four-year collaboration between 
Oxfam; the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, UK; University 
College Cork, Ireland; and research partners in ten focus countries: Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Vietnam and Zambia. 
It was financed by the UK Department of International Development and Irish Aid. 
The research involved yearly return visits to twenty-three urban and rural communities 
in ten countries, and analysis of national and international food data.
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2 A world in protest
Sara Burke
Introduction
During the time period covered by the Food Riots and Food Rights project, 2007–
2012, the world registered a dramatic eruption of protests on many issues, includ-
ing food. The protests were largely non-violent, but during these years episodes 
reported as “riots” and “violent protests” also occurred. These spiked to historic 
levels in 2008, 2011 and 2012 in response to price hikes for basic commodities 
necessary to life: fuel, water and especially food. Protests for subsistence have not 
been well understood, as they were not well covered in international news due to 
systematic biases in professional media organizations, which tend to ignore non-
violent protests – or the nonviolent parts of protests – and also fail to distinguish 
between acts that harm lives and those that harm property, as well as labeling 
“violent” both riots and protests violently repressed by the state.
This chapter aims to show how the historical eruption of protests through-
out the period can be understood as a response to the stormy political economy 
of the time.1 To many critics of the dominant economic paradigm, that time is 
best understood as the forseeable outcome of neoliberalism, what classical politi-
cal economists Gérard Dúmenil and Dominique Lévy’s 2011 book The Crisis of 
Neoliberalism characterizes as a globalized system of “free-market economics, free 
trade, and the free mobility of capital”, literally a “new liberalism” and corre-
sponding social order in which financialization propels a managerial apparatus 
that disciplines labor with greater and greater intensity (Dúmenil and Lévy 2011: 
35). “Neoliberalism” as a term of art, is typically counterposed to “globalization”. 
Proponents of inclusive, managed globalization have approached the period with 
a critique of its policy paradigm, the so-called “Washington Consensus”, which 
Keynesian Joseph Stiglitz characterized in his 2002 book Globalization and its Dis-
contents as the point at which growth, privatization and liberalization became 
ends in themselves, rather than means toward a more equitable distribution that 
benefits even the poor (Stiglitz 2002). Neoclassical economist John Williamson, 
originator of the term “Washington Consensus”, frequently complained that 
the set of ten policies he felt were widely held in Washington based institutions 
like the IMF, World Bank and U.S. Treasury in 1989–1990 (e.g. fiscal discipline, 
reorientation of public expenditures, tax reform, financial liberalization, unified 
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and competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, openness to direct foreign 
investment, privatization, deregulation and secure property rights) were good 
policies for Latin America at that time, but had been subsequently expanded 
by both proponents and critics into a generalized policy prescription he had not 
originally intended, although he didn’t necessarily disagree with it (Williamson 
2004: 1, 22).
Whether classical, neoclassical or Keynesian in theoretical orientation2 and 
regardless of their differing perspectives, these economists agree on the signifi-
cance of the period’s economic growth and the corresponding role of liberali-
zation, financialization and deregulation in shaping the political economy of 
the time. Two economic events of great magnitude in the commodities and 
financial markets took place that were driven by these very forces. Like storms 
rolling in from opposite horizons in 2007–2008, historically high commodity 
prices hit the global economy just as mortgage-based finance began its historic 
collapse. Flaunted profits and conspicuous consumption, which accompanied 
both the commodities boom and the financial crisis, enraged populations, 
which believed a tacit contract between citizens and state had been broken 
when basic economic needs were priced out of reach (Hossain et al. 2014). 
This crisis of the “moral economy” affected not only food and fuel protests 
in 2007–2008 and 2011–2012, but also helps us understand why one of the 
key demands coming out of the so-called Arab Spring, the Movement of the 
Squares in Europe and the Occupy movement that began on Wall Street and 
spread to many cities was the demand for “real democracy” in the face of unac-
countable governments.
To better examine these crises in the political and moral economy, we will 
draw from a data set on protests and political participation in the period 2006–
2013 that was created by the author and a multilingual research team between 
2013 and the present, outlining the main findings from this global study of 
protests.3 This data set, which coincidentally overlaps 2007–2012 by one year 
at the beginning and end of the period, is also the basis of an analysis of 843 
protest events4 appearing in more than 500 news sources available on the 
internet, and in 84 countries representing more than 90 per cent of the world 
population (Ortiz et al. 2013). It takes note of main grievances and demands, 
who and how many were protesting and where, what methods/repertoires they 
used, who their opponents or targets were and what resulted from the episode 
of protests – not only in terms of meeting the goals of a campaign, but also in 
terms of negative or positive unintended consequences such as repression on 
the one hand, or the creation of new movements, groups or political parties 
on the other. The main phases in the political economy of the time break 
down into three parts of roughly two-year duration each – boom and bust 
(2007–2008), stimulus (2009–2010) and contraction (2011–2012). After first 
outlining main and relevant findings from the protests study, we will analyze 
the emergence of protest episodes during the three phases to better understand 
















Wages and labor condions


























































































































































































































What becomes clear when we look at trends between 2006–2013 is that protests 
and protest movements were increasing in every geographic region and in every 
country income group (Ortiz et al. 2013: 12–13; Carothers and Youngs 2015: 
22–23). The leading cause of all protests was a cluster of grievances against aus-
terity policies and for economic justice that included demands to reform public 
services and pensions, create good jobs and better labour conditions, make tax 
collection and fiscal spending progressive, reduce or eliminate inequality, allevi-
ate low-living standards, enact land reform and ensure affordable food, energy and 
housing (Figure 2.1). The key demand in a second cluster of grievances relating to 
failure of political representation and political systems was for “real democracy”. 
It was also the single demand found most in world protests of the period and was 
counterposed to the actually-existing, corrupt and dysfunctional representative 
democracies that were increasingly faulted during this period for serving elites 
and private interests and for failing to stop growing economic inequality. Along 
with protests against corporate influence on government, deregulation, privatiza-
tion and corruption, the demand for real democracy was coming from every kind 
of political system, not only authoritarian administrations but also representative 
democracies, old and new.
A third cluster, of globally organized – or globally aspirational – protests, 
was less coherent than the other clusters, but encompassed rising environmen-
tal and climate movements, some aspects of Occupy and the Movement of the 
Squares, some indigenous movements and the ongoing alter-globalization move-
ment against free trade and multinational agribusiness, as well as the burgeon-
ing open internet/internet commons movement of whistleblowers, leakers and 
anarchist-hackers.
Whistleblowers, leakers and anarchist-hackers
This movement includes actors as diverse as Samuel Provance, who 
exposed U.S. military torture in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2006, as 
well as whistleblowers/leakers Mark Klein, Thomas Drake and Edward 
Snowden, who each revealed aspects of U.S National Security Administra-
tion domestic spying (Warren and Dirksen 2014: 72–74) and military intel-
ligence analyst U.S. Army Cpl. Bradley Manning,5 who leaked 750,000 
classified and sensitive military and diplomatic documents in early 2010 
to raise awareness of the human costs of war. These leaks, which came to 
be known as the “Iraq War Logs” (Wikileaks 2010a) and “Afghan War 
Diary” (Wikileaks 2010b), were published on the website Wikileaks by self- 
proclaimed “cypherpunk” Julian Assange (Assange et al. 2012). While 
each of these agents acted independently, the hacktivism movement coa-
lesced around the group Anonymous, which – among a variety of vigilante 
actions in different countries – protested the authorities’ mishandling of 
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a rape and sexting case in Nova Scotia, Canada, resulting in the subse-
quent suicide of victim Rehtaeh Parsons. Anonymous hackers determined 
the identies of the perpetrators and threatened to expose them if relevant 
government and law enforcement authorities did not hold them account-
able to the rule of law (CTV News Atlantic 2013; Slifer 2013; Kotz 2013; 
Griner 2014). The activities of the movement contributed to an upsurge 
of interest in acts of solidarity such as mutual aid and building a global 
information commons, but in the case of the Wikileaks and the revelations 
of Edward Snowden, also inadvertently acted as catalysts to world events 
that became violent or were met with violence, beginning with Wikileaks’ 
impact on the Arab Spring. In Tunisia, the population was already roiled 
by these leaks when Wikileaks published a U.S. dispatch with damning 
footage of their leaders’ opulence and decadence within weeks of when the 
revolution began (we explore this further in the section on Contraction).
A fourth cluster of grievances and demands framed in the language of rights 
(human, civil, racial, religious, labour, women’s, indigenous, LGBT rights and 
so on), also emerges. During the period we are concerned with, especially 2011–
2012, demands for rights seem to be fewer in number than the other demand clus-
ters. An exception is demands for labor rights and “subsistence rights” to food and 
fuel; this is most likely because both encompass economic as well as civil/political 
demands. Labor does so for both wages and freedom of association. Demands for 
subsistence are made for the implied contract between people and government 
that “the price of basic commodities such as food and fuel does not rise beyond 
the reach of ‘the ordinary person’ ” (Musembi and Scott-Villiers 2014: 36).
What the majority of protests of this period have in common – regardless of 
where they took place, where the governments they challenged fell on the politi-
cal spectrum or whether protesters were violent or not – is that they reveal fail-
ures of economic and social development and a demand for democracy that is 
capable of meeting people’s economic needs with effective policies and laws. In 
the aftermath of a powerful economic crisis that reverberated from the core of 
the global economy to the periphery, and with terror and armed conflict going on 
in many parts of the globe, the repression of protests amidst growing economic 
and social inequalities contributed strongly to a loss of faith in official political 
processes and usual political actors.
A closer look at who was protesting, and how, reveals not only the traditional 
trade unions and activists from NGOs, but also middle-class protesters of all ages, 
from students to pensioners, who did not consider themselves activists but nev-
ertheless did not trust the current political and economic system. Beginning in 
2011, they joined movements in the streets in large numbers, not only in sanc-
tioned marches and rallies, but in a new framework of protest that included direct 
actions such as “riots”, road blockages and occupations of city streets and squares 
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Contrary to public perception about rioting, actual protester violence was 
a small part of overall protests, although a not-insignificant number of violent 
protests involved self-harm, desperate methods such as hunger strikes or self-
immolation of the kind that sparked the protests in 2010 leading to revolution in 
Tunisia. Nevertheless, not only riots and other violent acts, but more than half of 
protest episodes globally experienced some sort of repression in terms of arrests, 
injuries or deaths at the hands of authorities, or subsequent surveillance of sus-
pected protesters and groups, which both governments and private corporations 
carried out. Of reported riots, almost half were in low income countries, mostly 
prompted by spikes in food and energy prices (Ortiz et al. 2013: 12). We turn to 
this issue in more detail in the next section.
The data informing the Global Platform on Participation and Protest does 
not represent an algorithm-driven approach, nor does it attempt an exhaustive 
“big-data scooping” of protests, which typically still relies on rough categories 
of actors’ behaviors to encode information.6 While the field of data analytics is 
evolving rapidly, as of late 2014 none of the few public, data-driven resources on 
protests at the global level – such as the Global Database of Events Language and 
Tone (Leetaru 2014), which predicts events of protest and conflict by analyzing 
people’s feelings as expressed online – has allowed researchers to “drill down” to 
the level of individual, citable sources or to trace complex processes in which 
multiple new actors made demands on various local, national and international 
opponents, sometimes in multi-year campaigns (Barrada 2014). The quality of 
the “big data” available as of 2013–2014 was therefore not sufficient to explain 
why and how the new waves of protests during this period had emerged.
What the Global Platform on Participation and Protest’s hand-curated 
approach captures best are months- or years-long episodes of protest whose 
impact was both newsworthy (in other words, it was reported in major national or 
international media) and for which strong evidence of grievances and demands is 
documented in protesters’ own words in local or alternative news sources or social 
media. This dual-sourced approach was an attempt to guard against known bias in 
mainstream news coverage by querying not only international but also local news 
and activist sources available on the internet (Musembi and Scott-Villiers 2014). 
In hindsight in early 2017, another bias emerges for which social scientists, espe-
cially those studying social movements, are only beginning to correct. This has 
been a tendency to focus on left-wing social movements oriented to human rights 
and social justice at the expense of greater examination of the right-wing move-
ments for denial of rights and nationalist protectionism that have formed before 
our eyes during this period, and which now overshadow many of the progressive 
movements that arose in 2010–2011.7
The politics that arise from the indignation of having to protest for something 
as basic as food flows directly from the impact on populations when the implicit 
contract between people and governments to keep basic economic needs within 
reach – a key tenet of the moral economy – has been broken (Hossain et al. 
2014; Musembi and Scott-Villiers 2014). This is a ritualized and indirect poli-
tics that must not be taken uncritically at face value. Reports of violence that 
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tar and discredit legitimate protests must be scrutinized: which agents incited 
the violence, and how? The targets of food protests are almost always national 
governments, but international forces working on those governments through 
trade deals, tax competition, debt servicing and financial regulation should not 
escape responsibility. Why? This entire constellation of actors – the protesters, 
national governments, international organizations, national and international 
media – have a role in determining whether protests for subsistence are treated as 
legitimate grievances requiring governmental or intergovernmental response, or 
as conflicts to be put down (Burke 2015).
Boom and bust (2007–2008)8
In the early 2000s, financialization was rapidly increasing in every region, but 
especially in high-income countries where falling labor share of GDP forced 
workers to take on personal debt to finance living standards, much of which was 
with imported goods from developing countries, in the face of falling real wages 
and rising inequality (Duménil and Lévy 2011: 179; Dünhaupt 2013; Gindin 
2013; Palley 2007). Non-financial firms contributed to the trend, embracing lev-
eraged financialization of major portions of their profits in lieu of traditional rein-
vestment in the firm and payouts to shareholders (Duménil and Lévy 2011: 126, 
Rude 2005: 86). Alongside these developments, the historic commodities boom 
that began in 2000 fueled economic growth in developing countries up until the 
2007–2008 economic crisis, which reverberated from the core of the global econ-
omy in 2007–2008 to the periphery in 2008–2009 and, for a few years, effectively 
stopped the commodities boom in its tracks (Erten and Ocampo 2012).
Prior to the crash, manufacturing and trade soared in the BRICS countries, 
particularly China and India, where the long economic expansions, as of 2007, 
were compared by IMF to the post-World War II experience of fast growing Euro-
pean economies, Japan and the newly industrializing economies in Asia (IMF 
2007: 173). Following the 1997 currency crisis, Asian economies that borrowed 
from IMF had bristled at what they considered harsh and excessive conditional-
ity by the institution. Consequently, during the 2000 commodity boom, coun-
tries throughout Asia accumulated trillions of U.S. dollars in foreign exchange 
reserves as “self-insurance” so that they would never again have to appeal to 
the IMF for bailouts (Lin and Treichel 2012: 24). These reserves contributed 
to global imbalances that, alongside housing bubbles in the United States and 
Europe and a lack of regulation in the financial sector at all levels, led to vola-
tility in the global economy (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009). These were arguably 
foreseeable outcomes of contradictions in the neoliberal globalization project on 
which economic arrangements were premised: free trade without free immigra-
tion, growth and deregulation without universal social protection, financializa-
tion exacerbating inequalities within and between countries and groups.
By mid-2007, as commodity prices had skyrocketed, a financial crisis was stir-
ring quietly in the housing markets of the U.S. and Europe (Pisani-Ferry and 
Sapir 2009: 9). It continued to build through the autumn and winter in spite of 
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a discreet series of coordinated central bank swaps aiming to curtail the toxic 
effects of exposure to exotic financial instruments at the heart of sub-prime hous-
ing loans (Rude 2010). By late September 2008, sub-prime’s quiet turmoil had 
erupted full-force into the public sphere, with failed banks, frozen credit markets 
and political upheaval on both sides of the Atlantic.
The immediate aftermath of the banking collapse focused on damage con-
trol. In Ireland, this served banking interests: on October 1, 2008 without any 
public debate, the government guaranteed the debt of the six largest financial 
institutions and just a few months later announced public spending cuts. In Ice-
land, protesters ensured the crisis response was in the public interest: banks were 
nationalized on October 6, 2008; IMF and European Union loans were procured; 
and the Prime Minister was forced to resign and make way for a center-left gov-
ernment that formed in early 2009 on a vow to rebuild the economy (Guillén 
2015).
From the eruption of this trans-Atlantic crisis in mid-September 2008, hardly 
a month passed before the regional crisis raised global alarm. The result was an 
upgrade to the Group of 20 (G20) from a gathering of finance ministers and 
central bankers to a summit of heads of state. By the time U.S. President George 
W. Bush welcomed anxious G20 presidents and prime ministers to Washington, 
D.C. in mid-November 2008, the global financial system had lost capacity to 
take even the simplest steps to convert corporate savings into investment, home 
building, personal consumption or development. In contrition, the G20 issued 
a declaration promising to address root causes, take coordinated actions and 
reform financial markets through transparency, accountability, sound regulation, 
prudential oversight, risk management, integrity (of markets) and international 
cooperation (G20 2008).
The first order effects of this crisis, which devastated financial markets in the 
United States, United Kingdom and European Union, were largely contained 
by the quick G20 interventions to segregate commercial and investment bank-
ing, exchange information for better international tax cooperation and discuss 
principles for sound executive compensation, along with other measures to curb 
short-term excessive-risk taking (Rude 2010: 1–3). Alarm catalyzed cooperation 
among governments, and between governments and finance, but since the crisis 
unfortunately did not end with financial market recovery, its second- and third-
order effects began to hit ordinary citizens in the U.S., U.K. and E.U. in the form 
of collapsing savings and pensions, falling incomes, unemployment, foreclosures, 
homelessness and lack of access to food, clean water and medical care (UN 2011: 
65–66).
Middle-income and low-income developing countries were also affected as 
commodity price indices first spiked and then became radically volatile over the 
next few years. Trade was hit hard; slower growth dampened manufacturing and 
export prospects. People living in lower middle- and low-income countries faced 
multidimensional poverty, few decent work opportunities and economically com-
pelled migration, on top of rising inequalities in many countries (Moghadam, 
Cottarelli and Blachard 2011: 8–9; World Bank 2011: 11). For large parts of the 
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world population, hopeful development outcomes and peaceful globalization 
premised on the United Nations’ (UN) 2000 Millennium Development Goals 
and the subsequent “Monterrey Consensus” of all UN heads of state in 2002, 
were hamstrung by unmet promises of official development aid from high income 
countries, and the crisis in G20 countries made it all the more likely those prom-
ises would remain unfulfilled. Poverty in developing countries persisted despite 
growth fueled by the commodities boom in the first part of the decade. Corrup-
tion in governments reinforced that trend, as did sophisticated tax avoidance 
by multinational companies, which deprived developing countries of resources 
needed to provide essential social services for their populations.
Almost two years passed between the emergence of the crisis in 2007 – which 
built slowly and in an almost hidden way throughout 2007 and until mid-2008, 
fueled in part by historically high commodity prices – and the crisis’ explosion 
into the public sphere when Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy on Septem-
ber 15, 2008.9 For this time period, 2007–2008, there are ninety-eight protest 
episodes in the GPPP database that shed considerable light on the main issues 
driving protests in the build-up to the economic crash. They relate primarily to 
economic grievances, rights and failures of political representation.
Discontent around economic grievances found sharp expression in Egypt in 
2007, when, after a year-long series of labor actions, striking textile workers from 
the largest public sector textile company in the country occupied their factory 
and won major concessions from the government, including bonuses, corruption 
investigations and the participation of the government in direct negotiations for 
the first time in years (GPPP 2017b, BBC News 2010, Bisgaard-Church 2007; 
Kenyon 2007). Internationally notable labor struggles also occurred among low-
skilled workers in Bangladesh (GPPP 2017c) and among highly skilled workers 
in Australia (GPPP 2017d). The data from 2007–2008 also capture burgeoning 
discontent in countries that had already begun to implement austerity, such as 
Greece, where hundreds of thousands protested privatization, wage caps, pension 
restructuring and the shutdown of public media that were part of a reform of ail-
ing public institutions beginning in early 2007 (GPPP 2017e, f).
In hindsight, mobilizations of 2007–2008 also revealed growing social divi-
sions in the interpretation of rights, such as in Poland where opposing groups 
demonstrated for and against tightening abortion laws (GPPP 2017g), and in 
Tunisia, where workers’ movements were joined by unemployed youth and stu-
dents, staging multiple strikes to protest their right to affordable food, an unjust 
employment policy and corruption (GPPP 2017h). In China (GPPP 2017i) 
and in indigenous communities throughout the Americas (GPPP 2017j), there 
were large and ongoing environmental rights protests. There were also protests 
against Islamic extremists in Algeria (GPPP 2017k). There were calls for a pan-
European movement for immigration restrictions in Denmark, Germany and 
the U.K. (GPPP 2017l), while in largely Muslim Malaysia, Hindus protested 
religious discrimination (GPPP 2017m). The global anti-sexism protest group, 
FEMEN, also got its start in Ukraine among anti-sex trafficking activists in 2008 
(GPPP 2017n).
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Some protests presented nascent challenges to the state, as when Irish citi-
zens protested the illegitimate socialization of debt (GPPP 2017o) and Italians 
protested government handling of the economic recession (GPPP 2017p). Addi-
tional protests, unified by grievances against corruption, unaccountability and 
failures of representation, are found in 2007–2008 in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bra-
zil, Cameroon, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Slovenia 
and Tunisia (GPPP 2017q). Icelanders protesting the financial crisis went all the 
way and toppled their government (GPPP 2014r), while Anonymous and the 
internet culture of hackers, leakers and whistleblowers in high-income countries 
emerged as a surprising force for exposing government and private corruption 
(GPPP 2017s).
There is also evidence of food riots, which are anchored in both rights and fail-
ure of political representation, in every region. While they occurred primarily in 
lower middle-income and low-income countries, there is evidence that in 2007–
2008 food riots were reported in every country income group, even high-income 
countries like the United Arab Emirates, due to immigrant workers’ grievances 
about wages and prices (GPPP 2017t). The Global Platform search for protests 
related to food prices lists 19 episodes during 2007–2008, in Argentina, Bang-
ladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Somalia 
and Uzbekistan (GPPP 2017u).
The high degree of global integration that food and agricultural systems had 
attained after years of structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s had oriented 
developing countries’ agricultural production toward export, making them vul-
nerable in the 2000s to price rises due to commodity speculation and the further 
degradation of food supplies when food crops were substituted for biofuel produc-
tion (UN 2011). Many food- and fuel-price protests of the period were directly 
related to the removal of subsidies and increases in regressive taxes as a result of 
the expansion of austerity measures, such that by the end of the period we are 
examining – not only in Europe but in over 100 countries, many of them low 
income – public expenditures were contracting (Balakrishnan, Elson and Patel 
2009; UN 2011; Ortiz and Cummins 2013).
Against this backdrop, commodity prices began to rise more sharply begin-
ning in January 2007 (Figure 2.3). By the end of that month, so-called “tortilla 
riots” were reported in Mexico (Table 2.1), as farmers protested price rises due to 
implementation of the final stages of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(Schneider 2008: 41–42). In the ensuing months, commodity prices continued to 
climb, setting off miners’ strikes and food price protests in Peru (Schneider 2008: 
46–47). Finally in July, commodity prices reached a peak worldwide and food 
riots continued. By the end of 2007, food riots had also been reported in India 
(August), Morocco, Uzbekistan (September), China, Mauritania, and Senegal 
(November); by the end of 2008, additional riots or violent protests for affordable 
food had been reported in at least 22 countries (Table 2.1).
The wave of protests for food and subsistence rights emerges as the single most 
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98 episodes in the GPPP dataset for 2007–2008, 19 (19.4 per cent), in almost 
as many countries, explicitly list food prices as a primary grievance driving the 
protests, and characterize the incident as violent. This is in contrast to the trend 
over the entire data set of 2006–2013, in which only 30 episodes (6.3 per cent) 
were driven by food price grievances. It also contrasts with the trend from 2007–
2012, in which there are 27 episodes (7.9 per cent). In other words, when we 
examine the whole period, riots do not predominate, but when we focus in on 
the roughly two-year runup to the economic crisis that began to engulf the global 
economy in late 2008, they stand out as the dominant response to the global 
economic turmoil. The riots of 2007–2008 were often not as violent as portrayed: 






































for example, when Al Jazeera reported in September 2007, “Morocco rolls back 
bread price hike: violent protests force government to withdraw 30 per cent hike 
in bread prices”, it failed to give an accurate picture of the character of the pro-
test, which had been organized by Moroccan Association for Human Rights as a 
peaceful sit-in (Al Jazeera 2007). Violence would likely have come only from the 
police crackdown, if at all.
More than mere media bias, this sort of mischaracterization had become a key 
part of the ritualized and indirect system by which people held governments to 
account for disregarding the “moral economy” in which governments safeguard 
populations against the erosion of basic economic needs, particularly food (Hos-
sain et al. 2014; Musembi and Scott-Villiers 2014). Like food protests, the protests 
of 2011 in Tunisia, Greece, Egypt, Spain, Portugal, Italy, the U.S. and beyond 
were fundamentally against an immoral and unaccountable global economy and 
inept, aloof, corrupt or authoritarian national governments. Despite their lack of 
a sophisticated network, food protests became the dominant mode of agitation 
for accountability during the commodities boom and financial bust of 2007–2008. 
That is when riots in poor and developing countries were an immediate result. 
Three years later, as the economic crisis evolved from the over-leveraged banking 
sectors in North Atlantic countries before the crisis, to coordinated global stimu-
lus post-crisis in 2009–2010, to a split between countries in the G20 on stimulus 
versus austerity policies mid-2010, the effects on growth, trade, financialization, 
unemployment and inequality set the stage for a set of sharp new agitations for 
accountability to arise: the Movement of the Squares, Arab Spring, and Occupy.
Stimulus (2009–2010)10
When the simmering financial crisis finally erupted in the autumn of 2008, G20 
countries agreed on economic stimulus to boost aggregate demand to salvage 
GDP growth (G20 2008). The effect was primarily positive, but limited, since 
rehabilitated banks that sat on large cash reserves could still not be enticed to 
lend, and economic growth rebounded slowly when at all. Vast public resources 
were directed to bail out private banks considered “too big to fail”, pushing the 
losses onto taxpayers and causing sovereign debt levels to rise, which in turn 
impeded economic growth (Ortiz and Cummins 2013: 37). Even if stimulus was 
slowing the negative social impacts of the crisis and contributing to economic 
turnaround in a way that technocrats could applaud, it did not feel that way to a 
lot of ordinary citizens of affected countries.
Developing countries that were experiencing the ongoing negative effects of 
the crisis on growth and trade worried that the falling fortunes of rich countries 
would prevent them from receiving official development assistance. Promises 
made at the United Nations Summit in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002 for developed 
countries to provide aid to developing countries amounting to 0.07 per cent of 
GDP per year were mostly forgotten, and those countries that kept their promises 
provided less aid in absolute terms as their GDPs fell to the lowest point in the 
first quarter of 2009 (Stiglitz 2009: 98). In response, the UN held in mid-2009 
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the Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on 
Development. The expert commission advising the conference recommended 
that the UN create a “Global Economic Coordination Council” to ensure that 
the needs of all countries, and not only the G8 or G20, would be taken into 
account in the crisis response (Stiglitz 2009: 87). Not surprisingly, the recom-
mendations of the commission regarding impacts on development and multilat-
eralism did not have much weight in the international institutions or the G20, 
which managed the crisis response.
Amidst speculation in early 2009 that a set of debt troubled countries were in 
danger of default, the E.U. ordered Ireland and Greece to reduce their budget 
deficits, which generated political turmoil and public anger, and it put France 
and Spain on notice that they should be prepared to do the same (Barber 2009). 
Late in 2009, Greece finally set off a crisis throughout the Eurozone when its new 
Socialist prime minister accused the previous government of concealing exces-
sive borrowing; this coupled with a sharp downgrading of Greece’s debt sparked 
concerns about the financial health of other euro area countries (Mongelli 2013: 
18). Before long the debt-troubled countries were being dubbed the “PIIGS” 
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain) – vilified in contrast to the rising BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), and subject to more and more strin-
gent terms of austerity in return for bailouts that did not even resolve their prob-
lems (BBC News 2010).
By mid-2010, the Euro was falling and Greece had received the first of several 
bailouts, although protesters stormed the Acropolis shortly after to protest the 
austerity measures demanded in the terms of the bailout (Smith 2010). Since 
2008, the G20’s initiative for regulation of big banks had stalled far short of the 
comprehensive, counter-cyclical policies needed to make the global financial sys-
tem less volatile. By the time of the 2010 summit in Toronto, the consensus on 
stimulus had crumbled. Europe embraced contraction, while the U.S. and U.K. 
persisted with stimulus (Ortiz and Cummins 2013: 11). Shortly before year’s end, 
Ireland revealed that the cost of its early 2009 Anglo Irish Bank bailout would 
push its budget deficit to unsustainable levels; the government then applied for 
bailout funds from the IMF and E.U. and began a new round of budgetary con-
traction (Whelan 2013: 13–15).
For 2009–2010, there are 92 protest episodes in the GPPP database. The 
majority of these concern economic needs and democratic reforms, especially the 
reform of public services – since austerity intensified in Greece (GPPP 2017v) 
and Ireland (GPPP 2017w) even while stimulus was still advocated within G20 
until 2010. Other key demands were for tax justice and living wages. Protests for 
real democracy appear at this time in at least 17 countries, and in virtually every 
region (GPPP 2017x). Widening inequalities between groups in many countries 
and global inequalities exacerbating geopolitical tensions set the stage for pro-
tests to explode in 2011, first in Tunisia and then in Egypt, when hundreds of 
thousands filled their streets and squares demanding the removal of corrupt lead-
ers, but there were still fissures, especially in Tunisia and Egypt, that had gone 
undetected. United Nations Human Development Reports and World Bank World 
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Development Reports from 2009 and 2010 forecast upbeat development prospects 
for both countries. Tunisia boasted high rates of internet connectivity and on 
the eve of the revolution may have had the highest rate of Facebook users in the 
world (Bachrach 2011), but its development plan to transition to a knowledge-
based economy was hampered by inequality, a lack of financial inclusion and 
high rates of youth unemployment, on top of growing religious/secular divisions. 
Egypt, with its powerhouse cotton and textiles sectors and a growing financial 
sector, had many development projects on the books in 2010, from microfinance 
to airports and wind power (World Bank 2010: 29). But inequality, government 
corruption and the brutal repression of years of strikes by textile workers and 
others in the Nile Delta left the population impoverished. Both populations felt 
the sting of unequal societies and were angered by the lack of accountability and 
displays of conspicuous wealth of their leaders.
Hacks and leaks played a role in “turning up the heat” on events in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa (MENA). In Tunisia in particular, where the popula-
tion had already been roiled by Wikileaks’ release of the “Iraq War Diaries” and 
related leaks, a dispatch from the U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia went public shortly 
before the fateful self-immolation by college graduate/street fruit-seller Moham-
med Bouazizi in December 2010. In it the ambassador describes a visit to Presi-
dent Ben Ali’s son-in-law, whose opulent estate boasts a tiger that “consumes 
four chickens a day” and desserts flown in from Saint-Tropez (Bachrach 2011). 
Between Al Jazeera, Facebook and “Tunileaks” a site that mirrored the Tunisian-
relevant postings of Wikileaks, Tunisians voraciously consumed this news of con-
spicuous consumption by a hated member of the elites: Bouazizi’s suicidal protest 
was a critical spark on a powderkeg. Before 2010 had ended, the trade unions, 
particularly the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), played a cen-
tral and decisive role in brokering a mostly peaceful transition in which Ben Ali 
stepped down and Islamist parties began to participate in governing alongside 
secular parties (Yousfi 2013).
Contraction (2011–2012)11
The stage had been set for serious budgetary contraction following the period of 
coordinated stimulus from late 2008 through early 2010, when the North Atlan-
tic countries and international financial institutions were entirely focused on 
bank bailouts and preventing economic spillovers, but the sharp downturn in 
growth of GDP, which became negative growth in the advanced economies in 
2009, was felt in all parts of the world (Figure 2.4). By early 2010, the IMF had 
signaled a major shift in its policy recommendations toward fiscal consolidation – 
contraction – to be attained through cuts in health and education entitlements, 
eliminating subsidies and increasing tax revenues in both countries in recovery 
and those on shakier ground (Blanchard, Cottarelli and Viñals 2010; Cottarelli 
2010). The OECD advice soon shifted accordingly, as the consensus emerged in 
the most advanced economies of the E.U. that the stimulus had run its course and 




































































































































































































































These shifts of policy outlook brought about disunity within the G20 on the 
need for ongoing stimulus, and enabled governments in the most advanced econ-
omies to shift blame for the crisis onto government spending and growing debt 
burdens, which were outcomes and not causes of the crisis (Ortiz et al. 2015: 8–9; 
Ní Chasaide 2013: 86–90). This shift to austerity and the growing debt crises in 
southern Europe continued to roil the E.U., even as GDP growth estimates for 
Africa, Asia and Latin America were going down and threatening development 
gains made over the previous decade due to falling asset prices, higher borrowing 
costs, capital flight and decreased exports (Li 2010: 55–57).
There were also geopolitical costs. The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions 
overturned an informal arrangement between MENA countries and the Euro-
pean powers in which, in exchange for entry into the E.U., southern European 
states would vigorously enforce E.U.-wide immigration policies. In this period, 
immigrants in question were primarily from sub-Saharan Africa and Syria, mov-
ing through southern Europe to get to Germany or other northern E.U. states. 
In implicit exchange for development aid, countries along the southern Mediter-
ranean coast, especially the Maghreb, agreed to readmit their nationals. This 
arrangement effectively pitted Northern Europe against Southern and had the 
whole of Europe against the nearest developing countries (Mouhoud 2012).
When commodity prices began to rise sharply again in early 2011 – after a 
steep decline from their 2008 peak – a two-year period of turbulent high prices 
set off another wave of food protests in at least twelve countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa and the MENA region (Ortiz and Cummins 2013). Other food protests in 
this period are likely to have gone unreported, especially in international media, 
overtaken in both numbers and media attention by the Tunisian and Egyptian 
revolutions and by the subsequent mass occupations of public squares in Euro-
pean and U.S. cities. These protests threw traditional political positions and 
alignments into question: in Europe, many Socialist Party leaders became imple-
menters of austerity, thereby justifying widespread mistrust.
For example in Greece, when the Panhellenic Socialist Movement’s (PASOK) 
George Papandreou became prime minister in October 2009, he discovered deep 
budget deficits left by the previous New Democracy administration that were 
in violation of the E.U.’s Stability and Growth Pact (EC 2010). Papandreou’s 
government thus commenced to implement austerity measures and promptly 
appealed to the IMF and E.U. for loans in April 2010 (Guardian 2010). By 2011, 
he faced hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, many inspired by the revolu-
tions that had just taken place in Tunisia and Egypt. A large proportion of these 
were middle class people who did not consider themselves activists but neverthe-
less began occupying Syntagma Square in Athens alongside trade unions and 
activist groups on May 5, 2011. They protested the national government’s poli-
cies, IMF policies, and German domination of European Central Bank policy, 
because Germany insisted upon harsh austerity measures. Following the occupa-
tion of the square, these groups initiated a number of creative, community-based 
mutual aid experiments to fill gaps left in social services by declining government 
spending (Oikonomides 2013: 51–56).
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Ten days after the Syntagma Square occupation began in Greece, indignados – 
ordinary citizens who were indignant over a burst housing bubble and high 
and rising unemployment – occupied Spain’s Plaza del Sol by the hundreds of 
thousands. As in Greece, most people in the square did not consider themselves 
activists and were sharply mistrustful of the main political forces in society, but 
they had come to the streets in a way they had not done before (Romero 2013: 
63–71; Errejón Galván 2013: 74–78). Prime Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapa-
tero of the Socialist Workers Party, who won a second term in 2008, was unable 
throughout the period to address citizens’ economic grievances and lack of trust. 
He resigned in April 2011, vowing not to run again. As in Greece, citizens in 
Spain also launched creative and sophisticated mutual aid projects to fill gaps in 
services (Romero 2013: 63–71).
In Ireland, which had suffered austerity since 2008, protests against taxes on 
water and other subsistence needs continued. People from all over the country 
and various political groupings boycotted water taxes and marched in the capital 
and in town centers bearing sharpened pikes, a traditional farmer’s weapon with 
a rebel history. The rainy island’s population was rankled at having to pay extra 
for water, one of Ireland’s most abundant resources (Wedes 2015). Nor was politi-
cal blowback from rising debt levels and austerity confined to Europe. Although 
the U.S. continued with stimulus after the E.U. had abandoned it, by mid-2011, 
the Tea Party movement in the U.S. Congress was threatening to shut down the 
government over routine moves to raise the debt ceiling, winning the promise 
of future spending cuts in exchange for lifting the ceiling just before deadline. 
Their brinksmanship and support for austerity helped fuel social divisions and 
unrest already brewing in the U.S., as occupations of bank lobbies and city streets 
in New York over the spring and summer of 2011 prefigured the emergence of 
Occupy Wall Street in September (Burke 2014).
In early 2011 in the U.K. and U.S., activists in the “Un-Cut” movement occu-
pied bank lobbies to raise awareness of banks and other multinational corpora-
tions that paid little or no legal taxes in those countries (Tierney 2011). The 
movement claimed they were bad corporate citizens and deserved to be shamed. 
In May 2011 the so-called “May 12 Coalition” of NGO social service providers 
and progressive political parties and think tanks in New York City, argued for a 
set of policies to discipline the six biggest U.S. banks and the hedge fund man-
agers located in the city who paid a lower rate of taxes than the average worker 
(May 12 Coalition 2011). As in other places, many new political actors who did 
not consider themselves activists began to join street demonstrations in support.
Protests continued over the U.S. “debt ceiling crisis” of the summer of 2011 
until they coalesced as “Occupy Wall Street” on September 17, 2011, when 
activists camped out in a public-private park on Broadway in lower Manhat-
tan for several weeks to raise awareness of the injustices of an economic system 
that produced unemployment, high student debt, falling wages, foreclosures, fray-
ing social safety nets and, above all, rising income and wealth inequality (GPPP 
2017y). In an essay by Judith Butler, entitled “So, What Are the Demands?” – the 
main question put to Occupy when it emerged as a political entity – she argues 
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that the question, “what are the demands?” is based upon the presumption that 
to be legitimate, a movement must have a list of demands that it strives to have 
satisfied by the state (Butler 2012). Some of the demands pursued, to which But-
ler also refers in the essay, are central to the concerns of the movement: jobs for 
all, homes for all, an end to foreclosures, the repudiation of student debt, and 
the overarching grievance: inequality. Butler argues that no matter how com-
prehensive, no list of demands can communicate how they all interrelate. That 
is explained only by the overarching complaint, economic inequality, the “1 per 
cent against the 99 per cent”, which emerges in Occupy and other protests of 
2011 as a fundamental violation of the moral economy, when the profiteering 
produced and reproduced by the economic system of neoliberal globalization 
leaves decent, ordinary people behind.
Conclusion
The Occupy movement’s greatest impact was bringing the concept of inequality 
to the center of public discourse. By refusing to play by the rules of protest, which 
required an ordered and coherent list of demands, Occupy made the claim that 
its demands were of a moral and ethical nature and were therefore irreducible and 
non-negotiable in a quest for social justice. In the years since, many have debated 
whether and why we care about inequality, and if we do care, what it is about 
inequality most concerns us.
Many economists stress pragmatic reasons; for example, because high levels 
of inequality might impede economic growth, create fragile economies or gener-
ate economic spillovers and contagion (Kumhof and Rancière 2011, Ostry et al. 
2016). Do we then focus on income and wealth distributions at the very top 
1 per cent, 0.1 per cent or 0.01 per cent? Or are we also concerned with what 
happens to inequality in the bottom 90 per cent or the bottom half of the income 
distribution, where it may be an even larger drag on growth than at the top? 
Do we care primarily about reducing inequalities within countries? Or like the 
United Nations’ Sustainable Development Agenda 2030, are we also committed 
to a project of global development, to reduce inequalities between countries and 
internationally?
In a 2012 World Bank working paper, Branko Milanovic first published a chart 
showing the global growth incidence curve (Figure 2.5), now widely referred to 
as the “elephant chart”, showing which segments of the global population expe-
rienced real income growth between 1988–2008 (Milanovic 2012). He has done 
a number of variations on the graph since then: the concept behind the graph is 
to show what international inequality would look like if we could line up every 
person in the world along the x-axis of income distribution from poorest to rich-
est, regardless of what country they live in; the y-axis shows the income growth 
rate (Lakner and Milanovic 2015).
In the graph the world’s poorest, mostly in Africa, line up to form the elephant’s 
tail. Then there is the vast hump that forms the elephant’s back, point A, repre-
senting the income gains of the rising middle classes in China, India, Indonesia, 
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Thailand and other powerhouse developing countries. From that apex, the graph 
swings down to the lowest part of the elephant’s trunk, point B, which shows 
the stagnant wages of the middle classes in rich countries, especially in Europe 
and North America. The tip of the elephant’s trunk, point C, represents the 
global super rich. While the gains of the vast majority of the world’s people in 
the elephant’s hump indicates progress toward reducing international inequality 
between countries, which for over half a century has been the bulk of inequal-
ity, Milanovic cautions that even reducing inequality within every country may 
not have a substantial impact on global inequality and the shape of the elephant 
chart (Milanovic 2016).
The reasons have to do with the political and economic interests concentrated 
in points A, B and C of the chart and with the absence of similar powerful inter-
ests in the tail. When national borders and economies are factored into the anal-
ysis, we see how it might support the interests of the global rich (C) to play the 
fortunes of the rising global middle classes (A) off against the those of the falling 
middle classes in the old rich countries (B). This power dynamic emerges as a 
major roadblock to addressing inequality, especially international inequality, and 
has exacerbated the impact of social inequalities in many countries, contributing 
to rising numbers of protests on both the political left and the right and to rising 
numbers of global migrants in the years since 2012.
In addition, while we know quite a bit about incomes and consumption, 
the true depth of wealth inequality and the scale of illicit financial flows 
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internationally are still largely hidden from view. What is increasingly not hid-
den is the degree of political capture of governments by wealthy interests across 
the ideological spectrum, making taxation and redistribution ever more diffi-
cult. This invites serious consideration of whether we have reached the limits 
of representative democracies to ensure widespread prosperity and social justice 
through laws and policies.
The initial wave of food riots in 2007–2008, which surged during the two-year 
period of economic crisis, held governments to account for violating the moral 
economy when food was scarce or unaffordable. These protests were a signal to 
global capitalism, a “canary in the mines” warning that the politics of subsistence 
must not be underestimated. Similarly, the Occupy movement and the Move-
ment of the Squares in Europe and around the Mediterranean framed inequality 
as a moral and economic aberration.
These protests, different as they were from each other, had in common that 
they were not primarily calls for new laws or policy reforms but sharp assertions 
that an economic system that produces and reproduces inequality by way of its 
normal and predictable laws of motion violates the moral economy. In response to 
this violation – the idea that ordinary people should not lose their pensions, jobs, 
houses and prospects for a better life – Occupy refused to be silent on inequality.
Since the initial impact of the economic crisis, different parts of society in 
many countries have grown out of sync with each other. Consider the failure 
of development-aid funded NGOs to relate to street protests over food and fuel 
prices beginning 2007–2008 (de Brito et al. 2014) or failures of news media and 
pollsters in the U.K. and U.S. to accurately register public discontent with the 
existing political classes in 2016 in the face of populist movements for “Brexit” 
and U.S. demagogue Donald Trump. Groups within these societies are out of 
sync, and as interests collide, they have jettisoned norms of liberal democratic 
practice with ever greater frequency.
To understand why, it may be helpful to note that the groups in society in favor 
of Brexit, Trump and nationalist, protectionist movements throughout Europe 
and North America are aggrieved at threats, not merely to their standard of liv-
ing, but to what they perceive as violations of the moral economy. It remains to 
be seen whether governments can be held to account for failures in development 
and social mobility, or if powerful interests will continue to scapegoat immigrants 
and refugees for a frayed moral economy. In this question, the degree of political 
capture of governments and institutions by rich and powerful interests is key.
Notes
 1 I would like to thank my husband Christopher Rudé for his insights into the political 
economy of late neoliberalism.
 2 Anwar Shaikh discusses these three fundamental theoretical frameworks of economics 
in a variety of publications. A concise explication of the differences can be found in 
“Heterodox Economics as a True Alternative: Going Beyond the Opposition Between 
‘Perfect’ and ‘Imperfect’ Behaviors” in New School Economic Review, Volume 6:36–39. 
January 2014, New York.
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 3 A portion of that data can be visualized on the “Global Platform on Participation and 
Protest” (GPPP) http://global-platform.org evolving global documentation of conten-
tious politics between 2006–2013 based on news and analysis openly available on 
the internet, still a work in progress. The data set in the GPPP, which includes new 
categories and further harmonization of data originally analyzed in the working paper, 
“World Protests 2006–2013” (Ortiz et al. 2013)
 4 The main unit of analysis in “World Protests 2006–2013” is the protest event; GPPP 
resolved a number of events into its main unit, the protest episode, which is poten-
tially of much longer duration. As of January 1, 2017 there were 473 protest events in 
the GPPP.
 5 Cpl. Bradley Manning disclosed the day after being sentenced to prison that he was 
transgender and wished to be known thereafter as Chelsea Manning.
 6 For example, the Global Database of Events Language and Tone (GDELT) purports 
to monitor “the world’s broadcast, print, and web news from nearly every corner of 
every country in over 100 languages and identifies the people, locations, organiza-
tions, counts, themes, sources, emotions, counts, quotes, images and events driv-
ing our global society every second of every day” (GDELT 2017); a 2013 profile of 
GDELT in Foreign Policy Magazine characterized its output as a “massive list of impor-
tant political events that have happened – more than 200 million and counting – 
identified by who did what to whom, when and where, drawn from news accounts 
and assembled entirely by software” (Keating 2013). However, its basis for classifica-
tion, the “Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO)”, a coding scheme 
developed by political scientist Philip Schrodt for classifying actors and actions 
related to conflict and mediation, has an extremely limited range for categorizing 
protests, with only 20 verbs, of which, only seven can be said to relate to protests 
(Schrodt 2012).
 7 The concern that social scientists’ bias against studying right-wing social movements 
may have led to a gross underestimation of their rise in recent years was a topic of dis-
cussion at recent workshop hosted by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung on December 15, 2016 
in Berlin on “World Protests and Political Economy”. Dieter Rucht from the Wissen-
schaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) made the point in particular of noticing that beneath 
current events (e.g. the rise of the right-wing in many countries, Brexit, the election 
of Donald Trump as U.S. president, et cetera), three undercurrents were beginning to 
merge: 1) the right-wing perception of its own economic deprivation, 2) feelings of 
political alienation (“politicians don’t care”) and 3) cultural disorientation and anxi-
ety about ways of life that are changing. The conversation acknowledged social sci-
ence’s failure to adequately study these groups and the need to see the proposed three 
undercurrents as unified.
 8 The Boom and Bust section of this chapter references protests found in the “Global 
Platform on Participation and Protest” (GPPP) between January 2007 and Decem-
ber 2008, accessable online at http://global-platform.org/#/protests?brush=24084.329
790767188%2B24109.66190634341&tags=CNT_ALL
 9 Among those who locate the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007 rather than 
2008 are esteemed economists George Akerlof, Olivier Blanchard, David Romer and 
Joseph Stiglitz, who co-edited the 2014 book, What Have We Learned? Macroeco-
nomic policy after the crisis. Joseph Stiglitz begins his chapter on Lessons of the North 
Atlantic Crisis for Economic Theory and Policy with the locus of his analysis in 
“the financial crisis that began in 2007 and led to the Great Recession.” He cautions 
therein that the wealth of historical data on economic crises and business cycles 
should prevent our asking, “how did this happen?” so that we might instead focus on 
lessons of history, including presumably our understanding of the timing of events 
(Stiglitz 2014).
 10 The Stimulus section of this chapter references protests found in the “Global Platform 




 11 The Contraction section of this chapter references protests found in the “Global Plat-
form on Participation and Protest” (GPPP) between 1/2011–2012/2012, accessable 
online at http://global-platform.org/#/protests?brush=24131.182995682495%2B24 
155.842577216874&tags=CNT_ALL
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Introduction
This chapter investigates some of the conceptual and methodological challenges 
of making sense of contemporary ‘food riots’, particularly the wave of protests 
reported worldwide during the period of the global food price spikes, around 
2007–2012. It does so through an exploration of the framing of media report-
age of food-related protest events during this period. Media coverage frequently 
provides the empirical basis for cataloguing and studying ‘food riots’ and other 
forms of contentious political events, as in Chapter 2 in this volume, A world in 
protest. The aim in this chapter is to provide an analysis of how newspaper cover-
age framed food riots and related events during the global food crisis period, and 
some discussion of the effects of such coverage.
Framing ‘food riots’: Frames of collective action and the media
What do we mean by ‘framing’, and why might it matter to the analysis of food 
riots? There are two disciplinarily distinct applications of the concept of ‘fram-
ing’, and both are relevant here. The first is the idea of framing as ‘meaning mak-
ing’ in relation to social movement analysis (Benford and Snow 2000). Frame 
analysis helps ensure that
social movements are not viewed merely as carriers of extant ideas and mean-
ings that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated 
events, or existing ideologies . . . [but] as signifying agents actively engaged 
in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, 
and bystanders or observers.
(Benford and Snow 2000: 613)
Frames help explain collective action by drawing attention to the work that goes 
into making meaning, to produce “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings 
that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement 
organization” (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). Collective action frames during 
food riots would, we expect, include a strong element of moral economy thinking, 
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particularly demands for public action against food price rises, justified by a 
shared sense that the right to subsistence is prior to the right to profit from dearth 
(Thompson 1971; Thompson 1991).1 Collective action frames of subsistence 
protests, particularly moral economy ideas, are discussed in detail elsewhere in 
this volume, in chapters exploring the grievances that motivate collective action, 
and how those grievances gain moral and political purchase through mobiliza-
tion and interaction with political and policy elites. This chapter draws on those 
insights from other chapters here for some of the analysis.
Most of this chapter concentrates on addressing some preliminary questions 
about media framing of food riots. It draws on analysis of the frames in selected 
national and international newspapers, and discusses their effects. Media framing 
is a core analytical concept in the study of media effects (Entman 1993; Scheufele 
1999; Matthes 2009). By framing as a media effect, we mean that we expect 
that newspaper coverage will shape how ‘food riots’ come to be constructed in 
media and thereby in public discourse more broadly; however, we also recog-
nise that these effects will interact with the individual and group worldviews in 
order to acquire meaning: media frames are not simply given by news outlets, but 
constructed in collaboration with audiences. This social constructivist view of 
media framing (Scheufele 1999) encourages attention to how the media “select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communi-
cating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman 
1993: 52). In the instance of food riots during 2007–2012, this means attending 
to where and which events are reported by whom, how actors are described and 
actions explained, and the kinds of resolution achieved.
As framing is not an effect achieved by the producers of media alone, it is also 
necessary to examine how consumers, and consumers’ pre-existing ideas, shape 
frames. To look at how pre-existing audience narratives may construct ‘food riots’, 
we need to take into account the influence of ideological positions, particularly 
among global elites, and the tone of international coverage, particularly any efforts 
to appeal to ‘human interest’ or threats of global crisis. But we need, too, to con-
sider the media as an active participant in the politics of provisions, whose framing 
is powerful in how it focuses public attention and articulates versions of public 
opinion. This chapter focuses chiefly on a discussion of media framing, looking 
at how different kinds of newspapers and other news sources with different audi-
ences framed ‘food riots’ and related protests during the global food crisis period 
(mainly focusing on 2007–2012). This exercise has been undertaken in an effort 
to understand any systematic biases, gaps, or resonances between the frames of 
collective action and those shaping news coverage of food riots. This may further 
improve the scope for analysis using newspaper coverage, helping to avoid errors 
and strengthen the basis for uncovering the key mechanisms at work in food riots.
To address these issues of how food riots are framed, the chapter first explores 
how international media identified, framed, and reported on such events dur-
ing the recent global food crisis. The chapter then discusses some of the issues 
arising in an effort to construct political event catalogues from national news 
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sources in four countries. The chapter then goes on to contrast findings from 
the national events catalogues with those of in-depth primary research into key 
incidents and struggles reported in the media. This provides an opportunity to 
discuss the lessons and limitations of qualitative case study research into such 
contentious political events. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the areas 
of overlap and dissonance between collective action frames and media frames 
regarding food riots. It also discusses advantages and limitations of mixed meth-
odological approaches to the study of food riots and related modes of contentious 
food politics.
International media coverage of ‘food riots’, 2007–2012
The politics of provisions are mainly negotiated at the national level (Bohstedt 
2010), but participation in a globalized food economy introduces supra-national 
dimensions to struggles over food (Patel 2012; Holt-Giménez and Patel 2012). In 
2008, the food price crisis hit food systems all around the world, and the aggre-
gated response of food riots in as many as 37 countries was seen as a wave of great 
significance; these events were cited collectively as evidence of a problem in the 
global food system, affecting all. Protectionist responses, particularly in large food 
producers, further highlighted the interdependence of national food systems with 
the global food economy. Climate change-related events led to a second global 
staple price spike in 2010–2011, further confirming the international and inter-
linked nature of the crisis.
The apparently global and contagious nature of the food price crisis and of the 
transnational and national policy responses it engendered means it is important 
to situate individual country experiences with ‘food riots’ in a more global per-
spective. This suggests it may be important to understand how food riots and/or 
the global food crisis are framed as a distinctly global problem, as distinct from a 
problem in poor countries far from the centers of global power. However, as we 
still expect that the most direct mechanisms of effect are likely to be policy levers 
at the national level, we still need to understand framing devices and strategies 
at that level.
Approach to exploring food riots in the international media
To study the coverage of food riots in the international media we used the online 
search engine of Nexis® (nexis.com), the international news database. Nexis 
allows searchable access to 609 news sources, including aggregators and newswire 
services, as well as online resources such as blogs and magazines. Although we 
used a variety of search terms and approaches in our search strategy, we focus 
here on the results from our search for and analysis of news coverage of inci-
dents labelled ‘food riots’ during the period 2006–2016. Our search was world-
wide, and included all available news sources in the Nexis database. Our Nexis 
searches identified 6,301 news items that included the term ‘food riot’ in the 
period 2006–2016.2
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Figure 3.1 offers a sense of the timeline of media coverage of food riots. It 
shows that by far the greatest number of articles including mention of the term 
‘food riot’ anywhere in the text during the period 2006–2016 were published in 
2008, when 2,545 news items were identified. As Figure 3.2 of the global food 
price index of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) during the same 
period shows, 2008 was the year of the first major price spike. However, whereas 
global food prices spiked again, peaking even higher in real terms in early 2011, 
international news attention to food riots events fell to 1,073 stories, only 42 per 
cent of the number of stories in 2008.
In order to explore the representation of food riots in a closer and more struc-
tured manner, we analyzed 156 articles from the peak period of the global food 
crisis (2007–2012) in which ‘food riot’ featured in the headline, and therefore 
could be assumed to be a core theme. This 156 represents more or less the full set 
of articles, other than a small number removed because the term referred to events 
very far removed from the subject of dearth and popular protest (for instance, 
teenaged vandals in an Edinburgh burger chain)3 or because of  re-publication of 
near-identical article. A simple coding was applied to the articles using NVivo10, 
in order to enable frame and textual analysis of the set. After an initial scan, one 
set of codes classified articles according to the general article type, specifically 
whether they were: a) factual accounts of protests, b) opinion pieces or analyses 
of the food crisis, or c) reporting on or providing a platform for advocacy, promot-
ing particular responses to the food crisis. Just under half, or 76, of the articles 
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Figure 3.1  Number of news reports mentioning ‘food riot’, 2006–2015
Source: Authors’ calculations from LexisNexis searches, 24–26 January 2017
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four of these also contained significant analysis or advocacy content; 59 articles 
contained opinion or analysis of the food crisis; 37 were advocating or giving a 
platform to advocacy for a policy response or course of action; 16 did both.
Overall, then, while around half of the articles in the international press which 
headlined ‘food riots’ during this period were accounts of actual protests, more 
offered opinion or advocacy. It should be noted that the Nexis database predomi-
nantly comprises international news sources, and by no means includes even all 
English-newspapers from developing countries – and so that first response arti-
cles, when the events were new or unfolding, may have been covered in local 
and vernacular media without ever making it into the international media as 
news stories in their own right. In reporting on a major global crisis such as the 
food price spikes of 2007–2012, then, the international media may of necessity 
be playing the role of an aggregator and commentator more than a news source.
In the absence of any substantial analysis of the framing of food riots in the 
international media to our knowledge to date, we focus here on addressing some 
preliminary questions: what are some of the key frames within which food riots 







2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Nominal Price Index Deflated Price Index
Figure 3.2  FAO Food Price Index, 2006–2015
Source: FAO, www.FAO.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en –accessed 31 January 2017
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communicate about such protests and the responses they suggest or call for? Tak-
ing into account the elements of Entman’s definition of framing, we turn now 
to an examination of: a) the ‘problem definition’, b) the ‘causal interpretation’, 
c) the ‘moral evaluation’, and d) the ‘treatment recommendation’ that emerges 
from this body of material.
The problem with food riots
The broad definition of the problem within which the ‘food riots’ articles were 
framed was the global food crisis, generally associated with the rapid rise of staple 
grain prices on global and national markets in the period 2007–2008, and again in 
2010–2011, and the consequent global subsistence crisis. However, as Figure 3.3 
0
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Figure 3.3  News article content on the causes of the global food crisis
Note: frequencies are of numbers of times causes are mentioned, rather than numbers of articles in 
which they are mentioned
Source: Authors’ analysis of sampled articles from nexis.com
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suggests, the content of news articles regarding the causes of the global food crisis 
about which people were protesting changed with changes in the nature of the 
crisis itself: whereas in 2008 a substantial part of the debate focused on bio fuels 
and financial speculation, by 2011, the focus was more firmly on climate change, 
as well as, to a lesser degree on agriculture.
The intensity and scale of food-related protest may have been as high as in 
2008, and the protests had substantially shifted from low- to middle-income, 
chiefly Middle Eastern-region countries, but there were far fewer articles headlin-
ing ‘food riots’ in this second phase of the crisis. Why was there substantially less 
coverage of food riots during the second price spike than in 2008? There may be 
several reasons. The first may have been the absence of novelty, as food riots were 
no longer ‘news’ after the wave of protests in 2008. Second, global policy efforts 
to address both the food insecurity of vulnerable populations and the wider issue 
of price volatility were in train by this time, and the 2010–2011 price spikes may 
have been seen as more straightforwardly the result of the natural disasters associ-
ated with climate change. In other words, the facts of this second round of food 
riots had changed, so they became less newsworthy.
Other reasons for this difference between 2008 and 2010–2011 may include 
differences in context and of surrounding events. More of the protests in the later 
period were now taking place in middle-income countries, including many in the 
conflict-ridden and predominantly authoritarian Middle East. These are more 
highly developed countries than the low-income countries that dominated food 
riots in the first phase, so that the equation of food riots with ‘hunger’ may have 
been less obvious. The narrative of food riots in Middle Eastern countries may 
also have been more complex because the international media may have been 
both more familiar with these settings than with the less developed countries of 
the earlier wave of food riots. Journalists may therefore have expected more com-
plex political realities, so that the simple message sent with ‘food riots’ fit such 
protests less well. A complicating factor was also that the world, and in particular, 
the developed world on which the international media chiefly reports, was by 
2010–2011 deep in the throes of the worst economic crisis it had seen in almost 
80 years. While the second round of the food crisis was dramatic, there was no 
shortage of other news stories, including many of popular political protest around 
basic needs in the developed countries on which to report during this period. It 
is possible, then, that the 2010–2011 food crisis was, in part, drowned out by the 
global financial crisis.
There was also a narrower definition of ‘the problem’ of food riots, however, 
related to the problematic impacts and implications of mass popular subsist-
ence protests. Many opinion pieces and advocacy articles conveyed a sense of 
the ‘threat of food riots’. For instance, ‘Food riots “an apocalyptic warning” ’ was 
the headline of one Australian Broadcasting Corporation Premium News story 
in 2008 (Barlow 2008). Another was the prediction that the world faced “an 
inflationary time bomb as shortages of food threaten to push prices to fresh all-
time highs”, by The Independent newspaper in August 2010 (O’Grady 2010). Of 
the substantial number of articles that were opinion or advocacy pieces, many 
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warned that food riots would result should certain events occur (further price 
rises, natural disasters, failed harvests) or actions fail to be taken (price stabiliza-
tion or consumer insulation in the short-term, agricultural investment or reform 
in the medium or long). A total of 82 of the 156 articles were coded as contain-
ing a prominent warning or reference to the ‘threat’ or ‘fear’ of food riots, most 
of which (66) were also classified as either opinion or advocacy pieces (factual 
articles reporting on food riots were less likely to include such warnings, with 
only 22 doing so).
But why should food riots pose a threat, and to whom or what? This is often left 
implicit, as if subsistence-related protest is an obviously bad thing to be avoided at 
any cost. Four specific threats can be discerned. First, at the local level, there may 
be violence and a threat to human life. Our calculations from the set of 156 arti-
cles indicate that at least 100 people were reported as killed in food riots during 
2007–2012, and at least 2,000, including police, army, and peace-keeping force 
members, were injured – more than 800 in Algeria alone. Unruly politics are in 
general a threat to the public authorities, by their very definition (Khanna 2012).
Second, and again at the local level, large protests can disrupt economic and 
social life. Where food traders or markets are specifically targeted, this may even 
have counter-productive effects in the short-term, as fearful traders retreat or 
conceal their wares. During the Mogadishu food riots of May 2008, news reports 
noted that the 20,000 reported protestors explicitly targeted food traders who 
demanded payment in U.S. dollars instead of the (often counterfeited) Somali 
shillings:
“We do not need cruel traders”, “We do not need people who are in love with 
dollar yet we have the shillings”, “We want our right to live”, they chanted 
in the streets, where plumes of smoke rose.
“We are going to demonstrate until they (traders) accept the Somali shil-
ling . . . we cannot afford dollars,” one protestor Hassan Said told AFP.
“And if they refuse to lower food prices, we will start looting their shops 
so that we can survive.”
(Abdinur 2008)
Although little information about the identities of the protestors is provided, 
this Agence France Press news service account of their grievances (cruelty, cor-
ruption, official failure to curb rampant inflation), ideological justification for 
protest (the right to live, the struggle against inequality and injustice), and pro-
test repertoires (bargaining over lower food prices or looting) describes a food 
riot very much in the European 17th and 18th century tradition documented by 
Charles Tilly (1974) and John Bohstedt (2010). As those scholars have shown, 
the food riot typically ‘worked’ at the local level, if only to temporarily enforce a 
local moral standard onto food markets and some momentary redistribution. For 
the owners of local businesses and the public authorities tasked with protecting 
their properties and livelihoods, such an episode is disruptive and costly, as well 
as dangerous.
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A third threat food riots are framed as posing is to political elites. At the 
extremes, food riots are cast as ‘a threat to democracy’, as in The Associated Press 
article about the April 2008 Haiti food riots(Katz 2008). The then-President 
Rene Preval instructed food rioters to stop looting because the solution was “not 
to go around destroying stores”, blaming the country’s dependence on imported 
rice for the food crisis. His intervention came at a crucial moment, although (as 
subsequent events suggest), lacked the desired effect:
The speech had been widely anticipated by observers who said Preval’s 
response could determine the course of the demonstrations and of his 
government.
“I believe if President Preval talks to the people about the high cost of 
living, people will listen to the president and go home,” said Sen. Joseph 
Lambert, a former senate president and a member of Preval’s party. “If not, if 
there is an attempt at a coup d’etat to remove the president, things will get 
worse.”
Food prices, which have risen 40 percent on average globally since mid-
2007, are causing unrest around the world. But they pose a particular threat to 
democracy in Haiti, where most people live on less than $2US (€1.27) a day.
(Katz 2008)
A short straight line is drawn here between the very low incomes of the Haitian 
people, the steep rises of staple food costs worldwide, and the risk to ‘democracy’, 
apparently represented by the U.S.-backed Preval regime. Food-related protest 
after Pakistan’s worst ever floods in 2010 similarly rise to fears that in the worst-
case scenario, “the military might feel compelled to step in if protests got out of 
hand” (Reuters 2010). Other articles also connect food riots and the interests of 
political elites, but do so without going quite so far as to suggest they jeopardize 
democracy itself. Instead, many articles associated the price crisis with loss of 
popular legitimacy by political leaders. For instance, Bolivia’s Evo Morales was 
reported to have cancelled a public appearance at the height of the 2011 crisis, 
fearing popular backlash engineered by the opposition (UPI 2011).
Causes of food riots
It would appear that public authorities unable to guarantee basic subsistence are 
also unable to assure law and order. Arguably (although the argument is rarely 
made in the news articles reviewed here), a lack of official legitimacy manifests in 
generalized social unrest and a descent into lawlessness. But how does this come 
about? What is the step from dearth to delegitimated authority, and from there 
to anarchy? This is less clear, or more implicit. News media commonly use action 
terms to explain the causal relationship between price rises and social unrest such 
as- ‘provoke’, ‘spur’, ‘trigger’, or ‘spread’.
These terms help frame food riots as a simple mechanism of societal response 
to dearth. In some instances, rioters’ anger is due, in a simple way, to shortages or 
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unaffordability. In others, such as the Mogadishu example given previously, the 
anger is linked to a perception of injustice that while they (the protestors) go 
hungry, others are immorally turning a profit. But a ‘food riot’ can be easily dis-
cerned as any protest by people who lack means in times of dearth, about which 
it is safe to assume the ‘trigger’ is the anger provoked by hunger and injustice.
The idea that food riots are somehow ‘natural’ is a particular political framing 
common to many on the left. Of the riots that hit three major Burkina Faso towns 
in February 2008, one commentator explained that:
“This reaction was expected,” Laurent Ouèdraogo, secretary general of the 
Confèdèration Nationale des Travailleurs du Burkina (CNTB) told IRIN, 
stating that the riots happened after anger welled up because of constantly 
rising prices for basics like food, cloth and petrol.
“Misery does not wait and you see people witnessing everyday rising prices 
and they do not know what to do. The situation is like having matches near 
cotton that can catch fire at any moment,” Ouèdraogo said.
(IRIN 2008)
Like other trades union or leftist party spokespersons, Ouèdraogo is well-versed 
in the language of the popular threat from the discontented masses, and skilled at 
its use in advocating policy change – in this case, price controls. Similar points 
were made by trades unionists in the Philippines and leftist party spokespeople 
elsewhere.
But the automaticity of the threat from the discontented masses also appeared 
in the framing by or on behalf of groups strongly opposed to a leftist platform, 
such as the multilateral institutions, and specifically the economic globaliza-
tion agenda of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. One 
finer-grained analysis contrasted the views on the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) of a former Mexican maize farmer who had marched in 
the ‘tortilla riots’ of 2007 against Robert Zoellick, the World Bank president who 
argued that far from raising the price of corn, free trade agreements kept it low 
(Koop 2008). But free trade and other open market policies were endangered by 
popular anger. The ‘apocalyptic’ ABC Premium News article cited previously 
reported the then-head of the International Monetary Fund, Dominique Strauss-
Kahn, spelling out the reasons to be fearful of the effects of food riots, particularly 
in Africa:
“Hundreds of thousands of people will be starving,” he said.
“Disruption may occur in the economic environment so that at the end of 
the day most governments, having done well for the last five or 10 years, will 
see what they have done totally destroyed and their legitimacy facing the 
population destroyed also.”
(Barlow 2008)
In other words, food riots jeopardized the entire neoliberal development project.
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Moral judgements
Moral judgements of protestors were muted, or implicitly sympathetic, in the 
international literature. As we will see in the next section, national media cov-
erage tended to be less universally sympathetic; closer proximity to events, local 
political interests and differences, and class or other social biases against particu-
lar protest groups within the media may contribute to this more heterogenous 
view of food-related protest. References to angry protestors drew attention to a 
simple mechanistic framing of the causes of food riots. By contrast, the many 
references to hunger and the ratcheting up of the subsistence struggles of people 
already on low incomes suggested a broadly sympathetic, or perhaps empathetic, 
view of food riots. This ‘human interest’ angle may also have been necessary 
in order for international news outlets to turn an abstract statistical account of 
global trade and food insecurity into a news story with wider appeal. But it has 
the overall effect of framing food rioters as driven to desperation – invoking a 
sense of a Hobbesian natural law of survival with universal resonance. An exam-
ple of this is the use of descriptors of protestors: whereas almost half of all the 
articles described angry and violent situations using such terms, only 16 referred 
to protestors as ‘angry’, compared to the 42 in which they were described as 
‘hungry’. Notably, the factual or news story accounts were more likely to use the 
descriptor ‘angry’ and articles featuring more analysis and advocacy preferred 
‘hungry’.
The ‘treatment recommendation’
The ‘treatment recommendation’, as Entman’s (1993) definition of a frame has it, 
varies across the articles. One factor shaping that appears to be location and role 
within the global food system; for instance, there seemed to be a comparatively 
large number of Australian, Canadian, and Irish news articles among the set, 
perhaps reflecting those countries’ relatively prominent roles as food aid provid-
ers. The phase of the food crisis being reported on also shaped the diagnosis of 
the problem and the proposed solution, as noted previously. Ideological factors 
may have shaped the ‘take’ on issues of free trade and the extent to which it was 
a problem or a solution, but most of the more detailed analyses examined argu-
ments pro and con. A tentative conclusion may be that the global food crisis 
and the threatening spate of food riots that followed in general weakened the 
case for the financialization of food commodity trade (the business and trade 
press no doubt have a different framing). There appeared to be a relatively strong 
pro-intervention framing on humanitarian grounds, but not to the extent of 
national protectionist policies. Whereas many newspapers published statements 
and reports from the UN, IMF, and World Bank on the food crisis, the analysis 
and advocacy of groups such as farmers’ and labor unions or consumers’ associa-
tions rarely achieved great prominence in the international media, and appear to 
be more usually relegated to the statement of key grievances at the moment of, or 
in predicting, the food riot.
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Media framing of subsistence protests in Bangladesh, India, 
Kenya, and Mozambique
Methodology and approach
This section of the chapter reports on experiences developing and using national 
events catalogues to support analysis of the causes and effects of popular mobili-
zation around food in Bangladesh, India, Kenya, and Mozambique during 2007–
2012 (Hossain et al. 2014). Developing these catalogues proved methodologically 
challenging and labor-intensive compared to the searchable online database used 
to analyze international media coverage. Nevertheless, the exercise generated 
some valuable insight into how the national media were framing subsistence 
protests – and to what effect – in each country.
Note that we explored media coverage of all kinds of subsistence protests relat-
ing to food during the period 2007–2012, rather than restricting our searches to 
‘food riots’. This is partly due to an early finding of a tendency for ‘food riot’ to be 
applied to explain events abroad, rather than at home, where grievances tend to 
be explained contextually and as more complicated matters. A second reason we 
focused on all manner of mobilization around food rather than just ‘food riots’ is 
in order to assess mobilization around the right to food, particularly in India, and 
other modes of organizing as civil society, as distinct from the more ‘transgressive’ 
forms of contention expressed in riots (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).
The Food Riots and Food Rights project selected Bangladesh, India, Kenya, and 
Mozambique – four food insecure countries with different experiences of popular 
political mobilization during the global food crisis – for closer and comparative 
analysis. Bangladesh was among the countries the international press and mul-
tilateral agencies listed as having experienced food riots in 2008; with a shared 
history of famine and famine response, India’s active, broad-based Right to Food 
struggle had yielded the establishment of a Right to Food Act; Kenya had simi-
larly instituted a new constitution in 2010, enshrining the Human Right to Food 
after the election violence of 2008; and Mozambique was among the countries 
in which food – and fuel – riots were prominently covered in the international 
media, including in 2010. The aim was to use national coverage of popular strug-
gles relating to food in this period to understand the political effects of different 
modes of mobilization against the backdrop of a globalized food crisis.
A common approach was developed for the identification and selection of 
news sources, and for the analysis of individual stories and connections between 
them. This was designed to highlight the identities of protestors, their stated 
grievances and demands, the objects of their demands, repertoires or techniques 
of protest, and policy and political responses by ruling elites. The ‘political event 
catalogues’ so developed aimed to provide a sense of the universe of food-related 
protests reported, and that therefore had a chance of coming to the attention of 
political and policy elites, and to provide the basis for sampling cases to exam-
ine in closer detail through qualitative interviews with protest participants and 
with policy and political elites. The first challenge was the selection of credible 
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national news sources. We concentrated on newspapers, as most large data stud-
ies rely on print media, and increasingly in particular on their digital archives. 
Sources were selected based on circulation, nature of the readership, ideological 
leaning, reputation, and the availability of online archives and search engines.
In Bangladesh, the online archives of Prothom Alo and The Daily Star were 
used. Both are part of the same news organization and have liberal, progressive 
inclinations, and both emerged with a new wave of print media that emerged 
with Bangladesh’s return to democracy in the 1990s. Prothom Alo has the highest 
circulation of vernacular newspapers and The Daily Star leads the English daily 
papers. The more ideologically and socially conservative Dainik (Daily) Ittefaq 
has been in circulation since the 1950s, and remains an authoritative source, 
particularly in rural areas. The Ittefaq had no online archive at the time, and 
12 university students were recruited to hand-search seven years of the physical 
archives of the newspaper in the library of the University of Dhaka.
In India, the large number of national, regional, and local newspaper meant no 
individual newspaper was likely to cover popular mobilizations across the expanse 
of this large and complex country. Two national dailies were finally selected for 
India: The Times of India and The Hindu, both established newspapers on opposite 
ends of the ideological spectrum. The Times of India is perceived as populist but 
also as pro-business and establishment, whereas The Hindu represents a largely 
leftist parliamentary perspective. The Times has the highest English-language cir-
culation in the country. Both newspapers had searchable digital archives.
In Kenya, the search moved beyond print media as online searches of the two 
leading dailies, The Nation Newspaper and The Standard Newspaper yielded too 
few results to gain a sense of popular mobilization around food. Wider online 
searches yielded coverage in YouTube channels of Kenya Broadcasting Corpora-
tion (KBC), Kenya Television Network (KTN), and Citizen TV, which were 
then analyzed for their contribution to national coverage.
In Mozambique, digital archives were limited and the physical archives were 
unwieldy and challenging to research. These challenges meant that the news 
content searches focused on hand searches of selected media from the months 
surrounding the riots of February 2008 and September 2010. The Mozambique 
catalogue brings together a larger variety of sources from state-controlled to ‘inde-
pendent’ (to whatever relative extent possible under the authoritarian regime) 
media, bringing together around 163 articles drawn from 15 different sources: 
three daily printed papers (Notícias, Diário de Moçambique and O País), six elec-
tronic dailies (CanalMoz, Diário de Notícias, Ponto Certo, Vertical, Mediafax and 
Diário do País) and six printed weeklies (Canal de Moçambique, Savana, Zambeze, 
Magazine Independente, A Verdade and Domingo).
Searching for relevant political events
Having identified sources, a second challenge was to locate reports of relevant 
political events for inclusion in the catalogue. A set of keywords was devised 
for the first round of basic search in all four countries. However, in the case of 
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online archives, what these terms yielded depended on the quality of the search 
engine. For instance, the search term ‘food riot’ produced 573 entries in The 
Daily Star search engine. After scanning more than one-third of these articles, 
only one entry was found to be relevant, referring to food-related protests within 
Bangladesh. Adapting the search strategy after this first round, a second round 
of search terms was adapted with specific reference to the events known to have 
taken place in each country. For instance, in Bangladesh phrases such as “RMG 
(ready made garment) workers protesting for food hike” were tried, and linked 
terms such as chapa (minibus), subsídios (subsidies), cesta básica (basic basket), 
revolta popular (popular upheaval), and custo de vida (cost of living) were used for 
Mozambique. Once events were located, a closer search of the days before and 
after the event was undertaken to identify follow-up stories and precursors.
In building the national catalogues, the definition of a ‘political event’ was 
broad. The entries in the catalogues cover a wide spectrum of mobilization, from 
street demonstrations, rallies, riots and other forms of direct action, to public 
meetings, seminars, and petitions. This approach to the identification of events 
as part of wider struggles was motivated by Tilly’s (2008) argument that to explain 
contentious struggle, it is not enough to count and catalogue individual events 
by type and draw correlations; an understanding of contentious politics depends 
on being able to make sense of individual events set within and as part of wider 
and more enduring struggles. This will entail not only observing the actions (the 
event counts), but also making sense of their effects and the responses they stimu-
late, and in addition, how the success or failure or repression of protest then 
feeds back into shaping how and when further protests take place. The aim of 
such analysis is to establish a mechanism-based approach, able to ‘specify what 
sort of event produces the correspondence between the presumed cause and the 
presumed effect’ (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2008: 309).
The catalogue entries included context, actors involved, grievances/demands 
made and to whom, the form of action, and the nature of response, including 
repressive or violence by state-sponsored actors. Information was also sought on 
the words used to refer to or represent the event and its actors, and statements 
recorded from event participants and those holding power. However, few media 
reports were exhaustive enough to provide the information sought, and there 
were few cases in which we were able to build a detailed narrative of a struggle 
across all its phases and interactions.
However, the events catalogues provided glimpses into the politics of provi-
sions, with preliminary insights into who was protesting about what and how in 
each country. However, even extensive hand-searches of events known to have 
occurred failed to yield the detail necessary to gain a sense of why such groups 
came to mobilize, how they articulated their grievances and selected their rep-
ertoires for action, or of how the political and policy elites responded, and why. 
Critically, we identified significant instances of food riots and more enduring 
subsistence struggles that had gone largely unrecorded by the national media, 
notably in Kenya. In Madhya Pradesh, although the media regularly reported 
on starvation deaths and malnutrition, local activism around the right to food 
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was substantially excluded from media coverage. In Bangladesh, events that were 
labelled ‘food riots’ in the international press were framed as significantly more 
complex matters in the national press, which situated them within their longer 
history as wage struggles.
Media bias
An urban bias, particularly in favor of coverage of events affecting capital cities, 
was common in national newspapers. In a small and selective way, we were able 
to confirm this bias, identifying events that went unreported. For instance, one of 
the Indian case study sites, in Madhya Pradesh, witnessed a series of protests and 
actions by a local organization which neither selected newspaper covered. Deaths 
from malnutrition in this state had focused media attention on issues of food 
security in Madhya Pradesh, but this interest did not apparently extend to cover-
age of popular mobilization relating to hunger. The coverage by The Hindu chiefly 
focused on events in Delhi, Karnataka, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu. 
In Kenya, similarly, local protests relating to claims to food relief that were iden-
tified during field work in Mathare and Ikutha had received little or no media 
attention. In Mathare, frequent skirmishes at the depots where the urban poor 
tried to buy subsidized maize meal were never reported. In Ikutha, three big pro-
tests against malpractice in the local distribution of relief food went unreported.
Events involving violence or disruption by economically or electorally impor-
tant participant groups had greater coverage and space, often on the front page, 
and in many cases reporting framed such protestors as trouble-makers, stirring up 
the crowd. Incidents of state repression and violence were, by contrast, down-
played or given less attention, with the exception of Mozambique. This attention 
to state repression in Mozambique was because of the novelty of the underclass 
mobilizing and protesting the food and fuel price hikes, a protest widely con-
sidered legitimate although repressed by the state police. At the same time, the 
police were thoroughly resisted by the protesters who wounded some police offic-
ers and burned some police vehicles. Moreover, some private press may have 
wanted to highlight the intolerance of the Mozambican state, as the right to pro-
test is protected in the national constitution, and state efforts to impede protest 
resulted in violence. There was a formulaic nature to these accounts, with a nar-
row range of descriptions and limited direct reporting of protestors’ viewpoints. 
Histories and backgrounds of protest campaigns, movements, or eruptions were 
generally ignored.
The prevailing political climate of the country also determined the news 
which was produced and in what way. The extent of media coverage the ‘riots’ in 
Maputo received in 2008 and 2010 was higher than in 2012, when the massive 
presence of riot police at the main focus of riot incidents aborted the demonstra-
tions. The authoritarian nature of the government in Mozambique also imposes 
various limitations to what things can be reported and how, limiting the scope for 
sympathetic coverage in fear of state reprisal. A focus group discussion with Bang-
ladeshi journalists uncovered a tendency to exaggerate food-related gatherings as 
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‘protests’ during the military-backed caretaker government, so that “a queue of 
people waiting to purchase subsidized rice from the OMS (Open Market Sales 
programme) could get reported as an agitation for essential goods”, as one jour-
nalist put it. This indicated a perception on the part of the media of their own 
role in holding power to account, and its particular importance during periods of 
undemocratic rule.
The construction of a ‘food riot’
Comparatively few references to the term ‘food riots’ were present in the national 
media reports, and with the exception of Mozambique, ‘food riots’ invariably 
referred to events that occurred elsewhere; conversely, events labeled as ‘food 
riots’ by the international media were rarely labeled as such in the national 
media. For instance, while a search for ‘food riot’ in Bangladesh leaded only one 
relevant result in the national English newspaper, there were reports of ‘food 
riots’ in sub-Saharan Africa, India, and elsewhere. Similarly, the Indian media 
labeled garment workers’ protests in Bangladesh as ‘food riots’, while the Bang-
ladeshi media framed them as wage struggles. The Hindu tends to cover West 
Bengal fairly closely, yet carried only one piece reporting on the widespread and 
significant events the international media had marked as ‘food riots’ in 2007. 
The sole article on these protests reported the state government’s claim that the 
riots were politically motivated and thus inauthentic. It should be noted that the 
government of West Bengal was at that time under the rule of the Communist 
Party of India (CPI-M), with whom The Hindu is ideologically aligned and which 
was facing a crisis of legitimacy after 34 years of rule.
The reluctance shown by the national media to frame incidents of domestic 
unrest related to food as ‘food riots’ suggests that the effect of such reports is a 
pointed political accusation: that the government of the country in question has 
failed in basic functions of governance, and is vulnerable to loss of authority and 
legitimacy.
National coverage tended to avoid framing subsistence protests as simple cor-
relations between hunger, anger and protest. Instead they were often linked to 
other contextual factors such as party political competition; histories of struggle 
and enduring grievances among protesting groups; local food market conditions; 
the performance of local government and agencies; and the role of external actors 
in ‘stirring up trouble’. Despite their frequent lack of sympathy with protestors 
and their means of protests, these articles aim to hold state power to account. 
See this excerpt from a December 2009 editorial in The Daily Star of Bangladesh, 
headlined: “Why food price hike worries us”:
Last but not the least, price hike of food and other essential commodities 
may lead to serious social unrest. It creates discontent, violence and food 
riots. We saw how several thousand garment workers at Fatullah, Narayan-
ganj clashed with the law enforcers and smashed cars and vandalised facto-
ries on April 12, 2008 in anger at price hike of food and other essentials and 
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low wages. In 2008, food price hikes sparked food riots in some African and 
Asian countries including Ethiopia, Cameroon, Haiti and the Philippines. 
In view of the fact that food is the most important of all the basic necessities 
in human life and per capita income in Bangladesh is one of the lowest in 
the world, and that it is the constitutional responsibility of the state to make 
provision for the basic necessities of life, including food, no government can 
avoid the responsibility of making food available to the people at affordable 
prices.4
While the article draws on the ‘threat of food riots’ trope of the international 
media, it avoids labelling garment workers protests in such terms, framing them 
instead as an early warning of the need for urgent state action, to prevent escala-
tion into food riots as had occurred elsewhere. Another entry in the catalogue 
reports on a statement by the chairman of the Regulatory Reforms Commission 
makes the Amartya Sen argument that “famines takes place in the countries run 
by unelected governments at there is none to put pressure on the government 
to take the right decision”.5 This strong emphasis on the state responsibility and 
intervention. This is in strong contrast to ‘treatment recommendation’ framings 
in the international media, which concentrated around issues such as regula-
tion of the financialization of food commodity trade and around investments in 
agriculture.
The widespread protests against local PDS stores and dealers in West Bengal 
were specified as ‘ration riots’ by the Indian national press and as ‘food riots’ by 
the international media. A Reuters report claimed, “the riots have been a major 
embarrassment for the state’s ruling communists since it involves people living 
below the poverty line, the vote bank of the left for the last 30 years”.6 It located 
the cause of the riots in the problem of corruption, in line with the growing pub-
lic sentiment that “for years, they have been cheating us”.
Three entries deploy the term ‘food riot’ in relation to the West Bengal PDS 
riots. A Times of India piece in 2007 reports on the Congress party ‘hitting back’ 
at the CPI-M for “raging food riots across the state”, with the Congress spokes-
person terming it as an “anachronism . . . in a country which is proud to flaunt 
a booming economy”. This ‘attack’ by the Congress is analyzed in the article as 
‘retaliation’ against the Left’s refusal to submit to the then-Congress-led coalition 
government over the unrelated issue of a U.S. nuclear deal agreement. An article 
in The Hindu the following day reported a rebuttal from the CPI-M politbureau, 
stating, “there are no food riots in West Bengal”. It accused the opposition of 
“inciting violence on the issue of ration distribution”, and blamed ration cuts by 
the central government. However, the retrospective use of ‘food riots’ in a Times 
of India article two months later reported that:
[T]he recent food riots in West Bengal were the result of a corrupt and pri-
vatized public distribution system running with political patronage of the 
Left parties, a survey conducted by SC-appointed special commissioners 
on food security said. The scathing report has debunked the West Bengal 
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government’s stand that the riots were a reaction to decreased allocation of 
wheat and rice for the above poverty line quota. The commissioners have 
concluded that this could not have been the provocation for people running 
riot in rural West Bengal against lack of food grain.7
This suggests tensions within the national media over the construction of events 
as ‘food riots’, particularly in relation to the implications for state legitimacy and 
competitive party politics. A more limited review of regional media in two prime 
areas of the protests adds another layer to the narrative. An important part of 
the context which both the international and national media miss is that these 
‘ration riots’ took place in the aftermath of a strong challenge to the hegemony 
of the Left Front regime in West Bengal. This took the form of massive resist-
ance to official land acquisition efforts on behalf of Tata Motors. The West Ben-
gal government responded with brutal police action, and finally withdrew. The 
Nandigram Singur resistance consolidated general disenchantment with the Left 
Front government, providing a political opportunity that played a role in the 
eruption of the PDS riots. The West Bengal media reported extensively on the 
riots, but neither malnutrition, nor the Right to Food, nor even the structural 
problems plaguing the PDS, nor the immediate grievances of local beneficiaries 
were central to its coverage. Instead, the reportage focused on events as they 
unfolded and the political analysis on the role of local units of the CPM. The 
state-level activists and experts we interviewed told us that political commentary 
in the Bengali press placed the PDS riots within along the continuum of protests 
against land acquisition and the call for ‘portiborton’, or change, especially since 
the location of riots was close to Nandigram, the site of the resistance to the land 
acquisition program.
The media as an actor in the contentious politics of provisions
The media often plays a crucial role in the contentious politics of provisions, 
and can be seen as a key actor in framing and amplifying popular grievances and 
interactions between protestors and policy and political elites. In Kenya, even 
though the local chapters of Bunge la Mwananchi (the Ordinary People’s Parlia-
ment) had been hard at work mobilizing around the rising cost of living since 
2005, it was only when they intertwined the issue with the issue of suppression of 
press freedom that the media paid attention. The media coverage given to their 
high-profile infiltration and disruption of the Jamhuri (Independence) Day cel-
ebrations in December 2008, when several Bunge members and journalists were 
arrested and assaulted by the Presidential Guard, marked a crucial point in the 
emergence of the movement. The protests that have now come to be identified 
as the “Unga Revolution” first featured in public discourse when the national 
media reported the heckling of the minister for labour – who was reading the 
president’s speech – by a diverse gathering of workers at the official Labour Day 
celebrations on 1 May 2009. After these successful episodes of gaining the media 
stage, grabbing state spaces as a form of mobilization and to express grievances 
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became closely connected with the media attention such direct action would 
generate.
The role of the media also emerged as important in the context of weak 
functional channels of communication between protestors and government. In 
Mozambique, protests had no evident leaders, and the urban poor – the popula-
tion most affected by the food price rises and subsidy cuts – had no political or 
civil society organizations to represent their interests to the authoritarian regime. 
In this communication vacuum, the period preceding the riots saw extensive 
media coverage of the rising prices of goods and services, alerting the government 
to the threat of popular mobilization due to price rises, and the media came to 
play a significant role in how events unfolded as protestors responded to reports 
by the relatively sympathetic independent media. Whereas ruling party-backed 
newspapers depicted the riots as illegal, opportunistic, and illegitimate due to vio-
lence and vandalism, the independent press frontally criticized the government 
and the police for the violently repressive response, which included live ammu-
nition. The protests created a new space of articulation for academics, political 
analysts, and some politicians, who used the mass media to express dissent. The 
role of the media as an actor in contentious politics of provisions is highlighted 
by how the Mozambican government turned to the radio to gather information 
on public sentiment, as popular mobilization for another greve (strike) began to 
emerge in response to a fresh set of price hikes. This time, the price rises were 
announced well in advance and in combination with specific mitigation meas-
ures, and government officials used radio phone-ins to test popular response to 
these measures before their official introduction.
In the context of India, too, the media were important actors and targets. The 
Right to Food Campaign had a sophisticated and comprehensive media strategy. 
Senior campaign members were regularly featured in the national media to dis-
cuss opposition to features of the draft National Food Security Act. The Madhya 
Pradesh case study on the Right to Food struggles of the Adivasi Adhikar Manch 
(translated into English as AAM) further brings out the intricacies of this media 
strategy, revealing in finer detail how allying with the media became critical to 
the success of the struggle. Although the media did not always cover AAM’s 
mobilization and public action, they coordinated to raise the issue of malnu-
trition and the failure of government response, partly through close association 
with the media activist organization Vikas Samvad.
Conclusions: why media framing of food riots matters
This chapter took a media frames approach to the analysis of how food riots and 
other subsistence protests were covered in the international and national print 
media during the global food crisis (during the period 2007–2012). A conclu-
sion by the international media framing of the food riots pointed to a global 
level in the politics of provisions, with debates and negotiations over the role for 
multilateral action to address global food security, emerging in direct response to 
the globalized spread of the protests. The language of ‘the threat’ posed by food 
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riots to global socio-political and economic order is a dominant thread in the 
international press. The international press also features a great deal of advocacy 
and opinion on these issues, often bringing the heads of multilateral agencies, 
the UN, the World Bank, and associated specialist agencies into the global pub-
lic space to offer their analysis. But protestors’ voices are comparatively muted. 
Their motivations are often flattened out to the universal stimuli of ‘hunger’ and 
‘anger’. But there are also finer-grained analyses in the international press. Many 
of these protestors’ voices spoke in broadly moral economic language, of rights to 
food and the responsibilities of public actors.
‘Food riots’, it turns out from analysis of both the international and the 
national media coverage, can as often be an accusation of state failure as it is a 
description or analysis of political events. A national press rarely uses the term to 
describe events at home, but often uses it to describe similar events abroad. It is 
not clear why this should be the case. However, it may reflect the way in which 
knowledge of the wider struggles within which such events are nested compli-
cates how people imagine such events. If you are writing for a Dhaka audience 
that already knows how little garments workers are paid, how hard they work, 
how lavishly factory owners live, how expensive food has become, and that the 
garments workers frequently protest about these issues in combination, it makes 
no sense to label it a food riot, with its suggestions of the moment of a hungry, 
angry mob.8
Protestors’ voices were louder in some of the national media, with their more 
contextualized framing, than in the international coverage. It no doubt matters 
that in particular for the vernacular press, the audience for such news would 
include groups similarly affected by the food price crisis, and who shared other 
characteristics with protestors, including geographical proximity. Even then, 
descriptions of violence often neglected state violence while emphasizing that 
of protestors.
A methodological conclusion is that while highly imperfect registers of the 
range of contentious politics around food crises, media coverage of ‘food riots’ 
offers valuable insights into the kinds of subsistence protests that enter the 
space of public opinion via media coverage. That there are biases is obvious and 
inevitable. But international media coverage makes it possible for global pub-
lic opinion to witness the global spread of conflict arising from food insecurity. 
This ‘scale-shift’ (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2008) from localized grievances 
to similar struggles across the globe was dramatized in the international press in 
apocalyptic terms. But while dramatic, these documented shifts are unlikely to be 
an accurate count of all such protests. Biases against rural and small-town areas 
mean national media almost certainly underestimate their total frequency, par-
ticularly where they are so frequent as to lack any newsworthiness at all. News-
worthy protests may be those that directly affect the interests of the elite or the 
audience, a subset of the total; these are in turn likely to more important political 
events because they draw powerful groups into their struggles. If there are reasons 
to believe media coverage yields only a subset of the most important ‘food riots’, 
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it was enough during the global food crisis of 2007–2012 to document a spread 
of important grievances about food prices across the globe. The very globalness 
of this wave of protests in turn created public space for deliberation over key 
issues in global food governance: climate change and renewable energy, trade and 
financialization, and industrial vs. smallholder agriculture.
It is difficult, however, to study the mechanisms of contentious food poli-
tics using media sources. Our adaptation of the Tilly (2008) approach was to 
try to situate individual events within their wider set of interactions between 
protestors and public authorities. The content of the national media was rarely 
detailed or longitudinal enough to enable significant analysis of these interac-
tions. To complement the newspaper coverage analysis, we also undertook quali-
tative case study approaches using primary research to deepen our understanding 
of the means and motivations and repertoires of subsistence protestors. It was 
through the interrogation and triangulation enabled by the use of these mixed 
methods that we found it possible to uncover some of the mechanisms shap-
ing subsistence protests and other forms of contentious food politics during the 
global food crisis.
Notes
 1 See also Hossain and Kalita (2014) and (N. Hossain 2009) for instances of moral econ-
omy thinking during the recent global food crisis.
 2 It should be noted that some articles appeared to use the term euphemistically, per-
haps to attract attention in a period during which food riots had become common. For 
instance, the official response to teenage vandalism of a burger chain in Edinburgh, 
not long after the wave of global protests about food prices, was reported by the Daily 
Record as ‘Yobs Not Locked Up Over Food Riot’ (September 19, 2008, p. 21).
 3 ‘Yobs Not Locked Up Over Food Riot’, Daily Record, September 19, 2008.
 4 www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-118957 [accessed February 15th 2017].
 5 www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-32038 [accessed February 15th 2017].
 6 http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-29970920071012 [accessed February 15th 2017].
 7 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Cong-hits-back-assails-Left-for-Bengal-
food-riots/articleshow/2481814.cms [accessed July 13 2017]; timesofindia.indiatimes.
com/india/Panel-blames-corrupt-PDS-for-Bengal-food-riots/articleshow/2639176.cms 
[accessed February 15th 2017].
 8 For critical analysis of media coverage of recent food riots, see (Sneyd, Legwegoh, and 
Fraser 2013), whose analysis has been very helpful in thinking about the media and the 
politics of food crises. See also (Engels 2014).
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4 Food riots in Bangladesh?
Garments worker protests and 
globalised subsistence crises
Ferdous Jahan and Naomi Hossain
Introduction
This chapter explores the politics of provisions in Bangladesh through an analysis 
of the so-called ‘food riots’ of 2008. On the face of it, poor, malnourished, mal-
governed Bangladesh was a clear candidate for food riots during the global food 
crisis, which the international media duly reported in April 2008. And there 
were indeed subsistence-related struggles, which resonated loudly with the pre-
vailing moral economy. But in intent, form, and repertoire, these struggles rarely 
targeted failures of food marketing systems or demanded action by public authori-
ties, and in no respects resembled what social history has taught us to think of as 
‘food riots’. Although triggered in part by food price rises, these protests reflected 
a strong sense of subsistence crisis among the protesting garments workers, and 
were part of a longer series of struggles over wages by this emergent, globalised 
precariat.
What do these protests tell us about the politics of provisions, or the struggle 
between elites and masses to secure basic protection against crises of subsistence? 
This chapter argues that Bangladesh has, for reasons of political economy, devel-
oped a comparatively responsive state system of food security since the devastat-
ing famine of 1974. Its food security system marries moral with political economy, 
guaranteeing that the interests of the hungry masses and those of the ruling elite 
align, at least to the extent of providing protection against crises of subsistence 
and survival. For this reason, Bangladesh is unusually good – for a country at its 
level of economic and institutional development – at providing such protection 
(Hossain 2017). But its precociousness with respect to national food security is 
not matched by forward thinking on industrial relations: wages have been kept so 
low that the steep rise in global food prices from 2007 caused a subsistence crisis 
among workers in the flagship garments industry, adding impetus and powerful 
moral economic resonance to an ongoing wage struggle. The struggles cast by the 
international media as ‘food riots’ are more correctly viewed as the wage strug-
gles of an emerging class of globalised, precarious industrial labour. These wage 
struggles were not the contentious politics of a population whose state had yet to 
develop the food security apparatus necessary to safeguard against major crises of 
subsistence, but reflected instead the exclusion of that emergent precariat from 
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the protection available to others. The prominent struggles of Bangladesh’s gar-
ments workers during the global food crisis point to what John Bohstedt terms 
the ‘politics of provisions’ as they play out in the recent, globalised subsistence 
crises of developing countries (Bohstedt 2016); this is the nature of contemporary 
grievances around food, and the opportunities affected populations have to mobi-
lise ‘collective bargaining by riot’.
The chapter is organised as follows. It first describes the food crisis of 2008 as it 
unfolded in Bangladesh, and examines some of the official responses, both short- 
and longer-term. Then it explores the politics of provisions during this period, 
looking at how the moral and political economy of food price crises played out in 
protests and other forms of popular and elite advocacy for action to correct fail-
ing food markets. It takes a closer look at how garments workers’ struggles were 
reported on and perceived, and at garments’ workers own views on the meaning 
and purpose of their protests. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what 
the garments workers’ protests tell us about the politics of provisions in Bangla-
desh, both its broad effectiveness in achieving protection without need for wide-
spread protest, at which groups were always excluded from such protection, and 
had the opportunities and means to mobilise to protest.
The global food crisis in Bangladesh
The onset of the global food crisis in 2008 was, for Bangladesh, a matter of triply 
unfortunate timing: excess flooding and Cyclone Sidr in 2007 had reduced the 
harvest by almost two million metric tons (World Bank 2010); national foodgrain 
reserves had been run down, in line with policy recommendations by the World 
Bank (Islam 2012; Chowdhury, Farid, and Roy 2006); and the country was being 
governed by an unelected caretaker government (Ahmed 2010). As the global 
financial crisis unfurled around the world, workers in the flagship readymade gar-
ments industry had already been protesting low wages and breaches of labour 
rights since 2006 (Rahman and Langford 2012; Siddiqi 2017). The high price of 
food could only exacerbate their grievances (Rashid, Hasan, and Hossain 2012).
The effects of the food crisis
The high price of food caused a real, if short-lived, subsistence crisis for the 
majority of Bangladeshis. When global food prices soared in 2008, the country 
was classed among the largest developing countries at risk of a major food cri-
sis (De Janvry and Sadoulet 2008). As late as 2005, 40 per cent of the popula-
tion lived below the country’s poverty line, a quarter in extreme poverty (World 
Bank 2008). Almost half the children were underweight and 12 per cent severely 
underweight in 2007 (NIPORT 2009). And despite progress towards rice self- 
sufficiency (Murshid et al. 2009), Bangladesh was ‘substantially deficit in food 
grains’ when world prices spiked in 2007, partly due to Cyclone Sidr (M. Hos-
sain 2010: 175). In usual years, the domestic grain production shortfall was met 
by Indian imports, averaging around 5 per cent of total consumption annually 
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(World Bank 2010). However, the effective ban on Indian rice exports at the 
height of the global crisis saw consumer rice prices double in 15 months, from 
Bangladesh Taka (BDT) 18 per kg in January 2007 to BDT 35 per kg in April 2008 
(M. Hossain 2010); see (Figure 4.1).
The effects of the rising price of rice were wide and immediate. Nationally, half 
of all spending was on food before prices rose. People started eating less and less 
diverse diets, with lasting adverse effect for infants and small children (Save the 
Children 2009; Thorne-Lyman et al. 2010; Sulaiman, Parveen, and Das 2009). 
Children were withdrawn from school (Raihan 2009), and people endured great 
physical hardships and indignities in order to meet basic needs (Rashid, Hasan, 
and Hossain 2012: 75).
It was not only the poorest who suffered, but people with regular but low-
paying jobs, factory workers, and the lowest grades of the civil service or ‘fixed 
income’ groups. Unlike domestic staff, they could expect no patronage from the 
better-off; and unlike self-employed transport workers or vendors, they found 
it difficult increase their working hours or bid up their earnings. Even middle 
class folk were seen queuing to buy the subsidised (often poor quality) rice 
offered for sale in the Government’s Open Market Sales (OMS) scheme (Khan 
and Wadud 2010). Toiling away in the factories for 10 or more hours a day, six 































































































































Figure 4.1  Wholesale price of coarse rice, Dhaka 1998–2016
Source: FAO GIEWS www.fao.org/pricetool – accessed 27 February 2017
Bangladesh, Dhaka, Rice (coarse- BR-8/ 11/ Guti/ Sharna), Wholesale
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Garments industry wages have been low, and until recent minimum wage rises, 
had stagnated in real terms since the beginning of the century. The price spike 
of 2007–2008 left garments workers’ at ‘starvation levels of living’ (Muhammad 
2011: 25), eating poorly, and sharing overcrowded, unsanitary housing, even 
while working long and arduous shifts. In real terms, although garments work-
ers saw rises in the minimum wage rate in 2006 (from Tk 930 to Tk 1,662 per 
month, the first rise since the wage was established in 1994) and again in 2010 (to 
Tk 3,000), food price inflation meant their real pay stayed more or less stagnant 
throughout the period (Ahmed and Nathan 2014; Rahman 2010; Muhammad 
2011). In other words, workers struggled at great risk to life and limb, only to 
remain on the lowest wages in Asia (Moazzem and Raz 2014).
The international media broadcast news of food riots in Bangladesh in 
April 2008, amidst a wave of similar protests in similarly poor and hunger-prone 
countries worldwide. In Bangladesh, these were framed as food riots (The Times 
of India 2008), food price riots (Al Jazeera 2008), and strikes or riots by garments 
workers over food prices (Ramesh 2008) in the second week of April 2008, when 
the price of rice also peaked. Bangladesh appeared in lists of countries experi-
encing food riots (for instance, CNN 2008; Schneider 2008). Bangladesh made 
several lists of countries that experienced food riots in 2008,1 shorthand for the 
kinds of places likely to suffer when food crises strike.2
Reaffirming national food security3
The global food crisis of 2008 came as a sharp shock to the ruling class and the 
state, and immediate and sustained action was taken. A key lesson from the 2008 
food crisis appears to have been about food sovereignty: that the government 
of Bangladesh must protect its power to influence the stability of domestic food 
prices. Under conditions of global food price volatility, it cannot rely wholly on 
international trade to achieve that, as trading partners may also be pursuing their 
own food sovereignty goals at the expense of their neighbours’. This implies the 
continued need for a strong and capable public food distribution system with the 
agility to respond to crises. It also implies the need for stronger capacities for food 
storage, which are being addressed through the Modern Food Storage Project.4 
It also implies the need for a public food distribution system that enables the 
government to combine the need to rotate its public foodstocks with its goals 
of poverty and hunger reduction and food and nutrition security. The state has 
relied increasingly on getting food markets to work better to ensure stable rice 
prices (see Ahmed, Haggblade, and Chowdhury 2000), and Bangladesh contin-
ues to view international trade as crucial to its food security: when India closed its 
borders in 2008, Bangladesh started to diversify its imports with new trading rela-
tionships with Myanmar, Pakistan, Viet Nam and Thailand (World Bank 2013).
But while the overall thrust of food policy management has been to enable 
markets to work more effectively, the social and political costs of food price spikes 
mean a continued role for public intervention, particularly food price stabili-
zation. Some of the key achievements with respect to food crisis management 
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have included interventions that have averted market failures due to hoarding 
or other collusive behaviours by major market actors (see, for instance, Osmani 
1991; Banerjee et al. 2014). The success of OMS and other fair price programmes 
depended on the state having foodstocks to release into the market, to stabilise 
prices, reassure consumers and traders that food prices would not go too high, 
and ensure food affordability and access. But in 2007–2008, the then-caretaker 
government failed to import enough grain to be able to make an appreciable 
difference in the market (Ali et al. 2008). In part, this was due to the decline in 
grain storage capacity: in the 2000s, the government of Bangladesh had reduced 
reserves with the aim of relying on the global market. By 2007–2008, only half 
a million metric tonnes were distributed through the Public Food Distribution 
System (PFDS) (Raihan 2013), when the National Food Policy declared a mil-
lion tons of public food stocks as its objective. After 2008, distribution through 
the PFDS rose to 2.29 million tons; at its peak during the 2007–2012 crisis period, 
public food stocks amounted to 2.77 million tons, of which 1.6 million were to 
be distributed through the safety net programme (World Bank 2013). A new pro-
gramme of warehouse construction featuring improved grain storage facilities has 
been supported since the 2008 crisis by the World Bank, which appears to have 
acknowledged that under these new conditions of price volatility, it is appropri-
ate for the government to have a ‘renewed focus on ensuring a higher level of 
public stocks . . . a consequence of hikes in international rice and prices and 
disruptions of rice imports in 2007–2008’ (World Bank 2013: 109).
Social protection
The global food crisis also helped persuade the government of the need for 
stronger social protection provision, noting in particular the exposure of the 
urban working classes to the global economy, without the customary protections:
[W]ith informal safety nets eroding, newer risks emerging from rapid processes 
of urbanization and global economic integration, and, stronger assertion of 
mitigation demands from a democratizing polity, a holistic re-thinking on 
the direction, scope and design of safety net policies in particular and social 
protection policy in general has become necessary.
(GoB 2012: 165)
The 2008 food crisis prompted the establishment of at least one important new 
social protection scheme, the Employment Guarantee for the Poorest. Although 
this was originally introduced under the caretaker government in 2008, the 
incoming Awami League government rebranded and expanded the scheme in 
its first term. The National Social Security Strategy stated that ‘Despite numer-
ous administrative problems, these programmes [FFW, the EGPP, and the OMS] 
have helped cushion against the impact of food price shocks’ (GED 2015: 41). 
However, it seems that provision falls well short of need: a 2009 nationally repre-
sentative survey of household shocks and coping mechanisms found that 29 per 
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cent of respondents had access to a public safety net, but that these ranked fourth 
in the list of sources of help with the crisis (Santos et al. 2011). Analysis in the 
wake of the 2009 Cyclone Aila found that 90 per cent of relief (food, cash, water, 
medicine, etc.) was distributed via state safety net channels and was well-targeted 
to those affected, but resource levels were inadequate to make a significant dif-
ference, and need was far wider than provision (Akter and Mallick 2013; Akter 
and Basher 2014). Direct social protection against food crises remains somewhat 
token – gesturing towards rather than guaranteeing food security.
Subsistence protests and civil society action,  
2007–2012: who, when, how, and why
Who protested or demanded action, why, and how during the global food crisis? 
To what extent did their claims hold government to account? What does the pat-
tern and nature of these contentious events tell us about the politics of provisions 
in Bangladesh more generally?
To address these questions, we constructed a political events catalogue from 
a careful digital and/or hand search of three of the most influential daily news-
papers in Bangladesh: the English language Daily Star, the Bangla Ittefaq and 
the highest circulation Bangla Prothom Alo. A search protocol was developed, 
tested, and refined, and a database developed to enable systematic quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of all reported events in which food security or related 
issues of subsistence were in contention during 2007–2012, the period of both 
major global and domestic food price spikes. To ensure coverage of a sufficiently 
wide range of contentious events to capture the quality and tenor of the politics 
of food crisis, claims-making in relation to food consumption (e.g., demands for 
fair priced food, price controls, subsidies, food relief) were included as well as 
in relation to food production (fertiliser, costs of irrigation, other agricultural 
inputs), as well as subsistence protests or claims-making activities that explicitly 
identified the rising cost of living as a source of subsistence crisis. The experience 
of constructing a political events catalogue showed us the great variability of cov-
erage of such events, including urban bias. After selecting from several thousand 
newspaper articles, a total of 168 newspaper articles covering 86 discrete events – 
some of them connected in protracted struggles – were analysed in detail.
Although worldwide, this was a highly febrile, protest-rich period (Ortiz et al. 
2013; Barnett 2011), contentious events relating to food or fuel were, perhaps 
surprisingly, few in number in densely-populated, low-income Bangladesh. This 
may have been due to the official ban on political demonstrations during the 
caretaker government, which was in place for the early part of the food crisis, in 
2007 and 2008. The 86 contentious events relating to the food crisis reported on 
in 168 articles, many of them non-violent or ‘civil’ in nature contrasts with esti-
mates of political violence, chiefly between political party supporters, of around 
2,423 episodes of ‘political conflicts’ between 1991 and 2002 (Moniruzzaman 
2009), and 2,859 of political violence, including terrorism, between 2001–2006 
(J. Alamgir 2011). But while food crisis-related contention was limited in scale, 
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it clustered around moments when retail prices of basic foodstuffs were peaking. 
This suggests that those who protested were persuaded of the seriousness and 
justice of their protests, and/or disinclined to believe the public authorities would 
suppress them. And that they were few in number does not mean the protests 
were insignificant; indeed, their rarity may tell us something important about the 
moral and political economy of food crises in that context.
Contentious actors and actions, 2007–2012
Table 4.1 lists all groups and organisations mentioned in all news articles about 
all types of contentious events relating to the food crisis in this period. These 
included riots, protests, and demonstrations, as well as more ‘civil’ or organised 
events staged by civil society organizations (‘human chains’, petitions, roundta-
ble discussions) that also fell outside the formal political process. The main polit-
ical parties took up issues of the cost of living in the period, particularly while 
they were in opposition, and both parties when in opposition led demonstrations 
to raise the issue. A small number of civil society groups also mounted actions, 
but these were usually more polite or formal organizational means of advocating 
action than protests. Some involved stylised repertoires of contentious politics 
such as demonstrations or actions staged for the benefit of the media, such as the 
token hunger strike. However, organised labour and worker welfare organisations 
were more prominent than party political actors. Garments workers’ protests led 
the fray: almost 40 per cent of all groups mentioned in relation to subsistence 
protests were garments workers or their organisations. The next most impor-
tant category was farmers and fisherfolk and their welfare groups/councils, with 
almost one-fifth of all mentions. Other groups with a significant presence in the 
protests were other labour organisations, including those of low paid public sec-
tor workers’ unions and groups. The rural poor, including destitute women and 
people affected by disasters or demanding relief, comprised only 6 per cent of all 
mentions.
Newspaper reports of grievances to do with rapid food price rises were less 
frequent during the 2010–2011 spike than in 2007–2008. This may reflect that 
in real terms, the second price spike was less severe than the first, and wages had 
risen for many (Zhang et al. 2013). It is possible that the drama of price spikes 
had subsided by 2010, and that people had adjusted their lives and expectations 
to the ‘squeeze’ of higher rates of inflation (Hossain, King, and Kelbert 2013). 
In addition, protections against food crises in the form of the national foodgrain 
reserve and direct food transfers and subsidies were more in evidence and quicker 
to kick in than they were in 2008.
Whatever the precise mix of factors, those who protested in 2010–2011 
were still aggrieved about high food prices, but the objectives and triggers for 
subsistence protests were now even more closely focused on wages and labour 
rights than had been the case in 2008. It may not, then, be a coincidence that 
there were 30 episodes of garments industry violence in the six months between 
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second food price spike; but by this time, perhaps as a result of their success 
at having bid up minimum wages in 2010, their attention was on the mini-
mum wage, rather than on food prices (which appeared to continue to rise) 
or on the marketing of rice, which proceeded as it always had. Other groups 
similarly focused on their rights to earn a living wage rather than on what that 
wage could afford them, despite remaining aggrieved by high food costs. In 
early 2011, as food prices spiked the second time, Dhaka rickshaw-pullers told 
researchers they felt they needed to protest to alert the attention of the govern-
ment to unlivable inflation. Yet when members of their profession rioted three 
weeks later, they cited the closure of their usual routes, rather than food prices, 
as their grievance (Rashid, Hasan, and Hossain 2012). This suggested that infla-
tion had become normalised or de-politicised, and that, although still a major 
public grievance, high prices no longer afforded the political opportunity for 
protest they once did.
Several of the more ‘civil’ events to advocate for public action on food prices 
addressed similar points to subsistence protestors themselves. At a pre-budget 
consultation meeting, a group of respected economists denounced governmental 
inaction to address food prices, noting that ‘economic indicators could not feed 
people’ (Daily Star 2008). Such awareness of and/or proximity to the plight of 
those living with poverty and food insecurity is, for political/historical reasons, 
characteristic of the elite-mass relationship (Hossain 2005). It suggests a degree 
of cross-class consensus with respect to the moral economy, or views about the 
responsibilities of public authorities to protect the population against the failures 
of food markets.
National government, in particular the executive and line ministries (e.g. 
food), were a key object of most major protests and advocacy events, but sub-
district and lower-level officials and elected representatives were targets of more 
localised protests. Global policies and actors were rarely objects of protest, other 
than a handful of events protesting actions of corporations and large companies, 
including foreign investors (e.g., the China Contractual Authority). Fully one-
third of all targets of protests mentioned in all the articles were garments fac-
tory owners and their association, the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and 
Exporters Association (BGMEA). Through these indirect routes, the subsistence 
protests targeted transnational actors and institutions.
Figure 4.2 provides a basic count of the types of action described in the article 
(in some cases more than one action was mentioned). All are from the Dainik 
Ittefaq, which provided a relatively rich archive in the vernacular. Reflecting the 
dominance of industrial conflict in the sample, the description of the events and 
the actions taken are substantially more often unruly and disruptive (demon-
strations, agitations, sieges, marches/processions) than civil (hearings, human 
chains, memoranda, discussions, petitions). This pattern extends also to the vio-
lent nature of these events: in some 30 events, or more than one-third of the 
total, vandalism of factories or vehicles and threats of violence occurred. The 
impression given by the news coverage is also that these were usually unorganised 
events – riots and agitations rather than organised lobbying or civil action: out 
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Figure 4.2  Repertoires of protest
Note: n=95 because more than one action could be recorded during a single event
Source: Political events catalogue, Dainik Ittefaq archive
of 84 events, 47 were described in terms that suggested spontaneity and lack of 
organisation, and 36 were characterised as organised or planned events.
We turn now to a closer look at how garments workers themselves perceived 
their grievances and opportunities for mobilization during this period of subsist-
ence crisis.
Wage struggles and subsistence protests among  
garments workers, 2002–2012
This chapter draws on the case study of garments workers’ protests in the peri-
urban industrial area of Savar, north of Dhaka, the April 2008 episodes of which 
had been reported by the international press as ‘food riots’. Because of the sensi-
tivities of researching such events, the case study research involved preliminary 
assessment and observational work and then a period of building trust and rap-
port with workers; only then were focus groups and interviews conducted. Focus 
group discussions used prepared protocols with protest participants, workers from 
the area who had not themselves participated in the protests, and local market 
stallholders and shopkeepers, while interviews with a small number of journal-
ists, leaders and activists and officials were also undertaken to fill in gaps and 
triangulate findings.
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Savar has been the focal point of industrial unrest since the 2000s, owing in 
part to the concentration of garments factories and the presence of the Dhaka 
Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in this sub-district, 25 km north of Dhaka. Savar 
has more recently become associated with exploitation in global export indus-
try, as the infamous site of the Rana Plaza building collapse which killed 1,130 
workers and injured almost 5,000 more in April 2013 (for accounts of which, 
see Karim 2014; Motlagh and Saha 2014). More than any protest, the trag-
edy and horror of that event exposed the chronic precariousness of workers’ 
lives, and their dependence on dangerously exploitative jobs to earn the barest 
subsistence.
Moving targets and shifting repertoires in the garments  
workers’ struggles
Garments workers offered a timeline of the struggles in their industry that placed 
the so-called ‘food riots’ of 2008 in perspective as a comparatively minor, if dis-
tinctive, moment in a longer struggle that had evolved over time, in relation to 
the political opportunities and grievances workers faced. Workers in Savar linked 
the 2008 and 2010–2011 struggles (featured in the political events catalogue, 
and referred to previously) to a longer sequence of struggles for adequate pay and 
conditions that dated back to 2002, and continued throughout the period cov-
ered by the research. Protests were initially motivated by demands for increased 
wages and against the illegal practice of terminating workers’ employment with-
out justification. In 2004, workers told us that the main protests spread out across 
factories in the area after an illegal sacking which had in turn been triggered by 
demands for trade union rights in a sweater factory. The police and local gang-
sters were called in to quell the protest, so organisers soon learned to organise 
outside the factory walls. These struggles were often fruitful: in one factory, work-
ers described how they had been permitted to organise after a demonstration 
entered the factory.
By 2006, protests had shifted from targeting the management of individual fac-
tories to making demands of industry leadership and the state, through a move-
ment focussed on the single and clear demand of raising the minimum wage. 
Since its establishment in 1994, the basic monthly minimum wage had been 
stagnant at BDT 930 (in January 2017 exchange rates, USD 11.74) (Ahmed and 
Nathan 2014).5 In 2006, the struggle that emerged was large in scale and spread 
rapidly through the Export Processing Zones (EPZ),6 despite repressive tactics 
by the police. The 2006 struggles were widely seen as a success for the workers, 
as the basic monthly minimum wage rate was raised, for the first time since its 
establishment, to BDT 1,662 (currently, USD 20.98). As the workers explained 
it, these protests were generally self-organising, without involvement by external 
actors. They adopted non-violent means to protest, viewing acts of violence as 
committed by ‘outsiders’ – professional agitators, not workers. The major political 
parties offered workers no support, although leftist political organisations backed 
them. Workers began to learn from their successes.7
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There was a qualitative change in the political space for workers’ protests 
after 2007, as external actors – workers’ rights organisations, leftist coalitions 
and groups, and activist and civil society organisations, several with roots in the 
garments workers’ struggles – began to engage with their struggles. Through this 
engagement, workers’ repertoires widened to include dialogue with factory own-
ers and industry leaders, information campaigns through leafleting about workers’ 
demands, and the use of peaceful human chains. Even with the involvement of 
new actors, the main source of mobilisation was stimulated by the ‘in-charge’ 
workers who commanded workers’ respect. Experienced leadership of ‘in-charge’ 
workers was used to organise a large group of workers, who would then spread the 
word by mobile phones and other means. In some factories, even this relatively 
flat leadership was absent, and groups decided on actions without clear leader-
ship. The involvement of external actors in supporting the workers’ protests did 
not reflect in the mobilisation. The site of mobilisation remained the factory.
Growing inadequacy of wages during the period of rapid food price rises from 
2007 led to relatively spontaneous and unorganised responses by workers in 
Savar. One reason was that, by 2007, workers were accustomed to taking to the 
street, and to taking factory-based action. Actions that started in one factory 
quickly spread to others, as news of wage increases were shared. The ‘movement’ 
was sporadic and stop-start, and never sought a long-term solution to their prob-
lems: direct action stopped whenever a raise was realised, and re-started when 
increased wages were found to be inadequate.
Throughout, the workers’ struggles had no major-party political support (no 
doubt reflecting the importance of garments factory ownership among the politi-
cal elite). Small leftist political parties joined in actions later during this period, 
but played no significant role in organising workers. A mutual lack of interest 
between the workers’ struggle and party politics reflected the workers’ distrust 
of political parties of all stripes. One male worker in a focus group with (non-
active) male garments workers noted that ‘we do not believe in banners (of polit-
ical  parties) – that will compromise our movement’ (focus group discussion on 
July 23, 2013, Savar, Dhaka).
The moral economy of garments workers’ protests
Over time, garments workers framed protests in different ways, in part depending 
on the wider political context, and in part on the political education gained from 
(at times) successful organizing. However, they continued to lack important party 
political backing and articulated their grievances and demands without refer-
ence to leftist or popular groups. Despite the presence of some established leftist 
groups (such as the workers’ wing of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal and the Com-
munist Party of Bangladesh) at some protests, workers’ struggles did not notice-
ably make common cause with other urban groups on fixed low incomes (such 
as other industrial or low-paid public or private sector workers). This may partly 
reflect the central significance of garments labour to the economy as a whole: 
this labour-intensive industry alone contributes 80 per cent of export earnings 
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(Bangladesh Bank 2015; MoF 2015), and employs more than half of all industrial 
labour (BBS 2013). It may also reflect the historic co-optation of organised labour 
by party politics, and the tendency for Bangladeshi garments workers to attract 
support from international labour interests and groups (see Siddiqi 2017).
However, compared to their early days, when protests almost universally tar-
geted factory owners for wage rises, workers began to frame their struggles in 
terms of subsistence rights, flagging issues such as the rising cost of living and 
the minimum wage, and basic labour standards. This was particularly noticeable 
during the food crisis period, and for the first time, garments workers’ concerns 
appeared to be resonating with those of not only the low-income rural and urban 
masses, but also the ‘respectable’ middle and lower-middle classes, all of whom 
were struggling with the sudden price rises to greater and lesser extent.
Some workers used the term a ‘fair wage’ to talk about their demands for higher 
pay. Workers clarified that such a wage afforded not only a basic living standard – 
not merely enough rice to stave off hunger and maintain factory functionality – 
but enough scope to invest in the future, for a decent standard of social reproduc-
tion. Speaking to us in 2013, when food prices were still believed to be high and 
the period of the price spikes were vividly remembered, people noted the strong 
sense of unfairness that their hard labour failed to afford them even basic needs. 
‘M.H.’, a married 40-year-old textile dyeing factory worker based in the EPZ in 
Savar, explained that, ‘Now the ongoing movement (andolon) is for fair wages. If 
government were to give those fair wages, we would see that everywhere people 
could meet their needs.’ Workers spoke about how rising living costs made it 
difficult for them to remit money to their families in the village – to do so is not 
only a source of pride but also an important source of support for ageing parents 
or families left behind.
Price controls were widely agreed upon as one of the key responsibilities of the 
government. The established idea was that the government can and should set a 
fixed price or control prices that people can afford to pay. The idea of a fair price 
or a fair wage refers to a social order in which people can manage their needs to 
a reasonable standard of living. In the protests in 2008 in particular, garments 
workers used the slogan ‘dam komao, banchte dao’ (‘reduce prices, let us live’). 
Labour leaders noted that food prices became a central part of their agenda at this 
time, because the rises made it even harder for workers to maintain even basic 
dietary standards, let alone other expenditures. By 2011, however, even though 
the political events catalogue identified other, smaller populations of (other, non-
garment) factory and other workers protesting high food prices, garments work-
ers’ protests were framed more in terms of wage rises. This reflected their successes 
at getting raised minimum wage levels in 2006, 2010, and (after the fieldwork was 
completed) 2013.
Food security for garments workers
To label workers’ struggles ‘food riots’ is to misrepresent their meaning; however, 
the food crisis created distinct political opportunities for the workers to dramatise 
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Table 4.2  Minimum wages in the garments sector




Sources: 2006 and 2010 are from Ahmed and Nathan (2014); 2013 estimate of per cent increase is 
from (Woodruff 2014)
their grievances around fair pay and conditions. At the same time, exploitatively 
low wages – workers’ ‘forced underconsumption’ (Araghi 2009) – were part of the 
same global economic system that led to the food price crisis. In brief, workers’ 
wages had always been unliveably low, and ‘the end of cheap food’ (Moore 2014) 
meant that in real terms, they declined further, and sharply so.
That policy elites recognised the moral and the political-economic signifi-
cance of the garments workers’ protests during the food crisis can be gauged from 
several different responses. The development of greatest significance was the rise 
in the minimum wage (see Table 4.2). At the time of writing (January 2017), 
workers’ struggles for a higher wage continued. This no doubt reflects both the 
experience of success in getting higher wages, and the continued inadequacy of 
the minimum wage in the context of rapid inflation; one 2014 estimate was that 
the minimum wage should have been set at BDT 8,200, but that the cost of meet-
ing a ‘model diet’ would have set the minimum wage at BDT 14,900 (Moazzem 
and Raz 2014).
A practically minor but symbolically significant success saw workers win the 
right to Open Market Sales (OMS) or state-subsidised foodgrain sales in factories. 
Specific factory-based sales were necessary because OMS usually take place dur-
ing working hours, and typically involves queuing for long periods of time. The 
state had responded by allocating subsidised grains for sale to up to three million 
workers by May 2009, soon after the newly-elected Awami League government 
came to power. This was a significant commitment in principle, but in practice 
was soon abandoned as market prices dropped in the first half of 2009, making the 
(often poor quality) subsidised OMS grains less attractive (bdnews24.com 2009).
While it never actually improved workers’ food security, the deployment of 
OMS in factories signalled a shift in how garments workers were viewed, suggest-
ing a new recognition of workers’ rights to food security as equivalent to those of 
other urban citizens, the need for special steps to ensure their access was the same 
as any other citizen, taking into account their particular modes of work and work-
ing hours. It also signalled very directly that the state accepted the responsibility 
or mandate for enabling their access to affordable food. It is possible to argue 
that this symbolism has gendered significance, in that an estimated 80 per cent 
of the country’s four million garments workers are women. There are no credible 
estimates of the level of womens’ participation in workers’ struggles in the 2000s, 
but although men are assumed to be more active, it is also clear that women 
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workers have taken a frontline position (Siddiqi 2017; Z. Rahman and Langford 
2012). It was partly because of the presumed docility and dependence of Bang-
ladeshi women that wages had been kept low; implicitly, women had husbands 
or fathers responsible for providing for them, and anyway, they were unlikely to 
rebel. Among other things, the establishment of OMS in factories signals explicit 
recognition of women as citizen-workers, or as ‘householders’ responsible for food 
security in their own right, and therefore with the right to protection against food 
crises tailored to their needs.
It should be kept in mind, however, that the Industrial Police were also estab-
lished in 2010, and that repression has been a significant, if not the most impor-
tant, response to the workers’ struggles (Siddiqi 2017; Z. Rahman and Langford 
2012). In addition, neither the Industrial Policies of 2010 or 2016 directly 
addressed garments workers’ wages or food security issues; the 2013 amendments 
to the Labour Law and other policy initiatives related directly to the after-effects 
of the Rana Plaza disaster, including the U.S. withdrawal of trade privileges (Kib-
ria et al. 2014).
Conclusions
What does this survey of contentious events around the 2008 food crisis tell us 
about the politics of provisions in contemporary Bangladesh? The chapter noted 
that the global food crisis hit Bangladesh hard in 2008, its impact aggravated by 
pre-existing poverty and hunger, two major cyclones, and exposure to global food 
market volatilities. A series of contentious events, including high-profile violent 
protests by workers in the flagship readymade garment industry, dramatised and 
politicised inflationary conditions. But the Awami League government elected 
in late 2008 took credit for stabilizing the food situation in this turbulent period. 
Tackling food prices took top billing on the election manifesto that won the party 
its largest mandate since the 1970s, signalling its intention to handle the crisis at 
all costs (BRAC University and Institute of Governance Studies 2010). The gov-
ernment shopped further afield for grain imports, expanded open market sales of 
cheap food, widened the social safety net, and built warehouses for expanded food 
reserves. When world food prices spiked again in 2010–2011, Bangladeshis were 
better insulated than many of their neighbours – and better than their grandpar-
ents would have been.
Arriving slap-bang in the middle of an unelected, military-backed regime, the 
2008 food crisis showcased the wide democratic streak that runs through the 
politics of provisions in contemporary Bangladesh. A popular political theory 
heard around the 2008 crisis was that the government was responsible for pro-
tecting its people against food shocks; it would do so not out of great love for 
its people, but because of simple democratic pressures – exerted, if necessary, 
through direct action, electoral or protest (Hossain and Kalita 2014; Hossain 
and Green 2011). The coincidence of the tenure of the caretaker government 
(January 2007 – December 2008) with the rising rice price lost its popularity, 
and confirmed the idea that military governments were inherently less capable 
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than ‘political’ governments of protecting the population against food crises (see 
[Islam 2012]). The U.S. Embassy reported on the worries of an unelected govern-
ment, highlighting in particular the grievances of garments workers:
Bangladesh’s food crisis threatens the country’s fragile Caretaker Govern-
ment . . . [Eighty] to 90 percent of Bangladeshis surveyed said they were 
worse off economically under this government than under the previous 
government. Thirty to forty percent of those surveyed said they had low or 
extremely low confidence in the CTG, up from 20 to 30 percent in February. 
Since January, thousands of garment workers have staged protests over high 
prices and low wages. The government is especially sensitive to discontent 
in the ready-made garment (RMG) sector, which supplies the country’s main 
export earnings and employs close to 2 million workers. The average wage 
for a garment worker ranges between USD 45 and 90 per month. Food secu-
rity has political ramifications in Bangladesh and threatens the stability of 
an already-weak Caretaker Government committed to hold elections and 
restore democracy in the Muslim-majority nation.
(American Embassy Dhaka 2008)
As the caretaker government had (somewhat ineffectively) banned politi-
cal protests, the sound of popular discontent was muffled. Some of the coun-
try’s superstar economists, a group frequently found on television talk shows and 
opinion columns, hosted a meeting to discuss Amartya Sen’s theory about the 
relationship between democracy and famine, an unsubtle dig at the unelected 
regime. Among its many efforts to address the food crisis, the top-ranking gen-
eral made the politically naïve proposal that Bangladeshis ‘should eat potatoes’ 
rather than relying on expensive rice (Unb 2008). So when food prices dropped 
sharply just after the Awami League government took power in early 2009, this 
gave credence to the idea that political governments respond faster than military 
(even though the success reflected the global commodity slump and a bumper 
harvest more than action by the new government). In general, the failures of 
the caretaker government were overstated in popular opinion, and the successes 
of the Awami League government in 2008 slightly lucky. But the popular theory 
was reaffirmed.
What reasons do Bangladeshis have to believe elected governments will do 
whatever it takes to protect against food crises? As was noted in the introduc-
tion to this chapter, Bangladesh has earned a reputation for having developed 
relatively responsive systems for protecting its population against the crises of 
subsistence and survival that come with the country’s chronic exposure to natu-
ral disasters such as cyclones and food price shocks, such as occurred in 2008 
and 2010–2011. The political origins of these systems in Bangladesh themselves 
originate in the aftermath of an earlier global food price crisis, the OPEC oil crisis 
of 1973–1974, which pushed up world food prices and subjected starving popula-
tions across Africa and Asia to the realpolitik of cold war food aid (Gerlach 2015; 
Rothschild 1976). The 1974 famine in Bangladesh was a humanitarian disaster 
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in which 1.5 million people, two per cent of the population at the time (M. 
Alamgir 1980), perished. But it was also a disaster for the political elite, contrib-
uting directly to the end of the democratic political settlement of the country’s 
independence from Pakistan, the assassination of the nationalist founding father, 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and his family. This ushered in 15 years of authoritar-
ian rule, and, for better or for worse, paving the way for liberal economic reforms 
and aid dependence (Hossain 2017). The Bangladeshi elite to this date remain 
closely attuned to the de-legitimating effects of subsistence crises. When asked 
why Bangladesh has such an elaborate and relatively responsive system of food 
security in place, several respondents from the upper rungs of policy and scholar-
ship explained that it was ‘because of the famine’. This was sometimes offered 
as if it were the self-evident underlying architecture of food security and social 
protection policy, needing no more detailed explanation.
Some protest was likely in the Bangladesh of 2008, as all governments strug-
gled to stabilise prices and protect their vulnerable and the hapless unelected 
regime fumbled at first with imports and fair price outlets. As the crisis struck, 
political parties and civil society elites no doubt felt the need to remind the 
unelected regime of its responsibilities under the moral economy. But the gar-
ments workers’ protests added new dimensions to these politics of provisions. 
First, they highlighted the acute vulnerabilities of the country’s flagship export 
industries to not only the low wages that come with a position at the bottom of 
the global value chain, but also exposure to global commodity price volatilities, 
and therefore to subsistence crises. Second, they highlighted their exclusion from 
the protections of the moral economy, which assured that hungry people could 
at least queue up for cheap or free food. Bangladesh’s national food system has, 
somewhat prematurely, achieved the kinds of security that Tilly noted came with 
an integrated, openly-traded domestic food market; this reduces the likelihood of 
riots targeting the marketing of foodgrains (Tilly 1974). But those most exposed 
to the downsides of global economic integration, the garments workers, also (and 
partly as a result) have the greatest opportunities to mobilise, and likelihood of 
success. There were no ‘food riots’ in Bangladesh in 2008 signalling the pains 
of adjustment to a market economy, but garments workers’ wage struggles were 
nonetheless a sign of the country’s adjustment to its newly industrial position in 
the global economy.
Notes
 1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007%E2%80%9308_world_food_price_crisis#Bang 
ladesh (accessed January 10, 2017).
 2 For instance, the celebrated essayist Mark Greif opened his 2008 discourse ‘On Food’ 
with: ‘Food riots have broken out in Haiti, Egypt, Mozambique, and Bangladesh’ (Greif, 
2016: 37).
 3 This section cites grey literature, official documents and newspaper reports. But it relies 
substantially on interviews with a small number of high-ranking policymakers (gov-
ernment and aid agency) and senior experts and scholars, the aims of which were to 
reconstruct the policy thinking and practice of the period. Due to the sensitive nature 
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of some of the material discussed, these interviews have been anonymised to protect the 
identities of respondents.
 4 www.mfsp.gov.bd/project.php; accessed February 16, 2016.
 5 Note that workers typically earn considerably more than the basic rate, which is the 
entry-level pay, and because most also earn overtime. However, take-home pay remains 
very low in practice, and hourly rates particularly so. See (Ahmed and Nathan 2014; 
Moazzem and Raz 2014) for discussion of the minimum wages and effective wages in the 
RMG industry.
 6 EPZs are special industrial zones offered for setting up industries by foreign investors. 
These are protected, closed areas with strict security.
 7 See also (Siddiqi 2017; Z. Rahman and Langford 2012).
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The policy effects of food riots  




The global media generally portrayed riots during the 2007–2008 and 2010–2011 
periods simplistically, as caused by food price rises in contexts of poverty and 
hunger (Sneyd, Legwegoh and Fraser 2013). The main policy response across 
the African continent at that time was to increase staple food imports and make 
these ‘cheap’ foods more available to the urban population, which fit the pre-
sumption that the food crisis hit the urban poor hardest. Writing for AllAfrica, 
Simon Maxwell (2009) contended that the food crisis hit African cities and 
urban diets the hardest:
Many Africans were hit hard in 2008 by rising food and fuel prices. With 
diets already stretched, and resources eroded, the numbers below the pov-
erty line will increase, with long-term consequences. Remember, hunger 
is corrosive of long-term life chances: it undermines the ability to grow, to 
learn, to stay healthy and to earn. . . . The first to suffer this time will not 
be rural people, far from the capital city, losing crops and animals, and often 
children, to the lack of rain. Instead, jobs will be lost in towns, amongst the 
vocal and educated. There were food riots in Africa last year. . . . And ten-
sion is rising.
What were reported as the food riots of 2008 were actually more complex and sig-
nificant than riot events, both in their origins and in their impacts on urban hun-
ger (Hossain and Green 2011; Mason et al. 2011; Sneyd et al. 2013). The African 
media tended to portray the food riots as being caused by a more complex set of 
factors, including citizen dissatisfaction and people’s ability to mobilize (Sneyd 
et al. 2013). And some researchers argue that the protests across Africa at that 
time were not food riots at all (Branch and Mampilly 2015). So simply throwing 
more ‘cheap’ food at the problem would not touch the simmering, underlying 
problems that sparked the protests in the first place.
An emergent body of work on the food riots of 2007–2008 suggest that the 
riots were linked to food inaccessibility on the one hand and inequality, poverty 
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and the need for better governance and greater equality on the other (Dia Kamg-
nia 2011; Sneyd et al. 2013; Berazneva and Lee 2013; Dimova and Gbakou 2013; 
Hossain et al. 2014). This is contrary to a commonly held assumption about the 
causes of food riots. For instance, the authors of the Foresight Report (2011) 
assume that a food price rise triggers riots regardless of situation and context, and 
that it is necessary to produce more food to avoid riots in the future. But the real-
ity is more complex: the food price crises have made accessing adequate food and 
maintaining nutritious diets more difficult for urban dwellers and connects them 
more deeply to a globalized food system (Pinstrup-Andersen 2010; Legwegoh 
et al. 2015; Clapp and Scrinis 2016). During the crisis, it seemed that it was easier 
to fill people’s bellies than tackle a more complex set of factors such as disenfran-
chisement, marginalization and accessibility.
In Cameroon, the distinction was no different. Drawing on interviews in mar-
kets and households in three cities in Cameroon, it was learned that the rice 
subsidies introduced during the crisis changed people’s diets and the local forest 
food economy in negative ways, replacing traditionally diverse diets with refined 
white rice-based dishes. The reliance on imported rice creates a vulnerable urban 
population, especially when world prices for rice remained volatile after 2008 
(Moseley, Carney and Becker 2010). The reality of relying on the world market 
for rice has had a considerable impact on urban dwellers realizing food security 
and has set the stage for a nutrition transition in this Central African country 
(L. Sneyd 2013, 2016b).
Methodology and approach
Two questions guided this study: What was the impact of the 2008 food riots in 
Cameroon on food security? What was the long-term impact of the food riots and 
rice subsidy on people’s diets after 2008? To answer her research questions, the 
author made five field visits to Cameroon from 2010–2013 to conduct urban food 
security research and to ask questions about the 2008 food riots and impacts on 
local food economies after the price spikes.1 During the field visits, over 100 elite 
interviews were conducted with officials from the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation (FAO), World Food Programme (WFP), the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and relevant government officials and local researchers. In 
addition to the in-country fieldwork, the study employed mixed methods, includ-
ing a review and analysis of media sources, reports and academic studies. The 
author also hired a team of 12 local researchers to conduct qualitative interviews 
with urban food traders and their customers on food security, dietary change and 
the 2008 unrest. These interviews were primarily managed in urban food markets 
during the wet and dry seasons in 2012–2013. In total, 409 people were inter-
viewed for the study. The data collection happened in two phases. In the first 
phase, 371 interviews were completed; and in phase two, 38 in depth-interviews 
were completed. The two phases covered 24 markets in three cities – the French-
speaking capital and smaller English-speaking cities. See Table 5.1 for markets 
and number of interviews from the first phase.
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The multi-focal approach was adopted to capture ‘sounds from the ground’ 
or impressions from people who may have been involved in the unrest, to learn 
more of the lived experience of the unrest and impacts on household food secu-
rity. Interview questions ranged from questions about household size, employ-
ment and family assets to questions about household food shopping, what 
happens when food prices are high and what the households does when there 
is not enough money to buy food. Also included were questions about the foods 
that are commonly consumed when food prices are high and questions about the 
cheapest meal consumed in the household and the most favorite meal. Questions 
were also asked about what was remembered about the riots of 2008, what foods 
do you need to feel food secure and happy, and how has your diet changed over 
time. The quotations from individuals from the markets are not outliers but are 
representative of the theme under discussion. Accompanying the quotes from the 
surveys is the market name and the date the quotation was recorded. The author 
has not changed the quotes, relying on the informants’ recorded account.
Table 5.2 characterizes the data by age, gender and reported class based on 
employment, income and assets. The data predominately represents middle class 
(65 per cent) females (86 per cent) between the ages of 20–40 (54 per cent). 
The data depicts a variety of occupations, primarily food vendors (~171) on pre-
carious incomes in the informal sector. However, household interviews were also 
conducted with house cleaners (26), business owners and employees (17) teach-
ers (18), civil servants (12), housewives (12), nurses (7), secretaries (7), students 
(8), lawyers (4), retirees (4), journalists (2), professors (2), aestheticians (2), 
hotel industry employees (2), a doctor, a naturopath, a landscaper, a builder, a 
prison guard, a taxi driver, an accountant, a freelance writer and a decorator. The 
Table 5.1  Market and number of interviews in Cameroon
Country and City Market Name # Interviews (n = 371)
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Table 5.2  Characterization of interview data by age, gender, class
Interviews 
(n = 367)
Total # % Interviews 
(n = 371)
Total # % Households 
(n = 197)
Total # %
Age < 20 3 0.8 Male 54 14.5 Poor 44 22.6
Age 20–40 197 53.7 Female 317 85.5 Middle 126 64.6
Age 40+ 135 36.8 Rich 16 8.2
No answer 32 8.7 No answer 9 4.6
participants represent a middle class in Cameroon from popular neighbourhoods, 
where contingent employment, employment in the informal sector, short-term 
employment as civil servants or seasonal workers on plantations are the norm 
(Bernards 2015; L. Sneyd 2015).
The majority of urban dwellers in Cameroon spend more than half of their 
income on food (from 50–75 per cent). This does not leave much room in the 
budget for other basic needs (Sneyd 2016a; 2016b). Households in the highest 
income group spend 25 per cent of their income on food. By contrast, those in the 
lowest income group spend 66 per cent of their income on food. The households 
interviewed mentioned various coping strategies they adopt when food accessi-
bility challenges arise. They eat fewer meals, a smaller quantity of food and lower 
quality food, and consume less diverse diets. When factoring in dependents and 
household size this study includes over 2,111 individuals. The author makes no 
claim from this case study that data are representative of the wider populations 
of these cities or quantitative rates of food insecurity in these cities. Instead, the 
data represents a snapshot into the lived and daily realities of food provisioning 
for residents of Yaoundé, Limbe and Buea.2
The data from the interviews were organized using dimensions established by 
Olivier de Schutter, the former UN special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, to 
better understand the food security situation in Cameroon (see also A. Sneyd, 
Legwegoh and L. Sneyd [2015]). De Schutter visited Cameroon in 2012 and his 
report on the mission focused on the widely accepted dimensions of the right to 
food, such as: the availability of food, the accessibility of food and the adequacy 
of food (de Schutter 2012; A. Sneyd, Legwegoh and S. Sneyd 2015; Clapp 2017). 
This chapter focuses on these dimensions to better understand the impact of the 
unrest on food security and the subsequent rolling out of social safety nets, such 
as the “universal subsidies, import and value added tax (VAT) exemptions” that 
were used by the government to mitigate the negative effects of high food, energy, 
and transport costs (del Ninno and Tamiru 2012: xiv).
The chapter proceeds first by detailing the events of the 2008 food riot in 
Cameroon and the policy responses. Second, it turns to three sections that detail 
the three dimensions of food security (availability, accessibility and adequacy) 
and illustrate with interview data how each of the dimensions were impacted 
by the unrest. The paper then enters into a discussion of the experience of the 
accessibility/adequacy tradeoff amongst urban dwellers. The chapter concludes 
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on a somewhat reflective note that re-examines questions about food riots in the 
scholarly literature then delves back into the Cameroon case and characterizes 
the dietary change that helped the urban population cope with the food price 
crisis.
Cameroon’s 2008 food riots
Resentment against the ruling elite has simmered in the country for decades as 
the majority of the population and the youth in particular experience insecurity, 
unemployment and poor living conditions. According to Cameroon’s National 
Human Rights Observer, the social and economic situation:
has continuously been deteriorating, leading to an unbelievably worsened 
situation especially in the areas of corruption, unemployment, poverty, mis-
ery, insecurity. The disruption of water and electricity supply has become too 
frequent. Health and education have become less accessible. The living con-
ditions of students have deteriorated: no scholarships, school fees steadily 
rising and insanitary condition of university hostels . . . most Cameroonians 
feel that the government and her sclerotic members of the ruling class are 
completely indifferent to their problems.
(2008: 8)
The events of 2008 in Cameroon reported globally as ‘food riots’ were motivated 
by a mix of political concerns: “the draft amendment of the Constitution, which 
was seen as an extension of the mandate of President Paul Biya and his regime 
of bad governance and the rise in price of fuel and food” (National Human 
Rights Observer 2008: 5). Together, these factors combined to trigger the popular 
uprising. The protesters voiced their demands for the realization of their socio- 
economic, civic and political rights. The protests were located in major cities of 
five regions in the southern parts of Cameroon, namely: the Southwest, North-
west, West, Centre and Littoral. Figure 5.1 shows the cities where the strikes and 
protests were located and the markets in Yaoundé, Buea and Limbe where the 
interviews were conducted for this study.
Throughout 2007, several top officials made repeated calls for the constitution 
to be amended to allow the Cameroon People’s Democratic Party (CDPM) “to 
seek a third mandate in 2011 against the provisions of the constitution” (Agou 
2011; National Human Rights Observer 2008: 7). On 31 December 2007, on 
the occasion of his end of year speech, President Paul Biya and his ruling party 
publicly announced that he would reform the constitution to extend his then-
26 years in power to seek a third mandate in the 2011 election cycle, thus paving 
the way for the president to become head of state for life3 (Amin 2012; Observa-
toire National des Droits de L’homme 2009 and 2011; Friends of Cameroon 2008; 
Reuters 2008c).
Sensing the trouble that a constitutional change could bring about, the gov-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































demonstrations and other unauthorized occupations on public roads for an indef-
inite period of time (Observatoire National des Droits de L’homme 2009). The 
order was largely unsuccessful as strikes unfolded in cities across southern Cam-
eroon. On 23 February, TV and radio stations in Douala that would have covered 
criticisms and debate of the proposed constitutional amendment were shut down. 
Protests were already organized in January by transportation unions to protest the 
high cost of fuel; however, given the new constitutional reality, the organized 
protests took on greater meaning for protesters. One trader said, “we strike when 
we are not happy with certain decision taken by the government,”4 and another 
participant in the study mentioned that a common reason to protest is “when we 
are sick and tired of certain things. We express our miscontent [sic] to the govern-
ment authorities to deal with any problems we may have.”5 Cameroon’s Human 
Rights Observer documented the unexpected response:
Many youths spontaneously descended to the streets to express their disillu-
sionment and loss of hope for a better future. The strike then became a wide-
spread movement. No political organization or trade union instigated the 
protestors. It was all spontaneous. The cities were totally paralyzed. Peaceful 
demonstrations could be seen everywhere. Rallies were held at junctions of 
main streets.
(2008: 10)
From 23–28 February, shops, bakeries, pharmacies, hotels, restaurants and fill-
ing stations were ransacked and looted. Government and perceived government 
buildings and offices were targeted. The protest slogans recorded below show the 
mix of political and food price demands:
They were in the streets in the thousands in different cities demonstrating 
and marching, and while a recurring theme was Biya Must Go (Biya doit 
partir) other placards were equally revealing: Popol tu seras pendu avec ta 
constitution; on a faim, non à la vie chère; trop c’est trop; Do Not Touch The 
Constitution; Halt The Cost Of Living; We Need Jobs; Paul Biya, La jeu-
nesse avant la constitution; Hungry Man Is Angry Man; No More Biya; No 
Constitutional Amendment; Down With France; Biya Is Old And Tired; 
Constitutional Change Only Over Our Dead Bodies; No Life President; End 
the Corruption; Non à la vie chère et à la vie clochardisation de Camerounais; 
Baisez le prix du tapioca sur le marché; Non à la fermeture des radios et télevi-
sions privies.
(Amin 2012: 28)
It quickly became the first protest in the nation’s history in which “minute- by-
minute events were covered by social media” (Amin 2012: 32). By 27 Febru-
ary, a strike had taken place in 31 cities, including Yaoundé, Douala, Bamenda, 
Bafoussam, Buea, Limbe, Tiko, Muea, Mutengene and Kumba (see Figure 5.1). 
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It was a time when “there were a lot of policemen on the street,” as police were 
mentioned 60 times in the interview data. One woman in Buea remarked:
It was not a very good time for us. I almost got shot by a police officer in 
Mutengene. I was around an area where young boys were throwing stones at 
the police officers and one of them almost shot me.6
Reactions from the police, including mass arrests, live bullets, tear gas and bar-
ricades occurred in all protesting cities throughout the country.
On 28 February, Biya issued a “stern warning to Cameroonians to stop the may-
hem, vowing to prosecute to the fullest those ‘demons,’ and ‘apprentice sorcerers,’ 
who had ‘manipulated’ Cameroon’s youths” (Amin 2012: 33). After the warning 
was broadcasted in Yaoundé, an informant mentioned that fires and smoke could 
be seen across the city. Protesters were dismayed:
Nothing on the issue of constitutional reform, the high cost of living, rising 
prices and chronic unemployment of young people was addressed. The disap-
pointment was widespread among the population. The demonstrators were 
thereafter regarded and treated as enemies of the state.
(National Human Rights Observer 2008: 15)
To combat the protesters, Cameroon’s special military units such as the Batail-
lon d’Intervention Rapide (BIR), an elite paramilitary force, was transferred to 
Yaoundé, Douala and other cities in the country. The BIR was created in 2001 
to combat armed groups and gangs along the nation’s borders with Chad, Nigeria 
and the Central African Republic, and has been used since to fight Boko Haram 
in the North (Amin 2012; Observatoire National des Droits de L’homme 2011; 
IRIN 2008; Hilsum 2015). Joining police forces, the BIR fired live bullets, tear 
gas, stun grenades and water hoses indiscriminately into protesting crowds. One 
trader explained:
We felt unsafe in this same market and we ran for safety. Can’t remember the 
cause, but the military came and people started running, boys burnt [things] 
and scattered. The young men were angry, some were arrested some were 
beaten up.7
The response resulted in both “financial losses and loss of human life.”8
The reaction of the government resulted in several violations of human rights 
including: excessive force against an unarmed population; targeted arrests and 
arbitrary detentions; torture and cruel and degrading treatment; violations of the 
rights to freedom of expression, opinion and information; and arbitrary execu-
tions (Observatoire National des Droits de L’homme 2009, 2011). During this 
time, the death toll has been debated. The government estimates around 40 
deaths, whereas civil society groups in Cameroon suggest the number is well 
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over 139. Also disputed is the number of arrests of as many as 3,000 individuals 
(Observatoire National des Droits de L’homme 2009, 2011: 23).
President Biya initiated a program to subsidize petrol, and to suspend import 
duties on fish, rice and cooking oil to lower their prices9 (Reuters 2008a, 2008b). 
It has been documented that even though the president “moved to reduce prices 
on food and petroleum products, the protests didn’t stop” (Amin 2012: 22). One 
70-year-old woman remembered an old proverb: “a hungry belly has no ears 
(un ventre affame n’a point d’oreille), it is impossible to talk to someone torn by 
hunger.”10
The subsidies only applied to imported food and locally produced and forest 
food remained expensive (L. Sneyd 2016a). The massive presence of military and 
police brought calm to the country on 29 February, although fear was felt by many 
residents. Over time, the government’s policy seems to have appeased the urban 
population in the short term, but some argue – and the World Bank concluded – 
that another price spike could drain domestic savings and disrupt balance of pay-
ments (Galtier and Vindel 2013). Not only of concern to the economy, informant 
responses in this study demonstrate the challenges facing the urban poor in the 
context of overwhelming food accessibility constraints. The following sections 
explore in greater detail the food security situation after the 2008 riots.
The impacts on the right to food: Issues of availability, 
accessibility and adequacy
Availability issues
The simultaneous rise in fuel prices compounded the local effects of the food 
price rise. Not only was food more expensive, it was more expensive to move 
it around the country. In the Cameroon case, food was available in 2008, but 
for many, not accessible. In the Cameroonian cities surveyed, the strikes were 
remembered as a time of low stocks in the markets and food shortages at home. 
The scarcity was linked to instability and violence, and the closure of markets. 
There was also an absence of supplies due to fires, burning of market structures 
and food and the destruction of perishable products. Tires and other materials 
were burned on highways so the entrances into towns were impassable.
The actual ways in which people responded to the crisis varied in Cameroon. 
The transporters strike and the subsequent halt in the movement of food and 
goods had the greatest impact on food availability. When the transportation net-
works were stalled, artificial scarcity was created, fueling further unrest and driv-
ing food prices higher. During this time, the rise in the cost of transport prevented 
most traders from buying wholesale food to sell because “vehicles were not bring-
ing food to the market.”11 According to the traders, this strategy “paralyses the 
market and the food supply chain is altered.”12
In Yaoundé, market officials “closed food markets until the calm returned.”13 
The consequences of riots and the closure of markets were deeply felt: “Consum-
ers are forced to go without their products and forces people to suffer as food is 
hard to find.” Affected traders tried to temporarily sell in other markets until 
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their market re-opened: “We don’t sell anymore. I tried to find a place in Mvog 
Mbi but they chased me away (on ma chassé).”14 One woman said:
If there is a riot and the market is closed I won’t have anything to eat. We 
run around trying to find food but cannot. We would be obliged to get our 
products elsewhere which incurs added expenses.15
Because of the violence, traders and officials closed markets to maintain calm (see 
Table 5.3 for a list of code counts from the interview data). Traders mentioned 
how “markets stayed closed for a week which penalized both the vendors and 
their clients.”16 When asked what the consequences are of riots and the closure 
of the market on your activity/sales, many traders state: “We don’t sell. When 
the market is closed I don’t work. If there is a riot, I don’t go to sell there is lower 
sales and it slows down activity.”17 The consequences of riots and the closure of 
markets are deeply felt: “consumers are forced to go without their products and 
forces people to suffer as food is hard to find.”
Accessibility issues
An International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) paper calculated the 
change in food prices from June 2007 to June 2008 in food markets across Africa, 
Table 5.3  Cameroon’s 2008 protests: Themes and code frequency from market interview data
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including Cameroon (Minot 2011). The calculation from Yaoundé revealed 
that the retail prices for many food items increased substantially: cassava (16 per 
cent), maize (29 per cent), plantains (14 per cent), red beans (17 per cent), rice 
(36 per cent) and wheat flour (51 per cent) (Minot 2011: 15). When food prices 
rise, participants mentioned, “I buy less or same quantities, sometimes I don’t buy 
at all. I mostly reduce quantity and at times go for the cheap ones.”18
Urban Cameroonians spend 50–75 per cent of their income on food, yet “the 
food basket of each household is becoming more and more meager because life is 
expensive in our country in general and in the city of Yaoundé in particular.”19. 
In Yaoundé, “food products are very expensive, to eat well we are forced to spend 
too much and this is an issue for impoverished families.”20
‘Forcing’, ‘forced to change’ and ‘forced to spend’ was a major theme from the 
interview data. Another individual explained in more detail:
[T]he riots really disturbed a lot of people. Everybody was complaining about 
rise in prices, especially sugar, flour and rice. It was such a bad experience. 
But I think the situation is the same now although we are now used to food 
prices being high.21
Households in Limbe, a coastal city outside of Douala, remembered “a limited 
quantity of food was brought to the market since buses were not moving and 
drivers were not working because of high prices in fuels.”22 One customer in Buea 
remarked:
[W]hat I remember is that it made prices increase more. We bought very lit-
tle food for so much money because cars were not allowed to run; the roads 
were blocked. When the market was ablaze most of the business men and 
women lose most of their items.23
When households do not have enough food or enough money to buy food, the 
most commonly named strategies include:
• I manage with the little I have
• I am stricter about how much food I serve and other than the children we only eat 
one meal a day
• I make a cheap meal with rice and palm oil or garri (cassava) and water
• I reduce the quantity of food I eat
• I eat one or two meals a day
• I harvest from my farm
• I borrow from family, savings group, or merchant
From these data, it can also be learned that eating fewer meals also means eat-
ing less at meals, eating lower quality foods and eating cheaper options (see also 
Table 5.3). Responses from the survey show that 54 per cent of the individuals 
surveyed consumed only two meals a day and if these meals already include dishes 
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that are of low quality and diversity, then nutrition is negatively impacted (L. 
Sneyd 2016b). When prices for foodstuffs are elevated, women mentioned buying 
in smaller quantities, changing their menu, and making food every two days, for 
the following two days, based on what is affordable. The food security situation 
in most households interviewed is tenuous at best.
Adequacy issues
The government continued to subsidize rice after 2012, making it available, 
accessible and cheap. Since the riot and subsequent government subsidies, many 
people say that imported food, especially the rice subsidy “helps us survive.” It 
helps was an overarching theme (see also Table 5.3). The rice that is imported is 
the milled white rice, which is devoid of the husk and bran. This often results 
in a version of rice that is quick to cook, but is low in fiber and vitamins. Cheap 
rice shifts purchasing patterns of urban households away from traditional, local 
foods (such as cassava, cocoyam, plantain, local rice and wild vegetables), which 
are nutritionally more beneficial and Cameroon has a comparative advantage 
in producing (L. Sneyd 2013). Older women surveyed were shocked by the fre-
quency at which their younger counterparts prepare and eat rice. To these older 
women, rice was a special occasion dish, often being served for the Sunday meal 
or for holidays with chicken (L. Sneyd 2013). When asked how many times they 
prepare rice per week, most women stated that they serve rice three to four times, 
some even claiming “in my household we eat rice five times a week.”24 The role 
of rice in the alimentation of households was most commonly stated as being 
“primordial” as “it allows me to make ends meet in difficult times.” Other women 
used adjectives such as “important” and “profound.” Almost all households inter-
viewed stated that rice serves “a big place in the household menu, because it is 
not very expensive, it is accessible and easy to cook, it is the most consumed 
product in our household.” The origin of the rice most commonly consumed is 
from Thailand, while the heartier Cameroonian rice is reserved for holidays.
The subsidies excluded locally produced food and prevented people from buy-
ing local food and local forest food, which continue to experience high prices 
(L. Sneyd 2013, 2016b). During the interviews, participants were asked to list 
the foods they need to feel food secure. The most commonly named were: rice, 
plantain, groundnut, couscous, palm oil, fish, tomato, fruits and vegetables. One 
respondent said: “I do not have food security; I do not eat fresh meat and fish 
as I would like.” Many people said that local food in Yaoundé is too expensive. 
When asked which imported food products are more available to you than local 
products, the greatest frequency in the response was rice, pasta, fish, and sardines. 
Households in Yaoundé described these products as being “available to everyone, 
they are less expensive than local products.” Other comments included: “We need 
to learn to eat our own products and the Cameroonian state must review the food 
prices” and “Food in Yaoundé is expensive, to eat well we are forced to spend too 
much. The government should watch and review the prices.” A not-so-surprising 
finding from interviews is that Cameroonians want to eat foods from Cameroon.
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It was perceived that imported rice is bad for the economy as it prevents people 
from buying local. Others think that the imported foods are of poor quality, they 
are toxic, full of fertilizers and taste is bad. They can “make you sick and gain 
weight.” Many participants even said rice is “a good thing for the poor classes. 
The foods coming from outside help to reduce hunger, especially rice.” While rice 
may be helping accessibility challenges, it is not improving the adequacy of diets. 
Overwhelmingly participants indicated that “our diet changed.”25
The accessibility/adequacy tradeoff
In cities in Cameroon the food price crisis has had a strong impact on households’ 
food security. People reported eating less and changing their diets. During the 
interviews, participants were asked to name and explain the ingredients for and 
technique of preparing meals in the household; the cost, who taught you to cook 
this meal and how often do you eat it? The questions focused on four different 
categories: the meal that is prepared the most in the household, the favourite 
meal, the most expensive meal and the cheapest meal consumed in the house-
hold. The data from the interviews yielded 420 recipes. What was learned from 
these series of questions and the recipes was that rice is not an accompaniment 
to the dishes prepared with food products from southern Cameroon’s humid for-
est zone (L. Sneyd 2015). Dishes made with ingredients from the Congo Basin’s 
forest emerged from a different culinary history than dishes that are traditionally 
prepared with rice (L. Sneyd 2013). Traditional dishes made with local forest 
food products that make up the routine cuisine accompany cassava or plantain, 
such as eru (a stew made with Gnetum leaves from wild vines, cow skin, crayfish 
and red palm oil), ndole (a hearty stew of leafy greens, raw groundnuts and beef) 
and mbongo (a dark stew made with charred wild spices and a protein, usually 
fish). It is culturally inappropriate and unpalatable for the routine dishes to sim-
ply be served with rice. Temporally, this is important, as four years after the food 
riots people said that nothing has changed save for a decrease in their dietary 
diversity: “We eat what we have, not what we want.”26
Refined white rice helped facilitate a dietary change; however, it can be argued 
that frequent consumption of conventionally-produced industrial and imported 
rice should be a coping strategy and not a long-term solution. The policy 
responses – importing and subsidizing rice – have made diets less ‘sustainable,’ 
and undercut the adequacy of diets through making healthier, more sustainably-
produced local foods, whether they were forest foods or less accessible agricultural 
products. Subsidizing rice to appease the rioting urban population further mar-
ginalized the poor from achieving the right to food and maintaining acceptable 
levels of household food security. The tradeoff here meant that due to accessibil-
ity challenges, the adequacy of diets suffer as households were forced to change 
their eating habits, eat a less diverse diet and eat less frequently.
Returning to the data, it was not only increased refined white rice consumption 
that changed diets in cities, but the accompaniments to the starches changed as 
the local vegetables, meats and spices were less accessible; prices for those foods 
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remained high into the present (L. Sneyd 2013; Rao 2014). The accessibility/
adequacy tradeoff is the reality for many in urban Cameroon. Circumstances dic-
tate that urban residents must make a compromise for cheaper, less diverse food 
options instead of maintaining a diet of diverse proteins, starches and vegetables. 
This was demonstrated in the data. Participants from cities in Cameroon men-
tioned eating rice three to five times a week. Hence, low-cost subsidized rice 
plus rising food prices not only priced more diverse local food options out of 
the reach of most, but also enabled a situation where there was a reduction and 
substitution of diverse local foods for most city dwellers. This led urban resi-
dents to substitute cheaper, less nutritious and less diverse foods – in Cameroon’s 
case, conventionally-produced, industrial, refined white rice, imported fish and 
imported tomatoes – for healthier, more diverse and locally produced foods. Data 
collected on dietary change showed that a new cheap dish is emerging across the 
urban landscape in Cameroon that puts these items into the same pot and that 
dish was consumed three to five times a week. The resulting dietary and culinary 
shift marks a turn away from the routine cuisine of a local starch (either cassava, 
cocoyam or banana plantain) prepared with a saucy meaty stew (made with beef, 
local fish and crayfish, green leafy vegetables and spices from the surrounding 
forest) toward a new subsidized, refined and cheap white rice dish. In the short 
term, the coping strategy of increasing rice consumption helps people cope with 
food accessibility challenges but it does not fix or address their challenges in the 
longer-term; it inadvertently ties them to a globalized food system relying on 
trade and un-nutritious and homogenized foods.
Discussion and conclusions
The evidence showed that political disenfranchisement, anger and outrage over 
an unjust political situation enabled the conditions for the riots and riots can-
not solely be understood to be desperation over the rising cost of food. This also 
relates to Hossain and Kalita’s conclusion on the political possibilities of action: 
“not all hungry people riot, and for many collective action is a risk” (2014: 
14). This finding is also in line with Demarest’s (2015) argument that there are 
numerous triggers that can spark a riot event, and rising food prices alone cannot 
explain this relationship. The Cameroon case raises questions about riots more 
generally: is it a food riot if the price spike coincides with the government mov-
ing to change the constitution and extend presidential terms? Is it a food riot or 
something different (Pritchard and Pakes 2014)? Can it still be called a food riot 
when the protests become a national movement that results in large-scale human 
rights violations?
The grievances are diverse yet each is intimately connected to civil and 
political rights, human rights, sustainability and the right to food. The longer-
term reality in Cameroon raises additional questions: was the regressive subsidy 
scheme a solution or a last-ditch attempt at political legitimacy? Was the subsidy 
a crude but effective resolution for a government in a globalizing food system – 
when a state was losing its legitimacy? Is it acceptable to fill people’s bellies 
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without focusing on dietary diversity? Why is subsidizing and supporting domes-
tic agriculture not considered as a way out of a food crisis (Lappé et al. 2013)? 
What about provisions to support and improve rural productivity of small holder 
units that will contribute to the achievement of the UN Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals, or transformation for gender and food security in Cameroon’s forest 
food trade (L. Sneyd 2016a)? These questions may not yield easy answers, but it 
is clear that the government response, by making cheaper rice available, further 
accelerated the nutrition transition in Cameroon (Steyn and McHiza 2014). 
The long-term effects have weakened people’s food security because they are now 
more dependent on volatile global markets for food of less dietary diversity. The 
food crisis in Cameroon changed diets towards more monocropped foodgrains, 
and – for the urban population, at least – a dependence on imports. The Cam-
eroon case demonstrates the challenge of making foods available that people 
want to eat and that provide a diversity of nutrients and vitamins versus simply 
filling bellies.
Notes
 1 The Social Science Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) funded this research. The 
author wishes to thank the following individuals for their various contributions to the 
project: Evan D.G. Fraser, Craig Johnson, Bruce Frayne, Jonathan Crush, Olufunso 
Somorin, Florence Munoh, Phil René Oyono, Stella Asaha, Akoko Guy Martin Mau-
rice, Serge Kombo Samba, Ngu Arrey Monica, Caleb Yengo Tata, Roland Ndah Njoh, 
Eugene Loh Chia, Fomeni Anne Christelle, Ashu Augustine Ayuk, Abdou Njida, 
Ekane Ivo, Mary Nana Nibba, Hubert (Nana), Patrick Wight, Brendan Schwartz, 
Naomi Hossain, Patta Scott-Villiers, Adam Sneyd and Marie Puddister for assistance 
with the map, and the hundreds of individuals who shared a glimpse into their lives 
after the food price crisis in Cameroon.
 2 Yaoundé is the French-speaking capital and the base of operations for many multi-
lateral organizations for the region, including various UN agencies, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. The Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale 
(CEMAC) is located in Yaoundé and operates for the CEMAC region (including 
Chad, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of the 
Congo). Yaoundé is also the hub for numerous INGOs including Greenpeace and 
the World Wildlife Fund, and domestic NGOs. Limbe was an old English colonial 
town, Victoria. A major oil refinery is located off the coast of the city in the Gulf of 
Guinea. Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) – an agro-industrial complex 
that grows, processes and exports many tropical crops such as tea, bananas, palm oil 
and rubber – is also based out of Limbe and a major plantation employer for the region. 
At the foot of Mount Cameroon and up the road from Limbe is Buea, an English-
speaking university town and the capital of the southwest region and an electoral dis-
trict of the Social Democratic Front (SDF), a prominent English-speaking opposition 
party. Cameroonian Pidgin English is spoken in both Limbe and Buea.
 3 Biya had succeeded Ahidjo in November 1982 and became with Eduardo dos Santos 
of Angola and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, “one of the longest-reigning presidents 
in Africa” (Albaugh, 2011). Fru Doh (2008) documents the history of growing elite 
power and political favoritism in his book suitably titled: Africa’s Political Wastelands: 
The Bastardization of Cameroon. In the past, this system has been described as neopat-
rimonial, but new dynamics of capitalism in Cameroon have recently been identified 
(see A. Sneyd 2014).
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 4 Interview with author in Mokolo, July 2012.
 5 Interview with author in Mokolo, July 2012.
 6 Interview with author in Likomba, July 2012.
 7 Interview with author in Mutegene, July 2012.
 8 Interview with author in Mvog-Betsi, July 2012.
 9 According to a World Bank Report, Cameroon’s social safety nets are ad hoc at best 
and regressive. The government “subsidized the price of several food items including 
maize, flour, fish, rice, and wheat to the tune of 60 billion FCFA [about USD $104 mil-
lion] on average annually between 2007 and 2009 (an average of around 2.42 percent 
of the government budget)” (del Ninno and Tamiru 2012: xiv).
 10 Interview with author in Mokolo, November 2012.
 11 Interview with author in Likumba, July 2012.
 12 Interview with author in Nkol Eton, July 2012.
 13 Interview with author in Mokolo, November 2012.
 14 Interview with author in Mokolo, July 2012.
 15 Interview with author in Mvog Mbi, July 2012.
 16 Interview with author in Essos, November 2012.
 17 Interview with author in Mokolo, November 2012.
 18 Interview with author in Likomba, July 2012.
 19 Interview with author in Yaoundé, November 2012.
 20 Interview with author in Mvog Mbi, November 2012.
 21 Interview with author in Mile 4, July 2012.
 22 Interview with author in Limbe, July 2012.
 23 Interview with author in Mutegene, July 2012.
 24 Interview with author in Mokolo, November 2012.
 25 Interview with author in Elig-Edjon, November 2012.
 26 Interview with author in Tiko, November 2012.
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6 Demanding accountability  
for hunger in India
Anuradha Joshi, Biraj Patnaik and Dipa Sinha
Introduction
The new politics emerging out of the food, fuel and financial crises that started 
in 2008 was born out of a sense of discontent with the ruling classes. The roots of 
the protests in country after country, and the responses they evoked can be best 
viewed, as this book argues, through the lens of a ‘politics of provisions,’ – the way 
in which “common people interacted with their rulers over subsistence,” and how 
these interactions were “permitted and shaped by pre-existing social and politi-
cal networks, both among rioters and between them and their rulers” (Bohstedt 
2016: 1036). Riots (or not) and responses (or repression) at moments of crises 
throw the ongoing politics of provisions into special focus by highlighting the 
boundaries of what the rulers will accept as a form of protest by the ruled, and 
what the ruled deem as necessary action.
In each of the country cases in this volume we have seen how this politics of 
provisions played out with particular nuances. The price spikes of 2008 and 2011 
were the source of social unrest, with commodity-dependent democracies such 
as Cameroon, Mozambique and Kenya being particularly vulnerable to protests. 
India is far less dependent on food imports, and although it did experience rising 
inflation, it did not witness sudden inflationary spikes during this period (Chan-
drasekhar and Ghosh 2013). Protests around food were few and highly localized, 
mainly because India has had a large program of subsidized food for the poor-
est households through the Public Distribution System (PDS) since the 1950s. 
The only reported ‘food riots’ were in fact around perceived corruption in the 
PDS in West Bengal. Instead, between 2001–2014, India saw a rise in mobiliza-
tion around a ‘right to food’ which was aimed at ensuring food security for all, 
especially the most marginalized, through guaranteed entitlements of basic food 
grains at subsidized prices. Significantly, such mobilization varied spatially across 
states. While a few states saw riots, in most states strong grassroots movements 
emerged and played a key role in the national right to food campaign.
In this chapter we explore the politics of provisions in the case of India.1 We 
ask: a) why does popular mobilization take the form of riots in some locations 
and rights-based movements in others? b) how does popular mobilization draw 
upon the imaginary of the moral economy of hunger? c) what features of the 
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environment matter, especially the role of the media in framing and shaping 
discourse enable mobilization? d) through what pathways do responses to mobili-
zation lead to institutionalized accountability for hunger?
We explore these issues by tracing popular mobilization and subsequent 
responses around food insecurity first in two states – West Bengal and Madhya 
Pradesh – and then exploring their linkages to the national right to food cam-
paign. West Bengal witnessed widespread popular unrest in 2007, in what were 
called ‘ration riots,’ in which rural communities directed public anger at the mal-
functioning of the subsidized food distribution system in the state. The riots were 
violent, spontaneous and characterized by burning and looting of PDS shops by 
angry villagers. Yet, these places had never been locations of widespread acute 
hunger or malnutrition. By contrast, in Madhya Pradesh, malnutrition and hun-
ger had become a big public issue in the mid-2000s, when the National Family 
Health Survey showed that it had the highest rate of malnutrition in the country 
(60 per cent of the children were malnourished at the time). Chronic hunger was 
a feature of life, especially in tribal areas. Rather than leading to rioting how-
ever, popular mobilization led by local grassroots organizations took the form of 
a rights-based movement against malnourishment and hunger, which linked up 
with the national right to food campaign.
How do we explain these contrasting trajectories of two states within the same 
national system? Our research finds that both riots as well as rights-based move-
ments were framed in terms of an implicit breach of the social contract; a rup-
ture in what Hossain and Kalita elaborate as the contemporary moral economy 
(Hossain and Kalita 2014). However, the causes of the protests, who partici-
pated in them and the form they took were different in the two states. Moreover, 
while both elicited responses from the state, only the rights-based movements 
had the potential to translate into durable responses to hunger. However, protest 
alone was not enough – the potential for gains at scale can be realized only if the 
political context is favorable and protestors can seize opportunities that arise. 
For rights-based movements, key enabling conditions included: strong networks 
that linked national policy actors with grassroots groups, thus increasing both 
legitimacy and strength at the national and local levels; active strategic use of the 
media; close and regular interactions between national and sub-national struc-
tures of government; and a framing of demands in terms of socially and widely 
accepted rights.
Methodology
The research reported here draws on two sources of evidence. First, at the national 
level, we constructed an event catalogue using media reports, and interviewed 
government officials, politicians and members of the national right to food cam-
paign. The empirical material generated through these methods was supple-
mented by data from official reports, newspaper articles and other documents.2
Second, in each of the two states (Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal) we car-
ried out focus group interviews with a purposive sample of villagers in two villages, 
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supplementing those findings with semi-structured interviews with activists, jour-
nalists and relevant government officials at the state level.3 We selected Bankura 
district in West Bengal, as it was one of the places where the ‘ration riots’ of 2007 
had started, and we had prior contacts with members of the agricultural workers’ 
union in that district.4 We carried out focus group discussions and local leader 
interviews in two villages in Bankura: Radhamohanpur (the site of the first riots) 
and Barokumira (where riots erupted later). Within Madhya Pradesh, we chose 
Satna district because it is one of the districts with the highest level of malnu-
trition, has a large tribal population and has witnessed local grassroots action 
and mobilization on these issues. Moreover, through the state-level right to food 
campaign, we had direct access to the work of one of the grassroots organisa-
tions working with tribals in the chosen district – the Adivasi Adhikar Manch 
(AAM). Again, two villages were chosen for the focus group discussions: Chite-
hara (a tribal-dominated village) and Baraha Mawan (a mixed village with tribal 
and non-tribal populations).
A word about our positionality: of our research team, two members were 
prominent members of the right to food campaign. While on the one hand, this 
meant that it was easier to gain access to senior policymakers and activists at 
short notice; it meant, on the other hand, that interviewees often presumed that 
as part of the campaign, interviewers had particular positions on the issues under 
question and occasionally responded in ways that addressed the campaign rather 
than the interview questions. Despite our best efforts to mitigate against this 
through triangulation, making non-activists lead interviewers and starting inter-
views with a more critical view of the right to food movement, some bias inher-
ent in interview context remains. The findings need to be read keeping these 
limitations in mind.
Food security in India
Between 2006 and 2013, India witnessed increasing food inflation but in contrast 
with global trends, there was no food price volatility. From 2008 onwards, food 
prices in India showed a rising trend compared to the two distinctive spikes in 
global food prices in 2008 and 2011. Further, in the Indian context, food prices 
were driven up not so much by prices of food grains (except for a brief period) but 
by other food articles such as pulses, vegetables and fruits (Chandrasekhar and 
Ghosh 2013). Considering the poor diversity in diets of the poor in rural India, 
food price inflation does not seem to have had much of an effect on their access 
to food. This was also a period that saw an overall increase in real wages (Drèze 
and Sen 2013, Gulati et al. 2014).
However, hunger and malnutrition were (and still are) widespread in India. 
Despite high economic growth, the decades of the 1990s and 2000s did not 
show an equivalent improvement in food consumption and malnutrition figures 
(Deaton and Dreze 2009; Svedberg 2008). The average calorie consumption 
decreased, with the poor continuing to consume much less than those in higher-
income deciles. While there was some increase in consumption of other food 
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items such as pulses, fruits and vegetables, they were still at extremely low levels. 
Available data show a slow improvement in nutrition status between the early 
2000s and the early 2010s. The National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3) of 
2005–2006 showed that 44 per cent of children under five were underweight and 
more than half of women of reproductive age were anaemic (Indian Institute of 
Population Studies 2007). The NFHS-4 for 2015–2016 shows some improvement 
in malnutrition, with 35.7 per cent of children under five being underweight 
(Indian Institute of Population Studies 2017). Improvement in nutrition levels 
in this period could be because of the efforts made by the central and state gov-
ernments towards providing social security and enhancing food security through 
programs such as the employment guarantee scheme and the public distribution 
system (von Grebmer et al. 2014).
Beginning in 2004, a number of rights-based legislations and schemes were 
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Figure 6.1  World and India cereal price indices, 2005–2013.
Source: Calculated from price index data available from FAO (for world) and Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, Government of India (for India)
www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/ accessed on March 25, 2015
http://eaindustry.nic.in/download_data_0405.asp accessed on March 25, 2017
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Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in 
2005 and the National Food Security Act in 2013. The MGNREGA guarantees 
100 days of employment at minimum wage to every rural household that demands 
work. While there have been implementation gaps, the Act has generated mil-
lions of days of employment and had a positive impact on rural wages, food secu-
rity and migration (Afridi and Iverson 2014). The impact of the National Food 
Security Act was still being assessed at the time of this study. However, most of 
the entitlements under the Act had already been in existence since 2001 through 
orders of the Supreme Court under the ‘right to food’ case. Through the food 
schemes covered under the food security Act and the Supreme Court orders, a 
range of entitlements help people meet their food and nutrition security needs.
The most important of these is the Public Distribution System (PDS). The 
PDS was started by the British as a wartime food grain distribution system, and 
later revised into a welfare measure in the 1950s. Initially the program was uni-
versal; however, over the years it underwent a series of changes and by the 2000s, 
the government targeted food subsidies to the poorer sections of the population 
through the distribution of three levels of entitlement cards (in order of decreas-
ing vulnerability): the Antodya Anna Yojana (AAY), the Below Poverty Line 
(BPL) cards and the Above Poverty Line (APL) cards (Swaminathan 2000). 
Under the scheme, households receive subsidized food grains (mainly wheat and 
rice), sugar and kerosene oil.
The aims of the PDS are twofold: to maintain stability of prices through gov-
ernment purchase of food grains at a minimum support price for farmers, and to 
distribute the food grains purchased at a subsidized rate to cardholders. The dis-
tribution occurs through a network of licensed Fair Price Shops, who hold a list 
of all the cardholders who are entitled to purchase the subsidized grain from their 
shops. Cardholders in turn present their cards to purchase their entitlements. 
The central and state governments are both involved in the PDS. A formula is 
used to assess how much subsidized food grain each state is entitled to receive, 
and states have to request the central government to send the amounts they 
need up to the entitlement limit, and the central government then distributes 
the grain through its stores. Thus, the actual availability of food grains in shops 
depends upon a certain level of central and state government interactions and a 
complex distribution system.
Other schemes addressing food security include the school midday meal scheme 
providing cooked meals to children in government schools, and the Integrated 
Child Development Services scheme providing supplementary nutrition, growth 
monitoring, nutrition counselling and pre-school education of children under 
six. Supreme Court orders in 2001, 2004 and 2006 directed that these schemes 
be made universal entitlements. These orders saw a tremendous expansion in 
these schemes, which currently cover about 120 million school-going children 
and 70 million children under six years of age.
The quality of implementation of these schemes varies greatly across states 
(Kabra and Ittyerah 1992, Jishnu 2004). Criticisms of the PDS are particularly 
trenchant and relevant here. The PDS is considered highly corrupt, and shop 
Demanding accountability: hunger in India 121
owners are believed to divert subsidized grain to the open market to pocket the 
subsidies, while reporting the grains were not received, or not in the required 
quantity. The allocation of cards is also contentious: eligible households may be 
excluded while some ineligible households are included. Moreover, cardholders 
find it difficult to buy their entitlements in instalments even if this is formally 
allowed (Programme Evaluation Organisation 2005; Khera 2011).
Most food-related government programs are centrally funded (sometimes with 
matching state funds), with the implementation left to state governments. For 
example, all procurement and storage of food grain is primarily under the control 
of the central government through the Food Corporation of India (FCI). While 
the central government allocates the grain to the states, it is the responsibility 
of the state to ensure it reaches beneficiaries. Further, state governments have 
few sources of revenue of their own, and many have faced serious fiscal crises 
in the last two decades. Therefore, while there can be wide differences in the 
way schemes are delivered, there is little room for expansion or creation of new 
schemes at the state level. Even then, some state governments have provided 
social support beyond that allocated by the central government (Patnaik and 
Sinha 2016).
The politics of popular mobilization around social provisioning
New social movements emerging in India in the 1970s focused on issues such 
as environment, gender and housing to fill a vacuum left by political parties 
and older movements, and as a critique of the state and its inability to deliver 
basic entitlements for women, lower caste groups and the poor (Kothari 1984, 
Omvedt 1994). The neoliberal policies followed by the Indian government since 
the 1990s met with firm grassroots resistance (Baviskar and Sundar 2008). Civil 
society organizations that emerged out of these new struggles played a key role 
in expanding the democratic obligations of the state and creating expectations 
among the poor. Thus, the decades of the 1990s and 2000s saw the emergence 
of a number of networks, campaigns and social movements built around socio-
economic rights, e.g., the Right to Education Campaign, the People’s Act for 
Employment Guarantee, the Right to Health movement (Jan Swasthya Abhi-
yan), the Campaign for Survival and Dignity (which demanded the Forest Rights 
Act), the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information and the Right 
to Food Campaign. One of the distinctive features of the campaigns was the 
simultaneous deployment of protest and collaboration strategies at different lev-
els (Pande 2014).
In this context, 2004 was a watershed: the ruling coalition, the National Dem-
ocratic Alliance led by the Bharatiya Janata Party, was overthrown in a landslide 
victory by the Congress party-led United Progressive Alliance. The ruling coali-
tion had gone to the electorate with images of a prosperous urban India that 
included wide roads and shopping malls using “India Shining” as its main cam-
paign slogan. By contrast, the principal opposition party – the Indian National 
Congress – claimed to represent the aam aadmi (common man), highlighting 
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the neglect of rural India, unemployment and the need for social security. Even 
though the broad economic policies of the two parties were not very different (in 
fact, it was a Congress government that initiated neo-liberal economic reforms in 
1991), the surprise victory of the Congress-led alliance was widely interpreted as 
a mandate for explicitly pro-poor policies.
The alliance was able to form a government with a clear majority with the sup-
port of the Left Front (consisting of the communist parties), who between them 
had about a tenth of the parliament seats. The Left Front offered support on the 
basis of a National Common Minimum Programme which included many of the 
issues taken up by the rights-based campaigns such as the employment guaran-
tee legislation, strengthening of the PDS, greater investments in education and 
health and so on. The program agenda was strengthened by the creation of a 
new body called the National Advisory Council headed by the president of the 
Congress party and including a number of activists who were part of rights-based 
campaigns and movements. This inside-outside position of the rights-based cam-
paigns – demanding rights through protests outside the state while simultane-
ously pushing the rights agenda from within the Advisory Council, is one of the 
hallmark features of India’s politics of provisions in the period from 2004–2014. 
As we will see later, linking protesters in the village to the corridors of policymak-
ing in the capital through various points of access is one of the reasons for their 
relative success in institutionalizing entitlements (Khera 2013).
Riots in West Bengal and rights in Madhya Pradesh
In 2007, in a village in Birbhum district of West Bengal, APL cardholders angry 
about being denied subsidized wheat due to them under the PDS forced the local 
shop-owner to sell wheat at a lower price. The spontaneous mobilization soon 
spread and there were riots around PDS shops in several villages in the region. 
One shop-owner committed suicide; the police fired on crowds injuring several 
people, and shops were burned and looted (Bhattacharya 2008; Majumdar 2007). 
In West Bengal, the ruling left party coalition, led by the Communist Party (Marx-
ist) (CPM), had been in power for over three decades. With party units in every 
village; local government, teachers’ unions, and PDS ration-dealers’ associations 
all politicized; spontaneous riots targeting PDS shops were an unusual occurrence.
The riots were neither initiated by the poorest villagers, nor about hunger or 
malnutrition; rather they were about accessing wheat (not the staple food in 
West Bengal) under the PDS, by Above the Poverty Line (APL) card-holding 
households. The proximate reason for the riots was the difference between the 
price of open market and the price of the subsidized wheat. For a decade previ-
ously, the APL prices of wheat had only been slightly lower than market prices, 
leading to lower uptake. In 2006 central government had decided to limit alloca-
tions under the APL category to the average taken up by states in the previous 
three years. At the same moment, however, the price of wheat began to rise, 
making the PDS wheat relatively more valuable. Given that the shop-owners 
and their association were closely linked to the ruling party, the state was seen as 
siding with corrupt shop-owners and protecting them.
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This was also a period when the hegemony of the Left Front was beginning to 
weaken. Massive protests had broken out across the state in response to the state 
government’s decision to acquire hundreds of acres of agricultural land for a pri-
vate car factory, Tata Motors. The main opposition party in the state – the Trina-
mool Congress – seized the opportunity offered by the widespread discontent and 
assumed leadership of the protest movement. The state government responded 
with police action, but was eventually forced to withdraw the acquisition plans 
and return the land to the farmers (Banerjee 2011; Banerjee and Roy 2007). 
These larger political developments provided the ‘environmental mechanisms’, 
against which the PDS rioters leveraged general discontent with the Left Front 
government (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001).
The popular view was that PDS shop-owners were generally corrupt and that 
both inclusion and exclusion errors were pervasive. As one villager noted: “APL-
BPL divide is not correct. The poorest people who should be BPL don’t have 
BPL cards. There is a political reason.” Another said: “some dealers are dacoits 
[armed robbers] and some are thieves.”5 So although the immediate issue con-
cerned the unavailability of APL wheat, both APL and BPL families participated 
in the riots. In Barokumira village, villagers dragged the shop-owner to a vil-
lage meeting and made him accept that he had been charging cardholders above 
the official price. To compensate for his wrongdoing, he was asked to contribute 
200,000 rupees toward village development. Unable to pay, three days later he 
committed suicide. Eight villagers had cases filed against them, but in the end, 
they were released.
Deep discontent with the way in which the ruling party had an iron grip on 
local governance also underpinned the riots. In Radhamohanpur village on Sep-
tember 16, 2007, the CPM was holding a zonal convention. Rumor had it that 
the CPM was part of the corruption in the PDS. Villagers decided to confront the 
shop-owner in front of other party leaders at the convention, to create pressure 
for reforms. However, when villagers went to the zonal meeting, the CPM pro-
tected the shop-owner. Violence broke out and police were brought in to control 
the protests. Ultimately several people were arrested and a curfew imposed on 
the village. Villagers expressed their discontent with political parties, which in 
West Bengal at the time, was synonymous with state government. As one land-
less woman observed:
When the (political) parties came to ask for vote, I said “what is that we get 
to vote for you?” I gave them a warning, “do not come for vote to us . . . what 
is that you give me? What is it that you help us with?” We do not even eat 
or wear their given stuff). We work and that is why we can eat a fistful . . . In 
every household, they will get seven to eight votes, that is how they see us. 
Why shouldn’t we speak up?6
In these incidents, villagers framed their demands as a ‘janagana andolan’ (peo-
ple’s movement), yet recognized that the mobilization had limited results. As one 
villager put it, “we went to ask for wheat, and ‘ate’ bullets.” The political party 
in collaboration with the shop-owners association agreed to compensate the two 
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people who were shot, but little else changed. However, they felt the khadyo 
andolan (food movement) would continue if necessary – “we have no choice, 
but yes. If we don’t have kerosene oil, how will we light our houses? We don’t 
even have money to buy candles. There will be a struggle again.”7 In West Ben-
gal, then, the focus was on rights, but narrowly, in the sense of the right to food 
through entitlement programs.
In Madhya Pradesh, the release of the National Family Health Survey (NHFS) 
data in December 2006 highlighted that the state not only had the highest level 
of child malnutrition in the country, it also saw an increase in the prevalence of 
malnutrition since the previous survey (1997–1998) (Indian Institute of Popula-
tion Studies 2007). At the same time, a number of deaths due to malnutrition 
were reported in the media, bringing the issue of hunger and malnutrition to 
national attention. Simultaneously, grassroots groups like the Aadivasi Adhikar 
Manch (AAM), were mobilizing villagers to demand better child care centers, 
improved delivery in the Public Distribution System and the establishment of 
nutrition rehabilitation centers. In collaboration with the state and national 
level right to food campaign, AAM was able to convert popular mobilization 
into sustained pressure for improving entitlements for the poor.
The story of popular mobilization and its effects in Madhya Pradesh has to be 
understood in terms of the ways in which local groups have managed to leverage 
activism at higher levels as well as creating allies within the media to gain trac-
tion on the broader issue of sustainable livelihoods. These provide the environ-
mental mechanisms with which contention can unfold (McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly 2001). The AAM, set up in the late 1990s by two activists who had been 
trained by a well-established non-governmental organization (NGO), initially 
started working on land rights and were successful in retaining land in de facto 
control of the tribal population. In Satna district, poverty and food insecurity 
are widespread, and the poor depend upon subsistence farming and forest pro-
duce. One villager described the food security situation as “four months of surplus 
and the rest a period of want.”8 Government programs such as PDS and midday 
school meals are critical for survival.
AAM’s links with a media advocacy organization working on the issue of child 
malnutrition – Vikas Samvad – led to AAM focussing on malnutrition and greater 
visibility for the issue. Between 2007 and 2012, AAM organized protest marches 
and public hearings at local and district levels, provided evidence of malnutrition 
from the grassroots, and participated in state and national protests led by the 
right to food campaign. In November 2009, 30 activists from AAM participated 
in a national rally in Delhi to reject the minimalist draft of the Food Security 
Act proposed by the national government. AAM connects child malnutrition 
to broader grievances which resonate with the population, such as malfunction-
ing government programs, increasing unviability of agriculture due to high input 
prices and inflation, and the lack of employment opportunities.
AAM also mobilized locally on policy issues in line with the national position 
of the right to food campaign. These local demands included universalization 
of the PDS, inclusion of pulses and edible oils within the PDS and improving 
Demanding accountability: hunger in India 125
the quality of grain provided. One of the public hearings on malnutrition was 
attended by a member of the National Commission for the Protection of Child 
Rights which is affiliated to the right to food campaign. The relative gains made 
by AAM locally were partly a result of these links to higher levels of activism and 
the media. After one of the protest marches, one tribal activist recalled:
After that all kinds of officials who we had never seen before descended on 
our village. Those who did not have the ration cards were issued the cards. 
All of us were given food grains and everything. There was a medical camp 
in the village for fifteen days. All the sick children were taken care of and 
things became better.9
The presence of national-level influential people who witnessed first-hand the 
testimony of the poor about child malnutrition led to the opening of a nutrition 
rehabilitation center. Since 2010, mobilizations have declined, partly because 
most of the demands for direct interventions on malnutrition have been met.
The cognitive frame of those who participated in the struggles was one of 
rights. Describing the protests, a member noted, “It was almost like an election 
atmosphere where the contradictions to our interests got clearly highlighted and 
people were ready to oppose those who obstructed their rights.”10 Protest slo-
gans reflected this rights-based perspective: ‘government land is our land.’ When 
asked if they were worried about state repression over their participation in the 
protests, one of the participants replied, “How will they arrest us? It was a rally.” 
The mobilization by AAM activists has increased awareness of rights, embold-
ening poor villagers vis-à-vis their state. As one villager put it, “Now whenever 
anyone comes asking about our problems, we know how to present our case to the 
government and any other journalists.” The rights that villagers refer to here are 
broader than accessing food entitlements.
The responses to the popular mobilization in West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh 
were very different and owe a lot to the political moment within which protests 
took place. In Madhya Pradesh, the response was twofold: the creation of a high-
level structure to converge action around malnutrition in the form of the inter-
departmental Atal Bal Mission for child health and nutrition, set up under the 
leadership of the chief minister; and increase in the number of PDS beneficiar-
ies.11 The Mission was comprehensive, looking at production and distribution of 
food grains as well as the social determinants of malnutrition, including water 
and sanitation, decentralization, and coordination of Women and Child Devel-
opment, Health and Family Welfare, and Rural Development and Panchayati 
Raj ministries.
In West Bengal, the policy response around a year later, and was primarily 
the provision of a state subsidy to reduce the prices of rice and wheat available 
to families living below the official poverty line. But this was less an immediate 
response to the riots as it was to the elections, which were less than 100 days away 
when the scheme was announced. A senior Food Ministry bureaucrat pinned the 
blame for the crisis in West Bengal on local factors and corruption in the state 
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machinery, and not on the reduction of the APL quota for the state, attributing 
the crisis to large-scale hoarding by private actors within the PDS network:
In almost all other states, there is a state government entity, which picks 
up food grains from FCI godowns and that entity keeps the food grains in 
their own godowns and then distributes it to fair price shops. In both Kerala 
and West Bengal the job of a wholesaler is done by private people. They are 
called authorised wholesale dealers. Ironically, in both the left-ruled states it 
is the private dealers who lift the grains from FCI. So we have tried and failed 
to persuade the states to set up their own corporations and do this work.12
The policy response in West Bengal thus focused on a populist price intervention 
that was easier to undertake than more difficult structural reforms in the manage-
ment of the PDS.
The case of Madhya Pradesh is more representative of what was happening 
elsewhere in India, particularly in the links between localized efforts and national 
policy advocacy by the right to food campaign. Supreme Court orders were dis-
seminated by the state-level campaign to the AAM, which used them in their 
mobilization strategies. The networked nature of the AAM gave it power well 
above its modest organisational base. The local media, linked to and feeding 
the national media, were heavily involved in highlighting malnutrition, turn-
ing it into a political issue, as evidenced in state assembly debates. In Madhya 
Pradesh, while individual PDS shops might have been linked to particular politi-
cal patrons, there was no state-wide capture of the PDS system by any political 
party, so mobilization for food security and malnutrition was not viewed as being 
against any particular political party. The AAM campaigns addressed all political 
parties in an effort to highlight the demands of the people, the main ones being 
access to and expansion of services related to food and malnutrition. The mobi-
lizational repertoires were common ones: of dharnas (peaceful demonstrations), 
petitions, jan sunwais (social audits) and rallies.
The difference in policy response in each case was driven by the underlying 
nature of the problem but also by its popular articulation. In Bengal, the riots 
were essentially ‘ration’ riots linked directly to the PDS, and the response was 
restricted to policy changes in PDS prices and beneficiary numbers. In Madhya 
Pradesh, the popular mobilization was around broad food security issues and spe-
cifically malnutrition, and the policy response was larger and more institutional, 
with influence on the national policy debates.
The Supreme Court and the right to food case
Inflation, and especially food price inflation, has been an issue of national public 
debate since the early 2000s, and by 2008 was a pressing concern. The initial 
response of the government to inflation was narrow, revolving around mone-
tary policy in respect of banning rice exports and futures trading in four com-
modities presumed to affect domestic prices (De Schutter 2010).13 A more direct 
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government response to issues of hunger and access to food was forced by three 
interlinked factors: an activist Supreme Court, the rising political salience of 
food security in the media and continuous pressure by the right to food campaign.
The Supreme Court played an active role in shaping government responsibility 
for hunger through decisions on the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) 
vs. Union of India and others, Civil Writ Petition 196/2001 (popularly known as 
the right to food case) (Banik 2016). The case revolves around a petition filed by 
the PUCL, a leading Indian human rights organization, in the Supreme Court. 
This argued that in the context of successive droughts in 2001, it was imperative 
that the government use the accumulated food stocks of approximately 50 mil-
lion tons to mitigate drought relief and hunger. The petition went beyond situa-
tions of drought and focussed on the need to uphold the ‘right to food.’ In ruling 
on the case, the Supreme Court laid out path breaking jurisprudence (De Schut-
ter 2013).14 The orders converted all food and employment schemes run by the 
central government into legal entitlements, universalising food entitlement pro-
grams for children, and instituting an independent accountability mechanism, 
the Commissioners to the Supreme Court, to monitor all food and employment 
programs.
Supreme Court activism ensured that right to food issues became mainstream 
in the public discourse. Media coverage forced the government to act under pres-
sure of judicial orders and the public debate that ensued.15 An illustration of this 
is the reversal of state policy linking the official poverty line to targeting of food 
security schemes. During 2011–2012, the Supreme Court made a series of obser-
vations on the low threshold of the poverty line (24 rupees per capita per day for 
rural areas and 32 rupees per capita per day at 2010 prices) set by the Planning 
Commission for targeting in food schemes, including the PDS. The low threshold 
of the poverty line was picked up by the print, electronic and social media and 
debated extensively.16 The barrage of reporting finally prompted the Minister of 
Rural Development and the deputy chairperson of the Planning Commission 
to issue a press statement de-linking the poverty line from the targeting of anti-
poverty schemes (Government of India 2012).
By 2009, then, the right to food had been firmly mainstreamed in national dis-
course, and both major political parties included it in their election manifestos. 
The passage of the National Food Security Act in 2013 was evidence of how far 
the discourse had moved toward inclusiveness. A comparison of the manifestos 
of the two major political parties both for the Assembly elections in 2008 and 
the national elections in 2009 shows that many of the demands met through 
the Act had been election promises. Both the major parties promised subsidized 
food grains and an expanded PDS. Notably, both manifestos mention a universal 
PDS and community kitchens for the urban poor. The Indian National Congress 
manifesto commits to the universalization of the Integrated Child Development 
Scheme and for the first time mentions a ‘Right to Food Act.’
This focus on the PDS in the national elections came against the background 
of an improvement in the PDS in many states in the period preceding the 2009 
elections and within the context of high food prices. Chhattisgarh had state 
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assembly elections in 2008, and pioneering reforms in the PDS took place includ-
ing a host of measures to increase transparency and accountability and reduce 
corruption. It was widely acknowledged that this contributed to the popularity of 
the Chief Minister and his party. Chhattisgarh became the first state outside the 
southern states to show that it was possible to improve the PDS and reap politi-
cal gains from doing so. This period saw a host of other states also taking similar 
measures to increase PDS coverage and subsidies using their own revenues. It was 
therefore no surprise when the PDS became a major campaign pledge for both 
major parties.
The right to food campaign, which emerged out of the Supreme Court case, 
was also one of the principal agents of policy change in the period, including 
campaigning for the National Food Security Act. Between 2009 and 2013, the 
bill went through various drafts and amendments. The campaign prepared an 
alternative draft17 and at each stage mobilized public opinion and engaged with 
the press, politicians and policymakers to expand the scope of the bill. A study of 
the various changes in the drafts reflects the richness of the policy discourse dur-
ing the reference period (Sinha et al. 2014). For instance, the March 2010 draft 
of the Act by the Empowered Group of Ministers restricted benefits to 25 kg of 
rice/wheat a month at three rupees per kilogram for a section of the Below Pov-
erty Line population (as defined by the Planning Commission). The second draft 
coincided with public debates about the poverty line, high inflation and lobbying 
by the right to food campaign, and entitlements were expanded to 35 kg for the 
poorest households, and coverage of 67 per cent of all households with 5 kg per 
person per month, with highly subsidized food grains. Other entitlements related 
to children and women also found a place in the final food security legislation, 
albeit in a diluted form (Sinha et al. 2014).
The final legislation, passed in 2013, guarantees subsidized grains to 820 mil-
lion Indians. It provides for free midday meals to 130 million school children and 
supplementary nutrition to all children in the country below the age of six and 
guarantees a maternity entitlement to every pregnant and lactating mother. With 
an annual budget of nearly USD $25 billion, the National Food Security Act is 
one of the largest food programs in the world. As we saw, its final shape was the 
result of a long trajectory of mobilizing, contestation and debate between the 
campaign, academic observers, politicians and bureaucrats.
It would be remiss to overlook the contextual features that have enabled the 
gains made by the right to food campaign. First, the liberalization of the Indian 
economy in the early 1990s has consistently triggered civil society protests against 
the elevation of private above public interests (for example, protests against land 
appropriation for Special Economic Zones). Rising food prices have been viewed 
as part of the broader impacts of liberalization. Second, the precedent of state 
obligations to protect the poorest from food insecurity had been well-established 
since the early 1960s. Third, the 2004 elections in which the Congress-led UPA 
unexpectedly won opened the door to the possibilities for several social protec-
tion policies. The National Advisory Council formed soon after the election with 
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Sonia Gandhi as chair had political clout, and with a membership consisting of 
several representatives of social movements, was able to support several pieces of 
progressive legislation – including the MGNREGA, the Forest Rights Act and 
the Right to Information Act. The impact of these was critical to support for the 
Congress-led UPA in the 2009 elections, in which the PDS became a political 
issue. Several state governments reduced PDS prices and the NSFA appeared 
in the election manifesto of many parties. Moreover, by continuously passing 
orders compelling the government to expand and improve food-related programs 
such as the midday meal in the right to food case, many in government believed 
that the Supreme Court was overstepping its mandate and interfering in govern-
ance. Returning debates about entitlements to food to the parliament through 
the Right to Food Act was seen as placing policy and implementation back to its 
rightful place: the legislative sphere.
The politics of provisions
Were these politics of provisions rooted in an implicit social contract around 
protection against hunger? The evidence supports such an interpretation. Con-
tention, by and large, was not in the form of riots but in the form of an expanded 
repertoire of engagement with the state through protests, social audits and media 
campaigns. Underpinning these was an expectation of justice, fairness and soli-
darity on the part of protestors and within government. The prevailing norm in 
India has always been that it is the state’s responsibility to provide for the poor 
and protect them from the market, as exemplified by the mammoth food mar-
ket intervention that is the PDS. Yet the roots of these expectations, the form 
they take and the responses they elicit, vary across the country. Thus, protests in 
Madhya Pradesh, or riots in West Bengal, and the broader right to food campaign 
must be seen in light of the expectations people have of their relationships with 
the landed elite, the community more broadly and the longer cycles of relation-
ships between the state and its citizens.
Two points are of particular importance. The first relates to the erosion of 
patronage ties with landlords and other community elites and the rural poor. 
In many isolated and underdeveloped areas of India, the state has not been a 
significant presence and the landed elite have been the source of social pro-
tection. However, these relationships are rapidly disappearing. With declining 
access to traditional products from the forests, the de-linking of employment and 
social security due to migration, the changing nature of employment and more 
recently the advent of the NREGA, the roots of popular mobilization can no 
longer be tied to the moral economy of elites and landlords.18 While exploitative 
landlords have not disappeared, their hold has weakened in many parts of the 
country. Seemingly in contradiction, it appears easier to direct anger against a 
‘faceless’ anonymous state than an identifiable local personage who might sub-
ject one to reprisal. Patronage ties have in general been replaced by electoral 
accountabilities.
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The second is that rights struggles in rural India have to be seen within a long-
standing politics of provisions in which the Constitution has within it accepted a 
‘right to life’ which has been drawn upon to make arguments in a variety of pro-
gressive cases, including the Supreme Court Right to Food case. Past histories of 
famine (including the Bengal famine), and the fact that hunger has always been 
an emotional and political issue, suggests that mobilization against hunger and 
malnutrition, no matter what form it takes, is more naturally directed against the 
state. The state on its part has been extremely sensitive to the threat of hunger 
and famine, as, if anything, its legitimacy rests of preventing starvation.19 The 
colonial roots of the Bengal famine of 1943–1944, and its evocation in the strug-
gle for independence give widespread hunger (or the risk of it) particular political 
salience. This is reinforced by the fact that civil society mobilization, under the 
auspices of the right to food campaign has managed to create an environment 
where the state is widely seen as responsible for addressing hunger.
These themes emerged from national level interviews and the state-level case 
studies. In Madhya Pradesh, the important rural social divisions are between the 
landed and the landless. Although awareness of state presence appeared to be 
relatively recent and partly an outcome of the mobilization work by AAM, there 
has been little expectation from patronage ties in the recent past (dependence 
on landlords ended at least two decades ago). Rather, prior to AAM’s interven-
tions, tribal populations had been left in a vacuum, squeezed between large scale 
economic changes that removed traditional sources of security and the absence 
of the – albeit limited – welfare of the state. The AAM was able to use ‘moral 
economy’ arguments of state responsibility to mobilize the poorest groups and 
demand accountability from the state.
In West Bengal, by contrast, social cleavages are more political than economic, 
in terms of those supporting the CPM and the rest. Shaped by the history of 
the left movement and the Left Front government that remained in period from 
1977–2011, the moral economy has been always framed by expectations from the 
state. The PDS, which was the focus of the riots, had worked relatively well in 
providing for the poorest (BPL quota), as well as providing the allocated quotas 
of rice, the staple food. The problems in 2007, as we saw, were in the provision of 
wheat grains for those above the poverty line (APL) which led to the spontane-
ous protests.
In this context, where the state accepts responsibilities to address food inse-
curity, the role of the Public Distribution System (PDS) looms large. The PDS, 
by providing subsidized basic grains and fuel (even when functioning poorly), is 
viewed as the institution through which food security is to be ensured. This is 
so not only in the eyes of the poor, but also in the perceptions of the state, for 
whom intervening in food prices has been limited (e.g., open market sale of pro-
cured grain and anti-hoarding policies). The PDS has sown the seed for a growing 
acceptance of a ‘right to food’ whose duty bearer is the state.
During (and slightly after) the period 2006–2011, there was a lot of policy 
action around food prices and food security. However, policy response during 
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this period has to be viewed as coinciding with the prevailing public debate on 
inflation and world food prices (and the related debate on the poverty line), 
the pressures exerted by the right to food campaign, the debates on the legisla-
tion of the National Food Security Act and the discussions in national media 
around the high levels of malnutrition in the country. As one right to food 
activist put it:
We know that price is something that is not at all in the hands of, or control 
of poor people – that is why a PDS which could give extremely subsidized 
and adequate cereals, pulses and cooking oil . . . that is why our response 
was in a comprehensive way in terms of a campaign for a FSA – a kind of 
guarantee.20
In addition, 2009 was an election year during which issues of food had become 
politically salient. The whole period was characterized by the rise of a rights dis-
course, increasingly accepted by the government in power as part of realisable 
policy options.
The perceptions of policymakers are of relevance. Our interviews suggested 
that state officials do not view themselves as highly constrained by global mar-
kets, partly because they operate a large-scale procurement program, and partly 
because India’s size and food production partially insulates it from world markets. 
A senior member of the Planning Commission noted, “in other countries the idea 
that world prices matter, that governments should do something about it is an 
issue, in India it is not.”21 The implication was that India was less affected by food 
prices, but also that there was never any doubt that the government was respon-
sible for securing affordable food. However, policy responses driven by Supreme 
Court orders did not automatically translate into action at the grassroots level: 
they had to be activated by campaign groups on the ground to mobilize people 
to make accountability demands. What some policymakers seem to argue is that 
the right to food campaign’s mobilizing was perceived as more acceptable to the 
bureaucracy because the right to food campaign offered ‘solutions’ and worked on 
details of programs.
This observation held in our two state-level cases. In West Bengal, although 
there was some immediate response to the riots, there were few institutional 
responses – the riots did not trigger state-wide improvements to the PDS, and 
key responses are more properly seen as preparation for the forthcoming elec-
tions that were anticipated to be hotly contested. Neither did the opposition 
party, which used the mobilisation for its own political ambitions, offer policy 
changes to the PDS or other related food security programs. By contrast, in Mad-
hya Pradesh, the responses in the form of improvements in the Integrated Child 
Development Scheme, the creation of nutrition rehabilitation centers and the 
better functioning of the PDS were institution- and state-wide. The implication 
is that the progressive responses by the state in Madhya Pradesh are also more 
sustainable.
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Conclusions
Bohstedt argues that ‘politics of provisions’ – “the ways in which common people 
interacted with their rulers over subsistence, and that those interactions were 
permitted and shaped by pre-existing social and political networks, both among 
rioters and between them and their rulers” – help explain why faced with a crisis 
of subsistence (food), people riot (or not) and states respond (or not) (Bohst-
edt 2016: 1036). In this chapter, the Indian case develops the argument further, 
showing that the politics of provisions are thrown into light not just in periods 
of crisis, but also in ongoing conditions of chronic food insecurity. Food riots are 
not simply a response to hunger, but symbolize feelings about an unjust economic 
and political system that coalesce around the issue of food.
The contrasts between the two states reinforce arguments about the impor-
tance of political economy to social and state reactions to food insecurity. Dif-
ferent political opportunities and different local institutions resulted in different 
forms of mobilisation. In West Bengal, the ruling Left Front had addressed issues 
of subsistence over three decades of socialist rule and resulted in a deeply poli-
ticked welfare system; in Madhya Pradesh activists, in collaboration with the right 
to food campaign, were starting to make inroads into problems of malnutrition 
in a context where the state was sensitive to such pressure. And yet the broader 
political and economic imaginaries were the same in the two states as well as at 
the national level for both activists as well as policymakers. Ideas that India was 
not a price-taker in food markets; that the poor were defenseless against sudden 
price rises; that elected governments were vulnerable to protests if food became 
unaffordable were common currency in networks and negotiations between the 
right to food campaign as well as those responsible for PDS and food policy. The 
very existence and scale of the PDS over six decades shows that social protection 
policy was well entrenched in the visions of all political parties. The language of 
protest, campaigns and riots was well understood in the long trajectory of social 
movements in India since Independence. Collectively, the Indian political econ-
omy of food combined with the political popular imagination of responsibilities 
combine to explain a period of ongoing chronic food insecurity and rising prices 
set within a broader politics of provisions, which led to the National Food Secu-
rity Act of 2014. Whether this Act delivers on its entitlement promises for all 
will depend upon continuous mobilisation and responses set within the changing 
political and economic context.
Notes
 1 The work presented here was funded by the ESRC project on the ‘Moral and Political 
Economy of Accountability for Hunger’ (ESRC – DFID Joint Research Programme). 
We are grateful to our interviewees for generously giving their time for this research, 
as well as Vaibhav Raaj and Shreya Bhattacharya who assisted in conducting the field 
work and the initial analysis. In addition, we are grateful to the RTF campaign for 
giving us access to campaign material. Prof. Jayati Ghosh, Dr. Santhosh Matthew, 
Kiran Bhatty, Dr. Santosh Mehrotra, Nitin Sethi, Anuradha Raman and Neelabh 
Mishra provided valuable comments at critical points in time. We are also grateful to 
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Anuradha Talwar, Sachin, Anand and Prateek for facilitating our site visits. We thank 
Naomi Hossain and Patta Scott-Villiers for useful comments on earlier versions of this 
chapter. The usual disclaimers apply.
 2 The researchers had the privilege of access to the numerous grassroots organizations 
which constitute the Right to Food Campaign in India. Many of these organizations 
maintain a comprehensive database on food-related events in their area of activity. In 
addition, the team produced an event catalogue, mentioned in Chapter XX.
 3 For details of each of the cases, see Sinha et al. 2014.
 4 The union works in the district but was not part of the food riots, and did not have a 
direct presence in the villages that were most affected.
 5 From a focus group discussion with senior citizens in Bankura District, August 29, 2013.
 6 From a focus group discussion with agricultural laboring women in Bankura District, 
August 29, 2013.
 7 From a focus group discussion with protestors in Bankura district, August 29, 2013.
 8 From a focus group discussion with landless indigenous people in Bankura district, 
August 29, 2013.
 9 Interview with agricultural laborer and activist in Madhya Pradesh, June 15, 2013.
 10 From a focus group discussion with activists in Madhya Pradesh, June 15, 2013.
 11 A comparison of the manifestos of the two major political parties in Madhya Pradesh – 
the ruling BJP and the Congress party – clearly shows that malnutrition and the right 
to food had emerged as dominant concerns.
 12 Interview with author, June 2013.
 13 Personal interview, senior member Planning Commission, New Delhi, September 18, 2013.
 14 What is notable is that the only short-term intervention of the Indian government to 
liquidate food stocks through the PDS came about in 2011, only after repeated direc-
tives from the Supreme Court, to release at least 5 million metric tons of food grains 
from the stockholding to the PDS. The orders were made in the context of media 
reports of rotting food grains in the government storage facilities even as inflationary 
pressures on food continued unabated.
















 17 The alternative draft, and a number of petitions and letters from the campaign to the 
government in relation to the NFSA, are available on www.righttofoodindia.org
 18 This point was made repeatedly in focus group discussions in Satna, Madhya Pradesh.
 19 The recent heated debate about definitions of the poverty line illustrate the extent 
to which poverty (including food security) and related relief programs are high- 
stakes issues.
 20 Interview with author, June 2013.
 21 Personal interview, senior member Planning Commission, New Delhi, September 18, 
2013.
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7 The constitution lies to us!
Food protests in Kenya, 2007–2012
Celestine Nyamu Musembi and Patta Scott-Villiers
Introduction
The constitution sometimes lies to us because they haven’t told us where we will 
find that food that is our right. . . . You will die of hunger if you overstate the 
importance of that constitution.1
Labour Day, 2009: from the densely inhabited informal settlements of Nairobi, 
streams of people marched towards the city stadium. Their banners and slogans 
protested the cost of the staple maize meal, unga. ‘Unga 30 bob!’ was the cry, hark-
ing back to a time when the price of a kilo of this most important of Kenyan foods 
was protected by government and rose at a rate of one shilling a year over a period 
of 24 years. Numerous localised riots also broke out in Nairobi’s informal settle-
ments at food distribution depots. Meanwhile, market stallholders at Ikutha, a mar-
ginal farming area 225 km from the capital, described noisy episodes outside grain 
stores and administration offices. These sporadic and localised protests were widely 
debated on local language radio, but received little or no national media attention.
In 2010, the Republic of Kenya enacted a new constitution that brought into 
law a range of progressive economic and social rights including the legal entitle-
ment of its citizens ‘to be free from hunger, and to have adequate food of accept-
able quality’ (Republic of Kenya 2010: 79). Yet the following year, in 2011, there 
were more protests as food prices peaked again and people on low incomes both 
cut down on the quality and quantity of the food they ate and stepped up their 
efforts to find more cash paying work (Scott-Villiers et al. 2016). Hunger was (and 
still is) widespread in Kenya. FAO statistics indicate that 10 million people – 
23 per cent of the population – were undernourished in the years 2010–2012.2 
Not having enough to eat is commonplace and protests about dearth are usually 
localised skirmishes in marginal areas, raising little political attention. Factors 
rooted in Kenya’s history and political economy have dampened citizen expec-
tations of the state, thwarted popular mobilisation and allowed for persistently 
weak state responses, a process that this chapter will explore.
Larger protests do occur at certain junctures, and this was the case in the years 
2009 and 2011 in particular. They were triggered by unprecedented rises in food 
prices and the cost of living, and inadequacy in state response. They were made 
legitimate in the minds of protesters and for many in government by a belief in 
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state responsibility for provisioning at times of dearth. They had greatest effect 
(as far as they had any effect at all) when political dynamics allowed citizen pres-
sure to be most acutely felt by politicians. The protest events thus helped reveal 
the makeup of the moral and political economy of low-income Kenyans in rela-
tion to food and other basic provisioning. We understand the idea of the moral 
economy to be the rationale for action by poor people, based on popular consen-
sus as to traditional rights and customs at times of dearth (Thompson 1971: 79). 
In Kenya, it was brought forth in the shouts for price control and fair distribution 
of relief during the protest events, and in people’s post-event explanations of 
their grievances and hopes. In this chapter, we use this notion of the moral econ-
omy to explore the politics of provisions in Kenya, tying the legitimising ideas 
of the moral economy into the opportunities offered by political dynamics and 
networks of solidarity and reciprocity. The result is a political bargaining process 
between the state and the masses which has substantial effects on state forma-
tion (Bohstedt 2016: 1035). The nature, timing and effect of the food protests 
in Kenya revealed the political opportunities to which the events responded, the 
networks of solidarity and fracture among people most affected by the price rises, 
and the degree to which historically-consolidated reciprocity (however weak) 
between poor citizens and state authorities still existed. This exploration of the 
politics of provisions allows insight into the means by which bargaining in favour 
of a contemporary moral economy might develop in the future.
We attempt here to show the field of struggle, by examining how local partici-
pants explained the contentious events in which they were involved, and analys-
ing how elites and people on low incomes interpreted official responses to protest. 
It is based on a study carried out in 2013, which combined analysis of media 
reporting, policy, academic and legal documents with focus group discussions and 
validation meetings with low income residents in two sites, one urban and the 
other rural, along with interviews with government officials and right to food 
activists (Musembi and Scott-Villiers 2015).3 Mathare, one of Nairobi’s informal 
settlements, was a significant site of organising for the unga (maize meal) price 
protests that followed spikes in prices in 2008 and 2011. Ikutha market, the rural 
site in Kitui County in the southeastern region, is among the areas in the country 
that are considered chronically food insecure,4 yet which has not been the focus 
of government attention due to its low political importance.
The triggers
A right to food means you are absolutely free to eat food if and when you can find 
it [Ni kuya wawona.]5
Over the years 2007–2012, the price of maize – Kenya’s main staple grain – rose, 
fell and rose again in a series of spikes, each of which left the price of this basic 
food higher than it had been before the spike (Figure 7.1). While the timing 
would suggest that the price volatility was a reflection of the global food, fuel 
and financial crises, closer examination shows that food prices in Kenya rose 
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more sharply and stayed higher for longer.6 Over the five-year period, though 
food prices responded to both local and international conditions, it was local 
conditions (production shortfalls, high import tariffs, dubious market interven-
tions and failures of social protection) that kept prices rising. It is of these local 
conditions that poor people were speaking when they protested.
Costs of grain and oil on world markets began to rise rapidly in late 2007, 
while poor rains across the East African Community free trade area raised prices 
in regional and local markets. Between the end of December 2007 and mid-
February 2008, unprecedented post-election violence in Kenya caused mass 
displacement from central maize-producing areas and substantial losses in food 
production (Short, Mulinge, and Witwer 2013: 11, Fengler and Kiringai 2009: 7). 
The overall effect was a deficit of some 1 million tonnes and a trebling in retail 
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Figure 7.1  World and Kenya maize prices, 2007–2012
Source: FAO GIEWS, www.fao.org/giews/pricetool/ – accessed 28 February 2017
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explained how the price of not only maize meal, but also wheat flour, rice, cook-
ing oil, beans, vegetables and other basics soared, as did the costs of rent, agricul-
tural supplies and transport.
Kenya’s formal mechanism for reducing volatility in grain prices, the Strategic 
Grain Reserve, managed by the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) 
has existed for several decades, its origin in the paternalist authoritarian govern-
ment’s view that the prices of staple foods should be kept steady. When prices rose 
in 2008, even thought the country’s economy was now operating under a ‘free-
market’ regime, the mandate of the NCPB was unchanged: to release stored grain 
onto the market, as it had done in previous instances of shortage.7 However, the 
stores were almost empty (Höffler and Ochieng 2009: 29) and there was no direct 
government action to mitigate the price shocks for almost a year.8 In Novem-
ber 2008 the government announced that NCPB would import maize using aid 
from the Japanese government and sell it to millers at below wholesale market 
prices, on the basis that the millers would then make the milled maize flour avail-
able on the retail market at a low price.9 Despite this initiative, the consumer 
price of maize flour remained stubbornly high (Höffler and Ochieng 2009: 29, 
Jayne and Tschirley 2010: 8, Short, Mulinge, and Witwer 2013: 11, Tschirley 
and Jayne 2010). At least half of the maize allocations of the scheme’s first phase 
went to only 10 companies and a quarter was issued to brokers, who sold on to the 
millers at a mark-up (Fengler and Kiringai 2010: 7). In January 2009, local media 
reported the failure as corruption, including alleging that the duty free imports 
had been re-exported to Sudan (Ariga, Jayne, and Njukia 2010: 16). In Febru-
ary 2009, the scheme was abandoned. Public losses were estimated at 23.4 billion 
Kenya shillings (Fengler and Kiringai 2009: 13) – US $310 million – and the 
scheme joined the lexicon of Kenyan scams in the media, on social media and the 
word on the street in the informal settlements.10
Kenya’s governance has long been characterised by an intricate dovetailing of 
economic and political power, sharply manifest in the food and agriculture sector 
(Leys 1975). A post-colonial elite inherited the colonial practice of subsidising 
large-scale farmers, while privilege quickly congealed into entitlement, secured 
by political clout. The favouring of maize-surplus areas both in pricing policy and 
production subsidies bears witness to this. Cereals board subsidies, for instance, 
have been shown to benefit a small number of large growers through raising the 
price of maize by as much as 20 per cent (Jayne, Myers, and Nyoro 2008). The 
maize-surplus areas of the Rift Valley and Western Kenya happen to be vote-rich 
areas, so that any suggestion of radical reform of the NCPB raises political tem-
peratures. By contrast, far-flung Ikutha can be safely ignored, and repeated years 
of drought and chronic food shortage can fail to register on the political radar 
screen. Experience has also shown that rumblings in urban slums can be ‘waited 
out’, repressed or appeased with hurriedly crafted relief programmes that do not 
need to last.
The people who grow maize for subsistence are not the ones who are subsi-
dised by the cereals board. The maize sector is held hostage by vested inter-
ests. The whole thing subsidises 2 per cent of farmers from the North Rift 
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and Kitale who are rich! They sit with us in cabinet and they tell us not to 
interfere with maize prices.11
Those most affected by the soaring prices were already spending as much as half 
their income on food from the market. Even small farmers suffered, since most 
were net buyers of grain. In 2008–2009 and 2011 we learned that it was common 
for families and especially for women to be eating only one meal a day. They 
ate smaller portions, reduced the variety of food to mainly ugali (cooked maize 
meal) and kale, and ate less diverse diets (Hossain and Green 2011, Lubaale 
2013, Gatimu 2014). Many in Mathare began to rely on eating small portions of 
ready-cooked roadside foods rather than home-cooked meals, cutting down on 
fuel costs and saving time. In Ikutha the kadogo economy, or the re-packaging of 
basic food items such as flour, maize, sugar and cooking oil into ever-smaller por-
tions to be bought by people barely scraping by as prices rose daily, was cited as a 
recent significant change brought about by rising food prices.
In the face of looming destitution, many people took often-irreversible deci-
sions to change their diets, their work and the places where they lived (Scott- 
Villiers et al. 2016). Focus group discussants in Ikutha and Mathare explained 
which elements of the government’s crisis response they felt breached the unwrit-
ten compact of a moral economy. While willing to double their own efforts to earn 
cash, and tighten their belts in terms of expenditures and food consumption, they 
directed their contempt towards inadequate and corrupt practices of price regu-
lation, social protection and relief. They considered the failures of government 
price stabilisation and the unreliable and unfair distribution of relief commodities 
to be utterly illegitimate. They explained that these failures, which the govern-
ment could have prevented, had exacerbated the negative effects of global market 
turbulence and local production shortfalls. People were exasperated, though not 
surprised, by the degree of plundering and blundering on the part of their govern-
ment and its cronies. In 2011, one matatu (public transport) tout went so far as 
to say: ‘it’s high time Kenya went the Egypt way. We need a leadership change.’12
Chronicle of food-related protest
A right to food means that the price of food should be lowered by the government 
so that people eat well.13
Demonstrations, court cases, petitions and riots
The period witnessed cost-of-living-related strikes by public sector workers includ-
ing health workers, teachers and lecturers14 and violent riots by informal traders 
evicted from their pavement pitches by armed police.15 Some of the most notable 
protests reported in national media related specifically to the cost of maize meal. 
These non-violent protests came to be identified as the ‘Unga Revolution,’ led 
primarily by the poor people’s social movement Bunge la Mwananchi.16 Away from 
the eyes of the national media, local chapters of Bunge la Mwananchi had been 
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hard at work organising protests over the rising cost of living since 2005.17 They 
were doing this both in their vibrant weekly outdoor debates in Nairobi’s Jee-
vanjee Gardens, a public park, and in campaigns within low-income neighbour-
hoods (Otieno et al. 2016). Through weekly forums in town centres, volunteers 
presented citizens with illustrations of the volatility and steep rise of unga prices 
since 2002. They compared the current situation to the relative stability in food 
prices during the era of Kenya’s one-party state under Daniel Arap Moi and his 
Kenya African National Union (KANU) party. They presented a moral economy 
argument: that even a dictatorship kept its bargain with the poor to control the 
prices of staple commodities.18 This counter-intuitive proposition achieved the 
desired effect of stirring up public outrage and collective action to protest.19
Although the name Unga Revolution has now become something of an institu-
tion, it first appeared in the national media as the chant of a gathering of workers 
heckling the labour minister reading the president’s speech at the official Labour 
Day celebrations on 1 May 2009.20 The minister was forced to cut short and 
eventually abandon the reading, bringing the celebrations to a premature end. 
The Unga drama was repeated during the Labour Day Celebrations in 2011.21 
Food price protesters had by then perfected the strategy of stealing publicity at 
national celebrations. This strategy was successfully employed during the Jam-
huri Day celebrations in December 2008, most Labour Days since 2009, and 
Madaraka Day22 in 2011. The activists consider their action a legitimate reclaim-
ing of national forums that have been turned into exclusive spaces for the politi-
cal elite. Alongside this unsettling of official functions, activists also maintained 
a two-decades-old tradition of observing the unofficial (anti-official) Saba Saba 
Day (7 July), which commemorates a brutal crackdown on proponents of multi-
party democracy in 1990. The price of food was the theme of the Saba Saba rallies 
in 2011 and 2013. Speakers at both events exploited to full effect the historical 
link between the securing of ‘political freedom’ in the 1990s and the pursuit of 
the ‘social and economic freedoms’ promised by the 2010 constitution.23
Theatrical street demonstrations, particularly in the Nairobi city centre, 
attracted much media attention, especially when accompanied by confrontation 
with police. On 31 May 2011, Unga Revolution protestors took over Haram-
bee Avenue, the location of the Office of the President and the then Office of 
the Prime Minister, temporarily renaming it “Unga Avenue”. The media were 
delighted by this, but showed no interest in the intense behind-the-scenes mobi-
lisation in low-income neighbourhoods that preceded each street event. It is on 
account of this less visible mobilisation that we encountered some very well-
informed analysis of food politics in poor neighbourhoods such as Mathare.
The Consumers’ Federation of Kenya (COFEK)24 joined Bunge la Mwananchi 
in the protests in 2011 when the government announced a steep increase in 
the price of fuel that would affect food prices,25 and on 30 May COFEK filed a 
lawsuit against the government offices concerned with regulation of the energy 
sector.26 The court process in Kenya has historically been used as a site for public 
protest, and COFEK wanted the court to issue a declaration to the effect that the 
government agencies’ failure to stabilise and bring down fuel prices had the effect 
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of raising the cost of food, thereby breaching Article 43 of the constitution. On 
the day of the hearing, the court building and grounds were packed with people 
wielding placards and the event was heavily covered in the media. However, 
COFEK’s petition was poorly substantiated: no impact data was presented; no 
demonstration of failure of the measures the government had taken; and the 
petition collapsed.27 The one documented incident of court action in protest at 
food price hikes proved a wasted opportunity. It was rumoured that the COFEK 
leadership and legal team were targeted and divided with offers of deals and pay-
offs, hence the poor showing in the handling of the case.
The next time food-related protest received national media attention was 
June 2013.28 The protests were against a proposed revision of the Value Added 
Tax (VAT) Act to apply the full rate of VAT (16 per cent) on products (includ-
ing basic food commodities) which had previously been either zero-rated or 
exempted.29 Packaged unga, which had enjoyed zero-rated status since 2003–
2004, was also included, earning the proposal the tag ‘unga tax’ on the streets and 
in the national media. A coalition of organisations led by the National Taxpayers 
Association held protest rallies for three days (24–26 June 2013) following the 
budget speech in which the proposed measure was announced, and then held a 
protest march to the Treasury on 2 July 2013.
Petitions were not uncommon in association with these demonstrations and 
marches. They involved the background work of getting enough signatures, then 
a high-profile march to the relevant office to present the petition. The unga tax 
protests, for instance, had already collected more than 10,000 signatures on their 
petition a year earlier. In most instances, police blocked the protesters from 
accessing the official to whom they intended to present the petition. In a rare 
gesture, one of the Unga protests (31 May 2011) saw the prime minister come 
out onto the street to personally receive the petition.30 In all probability, such 
a response was only made possible by the internal rivalry of a coalition govern-
ment. However, the prime minister’s appearance did not translate into any last-
ing food policy reform. He requested 14 days to exercise his ‘right of reply’, but 
he never did get back to the people. It was an instance of bad faith in relation 
to the moral economy that community activists were still angry about two years 
later. They speculated that his posture, identifying with the troubles of the poor, 
was merely a cynical exercise in media attention. Being the party leader of the 
weaker coalition partner, it is likely that the PM was unable to mobilize an official 
response. Despite their initial jubilation at his appearance, activists soon realised 
that there was little real hope of food policy reforms.
Besides the more organised mobilisations, there were also many sporadic and 
localised riots. We heard about these in our field research in both Mathare and Iku-
tha. In Mathare spontaneous skirmishes were witnessed repeatedly at the depots 
where the urban poor tried to buy the government’s much-touted subsidised maize 
meal. They were also witnessed during food distribution to Mathare’s internally 
displaced persons, who were still homeless five years after the 2007–2008 post-
election violence. The skirmishes, which went unreported in national media, were 
triggered by alleged manipulation of the beneficiaries’ list by local administrators.31
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In Ikutha we became aware of at least three protests against local administra-
tors in the distribution of relief food. The first two were directed at a district com-
missioner and a district officer for their personal involvement in hoarding and 
then re-selling relief food. In the first incident the protesters, with the backing of 
a local councillor, succeeded in preventing a truck loaded with relief food from 
leaving the district commissioner’s compound, and forcing instant distribution of 
food stockpiled in a government warehouse.32 The second incident took place in 
Kituti, one of the outlying market centres. Local young men had been employed 
as casual labourers to offload a large consignment of relief food. The lorry then 
left empty, and returned with a second consignment. While they were still wait-
ing for the order to off-load, the lorry started driving out of the district office 
premises. The young men blew the whistle, but by the time a crowd gathered it 
was too late. However, they vowed that they would not leave, and the agitated 
crowd kept growing, until every last grain from the first consignment had been 
distributed. The third was even more localised, directed at an assistant chief for 
allegedly stashing relief food away in a store room in his office. His defence was 
that he was storing it temporarily for some beneficiaries who had not attended 
the public distribution. ‘When we found a hammer and he saw that we were seri-
ous, he agreed to unlock the door.’33 In the meantime, the protesters had made 
calls to their elected councillor and to a local language radio station that cap-
tured the drama as they emptied out the store and distributed the food.
State response to the protests
The PM promised affordable unga, but that only lasted a few days. Is there any-
thing that moves the government to take more serious action?34
The immediate response from the state varied from repression to appeasement, 
including shows of solidarity by individual politicians. Repression took the form 
of blocking protesters from accessing government offices, beatings and intimida-
tion of protest leaders.35 Blocking access led to violent confrontation between 
the police and protesters, as was the case with the Unga protests of 2011. These 
violent confrontations were then followed by arrests but seldom by any formal 
charges. Denial of (or delay in offering) medical treatment to those injured by 
police was also common. Threats to movement leaders were also part of the 
repressive response.36 One of the community activists in Mathare found herself 
confronted in her police cell by the three most senior police officers in the dis-
trict, all from her ethnic group, deriding her for having been brainwashed by 
an ‘enemy’ tribe: ‘Don’t you know that “we” are now in power? What are you 
protesting about?’37
Appeasement was exemplified by token responses such as a miniscule reduc-
tion in excise duties on kerosene and diesel, leaving the hefty fuel levy untouched 
(Njagih 2011), or the short-lived availing of a small amount of subsidised unga 
through market outlets in urban areas. Maize meal was specially packaged and 
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delivered to designated depots in poor neighbourhoods between December 2008 
and March 2009, but people in Mathare claimed that almost no one was able to 
get access to it.38
There were several instances of individual politicians ostensibly lending sup-
port or expressing agreement with the protests. The unga campaign could boast 
two presidential pledges to take measures to make food affordable, but these were 
characteristically not backed by anything in written actionable form.39 Then 
there was Mike ‘Sonko’ Mbuvi, the maverick MP for Makadara (a Nairobi con-
stituency) at the time of the 2011 protests, who tried to hijack the publicity of the 
unga protests of 31 May 2011 as part of his successful bid for election as Nairobi 
Senator.40
Only two instances drew an institutionalised response. The first related to 
the unga tax. A number of MPs had already opted in late 2012 to side with the 
unga tax protesters.41 A looming general election in March 2013 might have had 
something to do with this populist gesture. The unga tax protest continued to 
attract MPs’ support even after the general elections, notably MPs from the Jubi-
lee coalition of parties that got into power, since lowering food prices had been 
one of their campaign promises.42 It would be fair to say that this victory was a 
precarious one, because future re-classification of goods and services for VAT pur-
poses is always a possibility, and the pressure of revenue collection targets could 
see the debate re-opened.
The second instance concerned the enactment of the Price Control (Essential 
Goods) Act in 2011.43 In June 2010, in an apparently hasty response to the vari-
ous cost-of-living protests in 2008 and 2009, parliament debated and passed a bill 
bringing several essential commodities under a price control regime. Economists 
described the bill as ill-thought-through.44 The business community successfully 
pressured the president into withholding assent to the bill, citing Kenya’s obliga-
tions under international and regional trade treaties. In June 2011, a parliamen-
tary select committee on the cost of living was set up, whose work eventually 
led to a revised version of the bill. The president gave his assent and the bill was 
enacted into law in September 2011. However, this law represented a hollow vic-
tory. The Act is very brief. It gives power to the responsible minister to declare, 
through a notice in the official Gazette, any goods to be essential commodities 
and thereby set a maximum price ‘in consultation with the industry’. Offences 
and penalties are provided for contravention of the law, but no institutional 
mechanism is legislated for its enforcement. Rather, the minister is simply given 
powers to enact regulations ‘for the better carrying out of the intent and purposes 
of this Act’. It is not clear which ministerial docket has the mandate to imple-
ment this law: is it under trade/commerce, or is it under social protection? What 
if the minister fails to make the regulations? As is often the case, what started out 
as a parliamentary initiative ended up in the control of the executive and the 
business sector. Activists, whose power in these realms is weaker than their influ-
ence with parliamentarians, did not consider it worthwhile to engage.
In 2007, before the explosion of the food and political crisis of 2008, the gov-
ernment had made proposals to update the existing food and nutrition policy 
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dating from the 1980s. The draft document departed from prior emphasis on 
maize self-sufficiency to more comprehensive food access, diversity and nutri-
tional status (Republic of Kenya 2007). It recognised that high staple prices only 
favoured producers of surplus, while hurting urban consumers and the great pro-
portion of rural producers who were net buyers and it proposed lifting import 
duties on grains and removing restrictions on cross-border trade (Ariga and Jayne 
2010: 227). The revision was not implemented, however. A new set of policies 
was drawn up and adopted by the cabinet in 2011. The Food and Nutrition Secu-
rity Policy of 2011 begins with the constitutional right to sufficient and nutritious 
food. It stipulates increased funding to the food and agriculture sectors, mandates 
increasing the strategic grain reserve and building the infrastructure to encour-
age local supplies into local markets and between surplus and deficit areas. It is 
silent on the much-debated problems of unequal access to subsidies and facilities, 
and on the inefficiencies in the strategic grain reserve and NCPB purchase and 
sales (Republic of Kenya 2011a: 13). On the achievement of adequate nutrition, 
the policy notes children’s constitutional right to proper nutrition and lays out 
government responsibility for provision of supplements for new mothers, infants, 
adolescents, vulnerable adults and older people. On relief and welfare, it offers 
continued food relief in rapid-onset emergencies, cash transfers including cash 
for work (building assets like roads and dams) and cash safety nets for people who 
are chronically poor. This area is then covered in more detail in the National 
Social Protection Policy (Republic of Kenya 2011b), but neither document 
tackles the limitations of the current relief and welfare programmes in terms of 
cost, inadequate coverage or corruption. A recent review of social protection in 
Kenya reports that from 2005 to 2010 social protection expenditure rose from 
KES 33.4 billion (USD $371 million) to KES 57.1 billion, or 2.28 per cent of 
GDP (Republic of Kenya 2012: vi). The bulk of this involved spending on con-
tributory programmes for public and private sector employees, including the civil 
service pension. External donors picked up most of the tab for the remaining part, 
providing 71 per cent of the costs of relief and hunger safety net (ibid.: vii-viii).
Government response to the food crisis and to the protests was roundly criti-
cised among people on low incomes, though they recognised a few improvements 
to some social welfare programmes and the victory of the VAT exemption strug-
gle. Rights activists in Nairobi who have researched food shortages have come 
to the conclusion that inadequate grain reserves and subsidies,45 combined with 
policies of support to large local producers and ad hoc waivers of import duties on 
staple grains have facilitated the commoditisation of food. One thing is clear: 
there is no lack of state capacity to create a system for preventing malnutrition. 
Kenya has an acclaimed system for famine early warning and response, albeit 
one alleged to be partly driven by short-term private gain. Nonetheless, it has 
worked to keep famine-related casualties low, and fatalities almost eliminated 
(World Food Programme 2011). According to the critics’ view, the reason why 
government departments invested in a famine relief response mechanism but not 
in a long-term mechanism to deal with chronic hunger relates not to blunder, 
but to plunder: ‘there is no interest in long-term engagement because long-term 
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engagement does not make people rich’.46 In short, activists believe that there is 
little interest in establishing institutions that work for the long term because ‘we 
have a mafia that thrives on crisis.’47
The struggle between the moral and political economies
Based on our discussion, we can now lay out the grounds of the struggle that 
constitutes the politics of provisions in Kenya. Bohstedt (2016) emphasises two 
aspects that help in the analysis: horizontal solidarities and vertical reciprocities or 
challenges. As we have seen previously, government’s response to the price hikes 
that led millions of families to cut down on food for significant periods of time was 
grossly inadequate. We saw both blunder and plunder in the management of subsi-
dies, tariffs and relief. We saw limited reciprocity in the matter of the unga tax and 
tokenism in the matter of the Price Control (Essential Goods) Act in 2011. The 
political power of the masses, activists and the press in the moments of protest did 
not do much to change the overall trajectory of the political economy, channelled 
as it was through well-worn courses of appeasement and repression.
The moral economy of the poor
Reading about and listening to the views expressed by the Unga protesters, one 
comes away with the impression that, though often ironic, there is a sense of 
citizen entitlement and government obligation with respect to food and basic 
provisioning that builds on an era of paternal governance that preceded the cur-
rent era of free trade:
They cannot eat when we are not eating.48
We wish to remind Mr Rotich [Cabinet Secretary for Finance] that he 
has misled the president. We are disappointed that even after coming from 
a humble background, he has failed the moral test by turning his back on 
the poor.49
The talk that established a sense of solidarity between ordinary market-goers, 
grassroots protestors, COFEK, non-governmental organisations such as the 
National Taxpayers Association and the media was of entitlement to some means 
of basic provisioning and/or to protest their lack. These sentiments can be said to 
represent the moral economy around food since they are legitimated beyond the 
protesting groups:
By the notion of legitimation I mean that the men and women in the crowd 
were informed by the belief that they were defending traditional rights or 
customs; and, in general, that they were supported by the wider consensus of 
the community. On occasion this popular consensus was endorsed by some 
measure of licence afforded by the authorities.
(Thompson 1971: 78)
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Many of the views expressed in the focus group discussions and in media cover-
age undoubtedly suggest a degree of wider community consensus on the existence 
of citizen entitlement and government obligation, in particular in times of food 
crisis. However, at the grassroots level, there was also a strong sentiment that at a 
specific historical moment such a moral bargain had ruptured. That moment was 
identified as the imposition of soko huru (free market) under the Moi regime in 
the early 1990s, when price control was abolished (under the Structural Adjust-
ment Programmes).50
After civil society pushed through economic and social rights in 2010, protest-
ers made explicit reference to the constitutional right to food to establish an ethi-
cal basis for the government’s obligation to protect its citizens from the effects 
of the food price hikes. They were calling for a right to fair governance of the 
markets and administrative systems supplying the basic essentials, notably food, 
and, at times of dearth, they called for subsidy. In the focus group discussions, we 
sought to understand how the idea of a right to food was viewed, and whether 
people might conceive of it in ways that were likely to spur political mobilisa-
tion. The findings revealed an ambivalence reflecting the struggle between the 
political and moral economies. A restrictive view interpreted the right to food 
simply as direct provision of free food by the government when and where need 
was greatest. This view limited the right to delivery of aid in situations of extreme 
destitution through a system vulnerable to graft. The category of rights-holders 
was narrowed down to those seen as ‘vulnerable’ or unable to feed themselves due 
to circumstances beyond their control. Viewed in this manner, the right to food 
did little to catalyse broad-based mobilisation.
Many others had a more expansive view, recognising that a right to food had 
to mean more than occasional free food. Here the emphasis was on creating an 
environment that would enable access to food and facilitating the ability to feed 
oneself. Thus, government measures such as regulation of food traders, stabilisa-
tion of prices, promotion of employment and investment in smallholder produc-
tion was seen as being at the core of what a government must do in order to 
fulfil its obligation under a right to food. Taken together with other views that 
expressed outright cynicism about the utility of a right to food, these ambivalent 
perceptions explain why a rallying call for the right to food did not become a 
galvanising force after its adoption in the 2010 Constitution. The contemporary 
moral economy was at a low ebb, affected as it was by 20 years of free market and 
‘it’s our turn to eat’ graft.
The paternal aspect
The price of maize meal and other essential commodities should be reduced 
to cushion the poor against the high cost of living.51
Did the government, by E.P. Thompson’s criterion, endorse a paternalist view 
of the moral economy articulated in the protests and by many in the research 
sites? There were instances in which officials felt compelled to concede (or at 
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least not dispute the claim) that the government had an obligation to cushion 
the poor against the high cost of living and that there was a political advantage 
to making such claims. Examples include MPs’ support of the unga tax protest. 
The parliament’s minority leader was quoted in the press as having said that the 
poor must be cushioned from the extra burden that would be imposed by VAT 
on food items, adding: ‘If any measures are brought here through VAT that hurts 
the poor man we shall reject them. . . . We don’t want those who live in poverty 
to be taxed harshly.’52 Beyond the politicians, officials from the Kenyan Revenue 
Authority and the Treasury were careful during the VAT debate not to appear 
to confront head-on the notion of obligation to the poor. Rather, they argued 
that the existing regime had become captive to unscrupulous merchants adept at 
manipulating the inefficient refunds system, implying that for the poor to benefit 
there was a need for reform.53
Within government more generally, the reception of economic and social 
rights had been lukewarm, due to difficulties and costs of implementation and 
contradictions with the logic of market-based growth. With the exception of 
the social protection sector,54 the message we got from government – especially 
the Treasury – was that rights had no bearing on the direction of policy.55 Activ-
ists and champions within the government felt that the constitution was not 
deeply rooted in the day-to-day interaction between citizens and officials or poli-
ticians. Informal rules and ethnically defined identities and modes of engagement 
eclipsed the formal system archived in the constitution (Berman, Cottrell, and 
Ghai 2009).
If political leaders conceded the protesters’ claims to a bare bones moral econ-
omy around food, what should we make of the violent repression of protest, or the 
tokenistic populist appeasement? A pessimistic interpretation is that the convic-
tion did not run deep; that some politicians and officials only needed to give a 
nod in the direction of the moral economy asserted by the protesters for political 
expedience. A more optimistic reading is that the struggle between the moral 
and political economies went on inside government as much as it did on the 
ground: there are some within government who do have a conviction about a 
moral economy around food and basic provisioning, who repudiate both plunder 
and blunder. Others believe in a harsher market-based approach involving mini-
mum levels of relief or price control.
The notion that the rich and powerful have obligations towards the poor 
majority has deep historical roots predating colonialism. However, the articula-
tion of these obligations in post-colonial governance has taken on an increas-
ingly materialistic and sectarian tone. Democracy in Kenya is largely clientelistic, 
and although considerable power was devolved in 2013 to 47 counties in the 
hope of spreading benefits more equitably, the tribalistic mode of governance still 
persists (Boone 2014; Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis 2016; D’Arcy and Cornell 
2016). It is usual for campaigning politicians to distribute substantial amounts 
of cash to potential voters, from their own and allied tribes. Cash handouts in 
election years dampened complaints about high food prices and unemployment. 
Aware that this was not quite in line with democratic rhetoric, people in our 
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focus group discussions spoke in the third person about accepting campaign cash. 
In the extreme, it provides a justification for corrupt and unaccountable leader-
ship: as long as ‘one of our own’ is in power there will be distribution of wealth 
to ‘us’. The moral economy is fragmented in a way that has little of Bohstedt’s 
(2016) horizontal solidarities for creating political punch. It is not necessarily 
a state of affairs that can last, since the vertical reciprocities also appear weak: 
many of those we spoke to admitted that once elected, political leaders showed 
little concern for the hungry in their own ethnic groups. They disappeared to 
parliament or the county capital and were not seen until the next election.
The politics of provisions in Kenya
The picture that emerged from our study is one of overall disillusionment with 
the political class. Would it be naïvely optimistic to hope that this collective 
disillusionment can be tapped and mobilised to transform the culture of political 
engagement? One Ikutha ironist’s quip (after our long discussion on the failures 
of the political class) would suggest so – ‘But mind you, if they were to come here 
now, we would dance for them.’56 Both rulers and ruled are performing to a script 
tacitly authored decades ago. Kenya’s politics of provision thrives on cynicism, 
irony and spectacle.
It became clear early on in our study that mobilisation and engagement with 
government on social and economic rights had been episodic rather than sus-
tained and had not achieved as much as it might have. Kenya cannot credibly 
claim to have a ‘right to food’ movement in the sense that India does, for instance 
(Chapter 6, this volume). Government repression and appeasement shows that 
the structure of existing political bargaining has undermined any efforts to turn 
the protests into a mass movement. This is not surprising, since food is a matter 
on which citizens and state have established some basic rules of engagement – as 
Bohstedt points out, ‘food rioters are usually not attempting to change the politi-
cal system, but rather to summon it to their needs’ (Bohstedt 2016: 1038). None-
theless a movement could shift the balance of the bargaining arrangements, so 
what is getting in the way? The political class is unshaken by short-lived ‘branded 
T-shirt’ types of protests, but ‘we would quickly come up with something if Kib-
era57 was burning.’58 The absence of a sustained social movement means that the 
political class can get away with simply quelling noise.
We believe that a primary obstacle to more sustained pressure is to be found 
in the history of mobilisation for rights in Kenya and the role of intermediary 
rights groups in diverting direct reciprocal relations between citizens and the 
state. Explicit mobilisation employing the language of rights only came into its 
own in the struggle against the one-party state (late 1980s–1990s). It intensified 
in the ensuing clamour for a new constitution. The struggle against the one-
party state focused on political competition and securing the civil and politi-
cal freedoms that would support it. It failed to connect these macro-political 
struggles with grassroots concerns that intertwined political with economic and 
social repression.59 The public face of the rights struggle was that of a professional 
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elite – a few budding opposition politicians, lawyers and prominent outspoken 
clerics, who were perceived as unable to relate to day-to-day struggles for basics 
such as food (Berman, Cottrell, and Ghai 2009, Kanyinga 2004). These basics 
were pigeonholed as ‘development concerns’, the province of an entirely separate 
cluster of actors – community development organisations. It was these organisa-
tions, funded through international donors, who took on the task of provisioning: 
filling the gap left by the state’s failure to deliver services, rather than pressing 
for state responsibility. Their paths did not often cross with those of the ‘rights’ 
organisations until the early 2000s (Nyamu-Musembi and Musyoki 2004, Okello 
2004). The effects of this history are still evident. The Unga Revolution did not 
include in its ranks names such as the Kenyan Human Rights Commission or the 
International Commission of Jurists, both of them affluent NGOs outspoken on 
human rights issues since the 1990s.
A second factor is a rural-urban chasm, a fractured horizontal relation between 
people who may have common ground (they all suffered acutely from rises in the 
cost of food) but who had felt isolated from each other. The kind of mobilisation 
that attracted media attention and sought direct engagement with high-ranking 
state officials was mostly a Nairobi-based affair. With very few exceptions, the 
rural scene only recorded small-scale protests such as those we noted in Ikutha 
which were not covered by the media. National protest campaigns did not tap 
into the energy expressed in these widespread but localised protests and channel 
it into sustained broad-based mobilisation. To be fair, Bunge la Mwananchi, the 
chief protagonist in the Unga Revolution, has a structure with a grassroots reach 
that cuts across urban and rural. However, its leaders acknowledge that they have 
had more success in organising the urban poor, and their most visible campaigns 
have been the ones staged in the capital.60 This is in contrast to India, where the 
‘right to food’ movement draws most of its participation from a rural constitu-
ency across the various states (Sinha et al. 2014). The explanation must lie in the 
political opportunity structures of the rural areas, which limited the effectiveness 
of protest.61
Our review of media reports on food-related protests in the 2007–2012 period 
showed little evidence of media profiling any emergent right to food movement 
which might have helped define the terms of public discourse, a third factor in 
the failure of sustained public pressure. Media reports tended to report the con-
frontation with authorities, especially when these had partisan political under-
tones, mentioning only in passing the issue at the heart of the protest.62 Such 
reportage is part of the structure of clientelist politics. There were no fact files on 
the campaign or media briefing packs to ensure accuracy and depth in reporting. 
We found no opinion pieces authored by the campaign’s leaders to inform the 
public, influence opinion or offer an alternative to the state’s narrative. Again, 
this is in contrast to India, where strategic alliances with the media have been 
central to sustaining the mobilisation, making it relevant to public discourse and 
impossible for the authorities to ignore (ibid.).
In the years after the 2008 and 2011 crises, the moral economy was strongly tem-
pered by the free-market political economy, which emphasised the privatisation 
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of misery in the name of resilience and economic growth. In the words of one 
policy maker, ‘somehow people survived and life continued.’63 The dovetailing 
of economic and political interests in Kenya’s evolving governance system, cou-
pled with the way in which electoral politics has been built on ethnicity, makes 
for an unfavourable political opportunity structure for movement organizing. 
A strong sense of personal economic responsibility, the chronic nature of hunger, 
the debilitating effects of poor diet and the experience of repeated disappoint-
ment in politics and donor-funded civil society has made patron-client arrange-
ments more attractive than public collective fury. These constraints on reciprocal 
relations between the common people, intermediaries and rulers have played an 
important part in restricting the power of food protests in Kenya. Nonetheless, 
the part played by the Unga Revolution in the evolution of state institutions has 
been to demonstrate that, were clientelistic tribal politics to fail, future govern-
ments will face a formidable challenge from the people.
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 30 See www.youtube.com/watch?v=GaTG8CgFKyU [Citizen TV, uploaded 19 June 2011, 
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also Focus Group Discussion with community activists, Mathare, 10 June 2013.
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 36 Focus group discussion with community activists, Mathare, 10 June 2013.
 37 Focus group discussion with community activists, Mathare, 10 June 2013.
 38 Focus group discussion with community activists, Mathare, 10 June 2013. Govern-
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 39 See ‘Kibaki pledges action on food prices’, Daily Nation, 21 April 2011, www.nation.
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html; F. Olick, ‘We will lower cost of food, President Uhuru Kenyatta assures Ken-
yans’, EA Standard, 21 June 2013, www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000086431
&story_title=Kenya-we-will-lower-cost-of-food-uhuru-assures-kenyans.
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 41 See A. Gitonga, ‘MPs warn of food riots over VAT hike’, EA Standard, 27 July 
2012, www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000062763&story_title=MPs-warn-of- 
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 42 See F. Olick, ‘We will lower cost of food, President Uhuru Kenyatta assures Kenyans’, 
The Standard, 20 June 2013.
 43 Price Control (Essential Goods) Act, No. 26 of 2011 (Chapter 113 of the Laws of 
Kenya), available at www.kenyalaw.org.
 44 See, for example, ‘KIPPRA: Debating the merits of price controls’, TTI Stories of 
Influence, www.thinktankinitiative.org/sites/default/files/KIPPRA%20Debating%20
the%20merits%20of%20price%20controls.pdf.
 45 Underfunding of grain reserves, it seems, is not unique to Kenya, and neither is the 
history of corruption in managing them (Murphy 2009).
 46 Activist, Nairobi, June 2014.
 47 Activist, Nairobi, June 2014.
 48 Comments of an unidentified protester during the 31 May 2011 protest. The phrase ‘to 
eat’ has a strong meaning in Kenyan political talk, since it implies plundering the state 
as well as having food. The Minister for Finance had just announced the government 
would stop using Mercedes-Benz cars and would instead assign Toyota cars in order 
to save on fuel costs, a downgrade that some ministers opposed. See video clips from 
Citizen TV and NTV respectively: www.youtube.com/watch?v=GaTG8CgFKyU and 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=CZe5tX28cHk.
 49 Attributed to 12-point petition presented by COFEK-led protesters. See A. Mutambo, 
‘Groups stage demo against ‘unga’ taxes’, Daily Nation, 2 July 2013.
 50 Focus Group Discussion with Roadside food-sellers, Mathare, 11 June 2013; Focus 
Group Discussion with Retailers, Ikutha, 27 June 2013; Focus Group Discussion with 
Butchers and kiosk operators, Mathare 11 June 2013.
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 51 Comment attributed to Professor Yash P. Ghai, former chair of the Constitution of 
Kenya Review Commission that presided over the process of enacting a new con-
stitution, which culminated in the 2010 constitution. Professor Ghai was taking 
part in the fuel price protest led by COFEK on 19 April 2011. See ‘Kalonzo urges 
patience over cost of living’, Daily Nation, 19 April 2011, www.nation.co.ke/News/-/ 
1056/1147378/-/10ycd5iz/-/index.html.
 52 See ‘Protests, strike threats, greet Uhuru Budget’, Daily Nation, 14 June 2013.
 53 Kenyan Revenue Authority, ‘The Case for VAT Zero Rating to Achieve Social Policy 
and Distributive Objectives’ (undated).
 54 The social protection sector expanded coverage over the period of the study, in par-
ticular in favour of children, the elderly and pre-and post natal welfare for women. See, 
for example, Republic of Kenya (2012) Social Protection Sector Review June 2012, 
Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision, Nairobi: Govern-
ment of Republic of Kenya.
 55 Personal communication with a member of the Commission for the Implementation 
of the Constitution, Nairobi, February 2013.
 56 Focus group discussion with small-scale market traders, Ikutha, June 29, 2013.
 57 Kibera is the largest informal settlement in Nairobi.
 58 Interview with Member of Parliament (name withheld) (Nairobi, July 2013).
 59 This is not unique to Kenya. The kinds of rights struggles that have appealed to the 
middle class in Africa have been about narrow political freedoms such as press free-
dom. See Mamdani (1989); Ndegwa (1996).
 60 Interview with Cidi Otieno, Co-ordinator, Bunge la Mwananchi, 3 June 2013.
 61 In 2013 Kenya devolved significant legislative, budgetary and administrative powers 
to 47 county governments, fundamentally changing political opportunity structures in 
the country. This can be expected to have new effects on the politics of provision in 
the country.
 62 For instance, the 7 July 2011 (Saba Saba) attempt to re-occupy Harambee Avenue 
to protest the continuing rise of unga prices in spite of the government’s promise of 
action was reported in the Daily Nation simply as ‘Nairobi demo turns chaotic, 10 peo-
ple arrested’. Four short sentences convey the purpose of the protest, the rest of the 
story describing the clash with police.
 63 Interview, National Drought Management Authority, 11 June 2013.
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8 Authoritarian responsiveness 
and the greve in Mozambique
Luís de Brito, Egídio Chaimite and Alex Shankland
Introduction
In February 2008 and September 2010, Mozambique’s capital Maputo and its 
satellite city Matola were the scene of violent protests by groups of ordinary citi-
zens against rises in the cost of living, including the prices of bread and urban 
transport. Immediately afterwards, these protests were replicated in some other 
Mozambican cities, but on a much smaller scale, and they were quickly brought 
under control by the police. Although the media and the government described 
the protests using terms that ranged from ‘uprisings’ to ‘vandalism’, the popula-
tion generally referred to them as greves, the Portuguese word for ‘strikes’. In 
November 2012, a new greve was set in motion, but immediate repressive action 
by the police (which had been greatly strengthened by that time) in key gather-
ing places prevented the protests from spreading, although this did not prevent a 
near total paralysis of activity in Greater Maputo for a day and a half.
Since then, Maputo has lived in uneasy expectation of the next greve. Expec-
tation intensified in 2015, with spiralling debt crisis associated with the freezing 
or withdrawal of much of the international aid on which the country’s ability to 
provide public services has historically depended. This triggered a devaluation of 
Mozambique’s currency and consequent rapid rise in local food prices in import-
dependent urban markets, aggravating the impact of a prolonged drought that 
had reduced local food production in 2015–2016. The government’s response to 
the risk of another greve was a mix of repression and concession, an approach that 
staved off further protests in 2015–2016 despite deteriorating economic, social 
and political conditions.
In this chapter, we argue that this dynamic derives from the experience of the 
2008 and 2010 greves, which has given the politics of provisions in Mozambique a 
distinctive character of ‘authoritarian responsiveness’. This concept has emerged 
from studies of middle-income countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe and 
Asia – especially China, where there is a growing literature on the Communist 
Party’s ability to combine repression with rapid course adjustments in the face of 
offline and online protests (Froissart 2014; Chen, Pan and Xu 2016). It has not 
yet been widely applied in studies of African politics, but we argue that it is a 
useful way of thinking about the distinctive ways in which Mozambique’s ruling 
Authoritarian responsivness 159
elite has responded to popular protests in a context where “processes, spaces and 
domains of the state are regularly challenged by formations beyond its control” 
(Bertelsen 2016: 2). In this chapter, we seek to show that, while the greves were 
part of a broader movement that has shaken many countries since 2008 as a result 
of global food price volatility, their characteristics and impacts have been shaped 
above all by local economic and political dynamics – and in particular by the 
interaction between the country’s authoritarian political tradition and the social 
and political exclusion to which the poorest urban strata in Mozambique have 
been condemned.
This chapter is the result of an extensive process of primary and secondary data 
collection carried out between 2013 and 2014, with further analysis and follow-
up work in 2015 and 2016. Beginning with a review of existing literature and 
secondary data on food security, urban poverty, wages and food price inflation in 
Mozambique, the study included the construction of a ‘political event catalogue’ 
based on newspaper reports of protests taking place between 2007 and 2012 
and of the associated policy responses, and a process of discourse analysis which 
focused on comparing the coverage of the protests in government-controlled and 
more independent newspapers (Pereira et al. 2013). Primary qualitative data col-
lection explored accounts of protest events in four popular neighbourhoods, two 
urban sites in Maputo and one rural and one urban site in Chókwe, a market 
town in the flood-prone Limpopo valley. This process included observation, indi-
vidual interviews and focus groups, with the latter using participatory visualisa-
tion tools such as timelines and matrix scoring in addition to semi-structured 
group discussion.1
The chapter begins by presenting a brief historical perspective and a charac-
terisation of the nature of the authoritarian political tradition that has marked 
Mozambique since the proclamation of independence in 1975, remaining domi-
nant even while co-existing with a profound change in the political alliances of 
the ruling party. It then looks at the question of food and the cost of living, as well 
as the immediate context of the greves, the discourses and images used to describe 
them and the type of government responses that they received, reflecting on the 
extent to which these protests have revealed the contours of a contemporary 
Mozambican ‘moral economy’ – a term defined by Hossain and Kalita as includ-
ing “(1) conceptions of material justice, (2) the idea of clear limits to the toler-
ance of exploitation and unfairness, and (3) the impacts of sweeping economic 
and political change on understandings of fairness and equity” (2014: 4). We go 
on to examine how Mozambique’s “politics of provisions” – Bohstedt’s term for 
“the ways in which common people interacted with their rulers over subsistence” 
(2016: 1036) – has been shaped by the failure of civil and political society in 
Mozambique to institutionalise the popular demands that found expression in the 
greves via the formal spaces for debate and negotiation of the country’s political 
system. We conclude by analysing the extent to which the protests have pro-
duced new accountability relations – however informal and unstable – between 
Mozambique’s government and its citizens, as well as the role in shaping these 
relations that is played by the country’s dependence on international donors.
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Authoritarian tradition and political alliances
The recent political history of Mozambique is characterised by an authoritarian 
political tradition, both under the one-party state, which lasted from independ-
ence in 1975 until 1990, and in the period that followed the introduction of 
a multi-party system and the end of the civil war. Indeed, after a brief period 
of weakening and hesitation in the years following the General Peace Agree-
ment in 1992 and the first multi-party elections in 1994, the ruling Mozambique 
Liberation Front (FRELIMO, or Frelimo) chose, from 2002, to strengthen the 
party-state model, which had developed during the one-party period. To this end, 
the network of party branches and committees was reestablished throughout the 
state apparatus (including the defence and security forces), from the central to 
the local level. The principle of accountability of state officials to Frelimo party 
leaders at the various levels was also reactivated.
In the period immediately after independence, despite the fact that Frelimo 
had fought its guerrilla war among the peasantry and with a discourse evoking 
the ‘worker-peasant alliance’, its political choices resulted in a de facto alliance 
with urban strata, particularly middle- and low-income groups. Indeed, even in a 
context of crisis, it was these groups who most benefited from Frelimo’s price con-
trol policies, as well as from its measures to promote access to services, especially 
health, education and housing. The peasant population was severely affected by 
the breakdown of the agricultural marketing system and by the civil war, which 
substantially disrupted food production conditions and led to millions of Mozam-
bicans becoming internally displaced people or refugees.
Under pressure from the international financial institutions, Frelimo adopted 
a policy of economic liberalisation in the mid-1980s, but due to the war this 
had practically no significant effects. From the 1990s, however, it was resumed 
with price liberalisation and the privatisation of most state-owned companies. 
This period saw the start of a search for foreign investment, accompanied by the 
offer of fiscal incentives, which would lead a few years later to the emergence 
of a series of mega-projects, mostly linked to exploitation of natural resources 
(principally natural gas, coal, heavy mineral sands and oil). Alongside economic 
liberalisation, the Frelimo leadership underwent a conversion to capitalism in its 
own affairs and became increasingly involved in the world of business. Thus, the 
party’s old political alliance was replaced by a new one, this time with business 
circles, and particularly with large-scale foreign capital.
Throughout this period, the authoritarian tradition that characterises Mozam-
bican politics and the hegemony of Frelimo (which has always enjoyed an abso-
lute majority in parliament) have been major obstacles to the development of 
alternative political projects and to the scope for citizens to organise themselves 
and freely express their opinions, interests and demands, either individually or 
collectively. Also contributing to this is the fact that the government – and thus 
Frelimo – exercises direct control over the main publicly-owned mass media.2 
Additionally, the government is able to influence many of the more recently-
established media outlets (newspapers, television and radio) through its power to 
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control the advertising flows on which these outlets depend.3 This has inevitably 
limited the space for the appearance of an informed and critical public opinion 
and for open debate on questions such as the rise in the cost of living in general 
and in food prices in particular, despite the status of these issues as pressing con-
cerns for ordinary citizens.
By the time of the 2010 greve, the picture of Frelimo media hegemony had 
begun to change a little with the growth (principally in urban areas) of a range 
of new informal spaces for political debate resulting from increasing access to 
social media (particularly Facebook) and the emergence of a new generation of 
young people with relatively high levels of education (including a growing num-
ber with university degrees). This generation provides a potential constituency 
for Mozambique’s abundance of civil society organisations (CSOs), but (as we 
discuss later in this chapter) few Mozambican CSOs are fully independent of Fre-
limo, and almost all remain heavily dependent on funding from foreign donors.
The potential voting power of educated urban young people became clear over 
the course of a series of local elections between 2009 and 2013 in which a rela-
tively new opposition party, the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM), 
won control of some of Mozambique’s largest cities by capturing a large share of 
the youth vote. However, while formally tolerating opposition parties and the 
structures of multi-party democracy, Frelimo regards the former as politically 
illegitimate. This attitude has shaped both Frelimo’s efforts to restrict the free-
dom of operation of MDM mayors in the cities and its reluctance to embrace a 
negotiated peace agreement with the largely rural-based armed opposition group 
Renamo (Mozambique National Resistance). Since 2013 Renamo has combined 
an intermittent insurgency in the centre and north of the country with continu-
ing to operate as a political party, and performed strongly in the 2014 presidential 
election.
The way in which Frelimo’s control has made it almost impossible to develop 
structures of collective representation that might be considered by the regime 
as legitimate interlocutors is also evident in the fact that it has hollowed out 
Mozambique’s constitutional guarantees of the rights to freedom of assembly and 
of demonstration. The government requires those organising demonstrations to 
seek prior authorisation, and while marches directly or indirectly promoted by 
the ruling party or organisations close to it tend to be permitted, in most cases 
those led by independent groups or opposition parties are denied authorisation 
and/or repressed by the police in a particularly violent way. The lack of space for 
the free exercise of democratic rights has resulted in severe limitations on the 
room for social negotiation and on citizens’ experience of and access to differ-
ent forms of mass political mobilisation (such as petitions, boycotts, strikes or 
marches). This leaves the low income urban population, as it seeks to respond to 
the effects of sudden increases in the cost of living, with few alternatives but to 
resort to violent street protests that take place without organisational leadership. 
In later sections of this chapter, we examine the extent to which greves, such as 
those which took place in 2008 and 2010, are part of an emerging ‘repertoire of 
collective action’ in Mozambique (Chaimite 2014). First, though, we examine 
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the contextual drivers of food price volatility in Mozambique, and the ways in 
which food insecurity has been experienced by the citizens of the popular neigh-
bourhoods where the ‘Food Riots and Rights to Food’ study was conducted.
The food question and the cost of living
Although Mozambique has always been a food importing country, the situation 
was particularly serious during the civil war period (1976–1992). In 1975, the 
year of independence, 49 per cent of the grain supply was produced domestically, 
42 per cent came from commercial imports and 9 per cent came from food aid; 
but by the end of the 1980s, domestic production accounted for only 14 per cent, 
with the remaining 86 per cent coming from food aid (Eduardo Mondlane Uni-
versity Economics Faculty 1990: 13). Food aid continues to play an important 
role in supplying the country, as although domestic food production has risen 
since the end of the war, the country remains far from self-sufficient. In particu-
lar, Mozambique has a situation of persistent deficit in the production of rice and 
wheat, imports of which account for the majority of the annual general grain 
deficit of around 17 per cent (SETSAN 2013).
Food production in Mozambique, the vast majority of which comes from 
peasant family farming, has long been affected by the natural disasters (includ-
ing droughts, cyclones, floods and pest outbreaks) that frequently strike the 
country, triggering government emergency programmes backed by foreign aid. 
Government policy documents have long placed great emphasis on agricul-
tural production and productivity, but their impact has been practically nil, 
as shown by the feeble growth of the agricultural food sector in recent years 
and the stubborn persistence of high poverty levels in the country.4 According 
to Mosca (2014), per capita domestic food production has been declining in 
absolute terms over the last fifty years, and for a significant number of the main 
food crops (with the exception of maize) productivity per hectare has also been 
declining.
Contrary to expectations that national food production would increase in 
response to the rise in prices for food on the international market in the 2007–
2013 period, this rise had practically no impact on the domestic production of 
foodstuffs. According to producers we interviewed in Chókwe, production during 
this period was strongly affected by increases in the cost of inputs, by climatic 
conditions (floods and drought), as well as by uncertainty over the extent to 
which a market for their crops could be guaranteed, undermining the stimulus 
effect of rising food prices.5
Meanwhile, the overall food security situation deteriorated significantly. Most 
households in our research sites reported scaling back their food consumption to 
one main meal at the end of the day, with a few leftovers being carefully saved for 
breakfast. The major difference we found between rural and urban areas is that 
people in the latter relied overwhelmingly on bread, made from imported wheat 
flour (obtained both on the international market and via food aid) supplied to 
bakeries whose prices were under tight government control. Bread was usually 
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eaten on its own or as a sandwich with a leaf of cabbage or slice of tomato – eggs, 
fish or chicken were considered rare and increasingly unaffordable luxuries. The 
traditional rural diet, based on maize and cassava, had been rejected by urban 
Mozambicans for both aesthetic and practical reasons: it was seen as rustic and 
unsophisticated, and also required expensive charcoal and scarce time to cook, 
whereas bread could be eaten as soon as it is bought.
The food security situation of the poor in the peripheries of urban areas, where 
the riots of 2008 and 2010 started and were most intense, is particularly dif-
ficult. That is because unlike rural areas, where household production accounts 
for about 75 per cent of the food consumed, in the peripheries of Maputo and 
Matola the poorest families rely on cash income flows for 97 per cent and 91 per 
cent of their food needs, respectively (Mandlate 2015). The vulnerability of poor 
households in these two cities to fluctuations in food prices is not mitigated by 
government subsidies, which according to Mandlate (op. cit.) principally benefit 
wealthier households.
When asked to identify who was responsible for the degradation of their food 
security situation, people in these areas were outspoken in their contempt for the 
ruling elite. However, they sharply differentiated the recent period of Frelimo 
rule from its previous incarnations – especially the heroic socialist period under 
Samora Machel, in which hunger was remembered as an experience that was 
shared by rulers and ruled, as government ration shops distributed the meagre 
food supplies that were available in an economy ravaged by civil war and agricul-
tural collapse. The nostalgic refrain ‘in Samora’s day . . .’ was a recurrent one in 
our interviews and focus group discussions, used to refer to a period that not only 
symbolised greater economic equality but also official intolerance of corruption 
and self-interest among government officials. It was clear from our interviews 
that Mozambique’s dramatic recent rise in income inequality, which doubled in 
the six years to 2015 (Hanlon 2016), was associated with a perceived increase in 
corruption among the ruling elite.
Another refrain was the popular phrase quem não trambuca não manduca – 
‘those who do not work, do not eat’. The moral economy in both rural and 
urban Mozambique is strongly marked by the understanding that food security is 
something to be earned through hard work by everyone except the very elderly 
or infirm; an understanding that resonates with the deep-rooted experiences of 
forced labour regimes under pre-colonial conquerors, Portuguese colonists and 
post-colonial state and rebel forces alike that are powerfully analysed by Bertelsen 
(2016). Frelimo’s liberation promise that the state would deliver material progress 
in return for hard work continues to hold broad popular legitimacy; within this 
logic, in urban Mozambique the government’s violation of the moral economy is 
perceived as lying not in a failure to distribute free food but in a failure to preserve 
the relationship between wages and food prices. The result of this failure is that 
the idle children of the elite grow fat while even the hardest-working semi-skilled 
labourer cannot earn enough to feed a family – a situation described by one middle- 
aged man in the Maputo neighbourhood of Ferroviário as a “psychological tor-
ture” perpetrated by the government.6
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Focus group participants recalled that food prices had also risen in the 1990s 
under another Frelimo president, Joaquim Chissano, but insisted that during that 
period wages had risen enough to keep pace, whereas since 2008 they have been 
outstripped by inflation. Indeed, as shown by Wuyts (2011), the period since 
2007 has seen the annual average rate of food price inflation clearly outstrip the 
rise in prices for other products. Inflation has thus had a much greater impact 
on the urban poor than on wealthier groups who tend to spend a smaller pro-
portion of their income on food, further intensifying the effects of inequality in 
Mozambique (Arndt, Jones and Salvucci 2015). However, governments in power 
during this period have consistently refused to recognise this, and labour union 
representatives interviewed during our study accused the government of short-
changing workers by insisting that any wage rises should be linked to a complex 
measure of sectoral GDP growth, rather than to the cost of a ‘basic basket’ of 
goods in which food items would be heavily represented.
Popular revolts
Since 2007, Mozambique has experienced several explosive episodes of popular 
mobilisation (in 2008, 2010 and 2012) in which protesters have voiced anger not 
only at the rising cost of urban transport and food but also at growing inequality 
and ever more visible corruption. Although these revolts spread to other towns 
and cities (including Chókwe, where we interviewed people who had protested 
in the local marketplace), their birthplace and main stage was Greater Maputo, 
a metropolitan area covering the country’s capital and its satellite city of Matola, 
with a combined population of about two million people. Greater Maputo is 
highly unequal; its average indicators of development and wellbeing, higher than 
those for any other region of Mozambique, disguise the fact that it also contains 
the country’s largest concentration of people living in poverty. Maputo is also 
highly connected, with levels of education and rates of computer, internet or cell 
phone access that are well above those for the rest of Mozambique. As noted by 
Tvedten et al., the perception of “being trapped in poverty and of being unable to 
take part in what the city has to offer, is at the heart of the current dissatisfaction 
among poor people in the poor neighbourhoods of Maputo” (2013: 4). Greater 
Maputo is also a region where support for the ruling party has historically been 
very strong, with Frelimo consistently obtaining around 90 per cent of the vote in 
Maputo and Matola between the first multi-party elections in 1994 and the 2004 
general election (the last to take place before the 2008 protests).
In early 2008, the Mozambican government decided to increase the price of 
liquid fuels to compensate for the increased cost of imported oil (World Bank 
2008). This decision led the operators of private passenger transport vehicles 
(known as chapa 100 or simply chapa) to increase their fares by between 33 per 
cent and 50 per cent. In this same period, there had already been an increase in 
the price of some foodstuffs, notably bread, the price of which had gone up by 
12.5 per cent. After several days in which text messages circulated widely calling 
for a greve or “strike”, on 5 February a wave of violent popular protests erupted, 
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which included blocking the main roads with improvised barricades and burning 
tyres, looting shops (particularly of food), and burning or stoning vehicles in the 
places with the largest concentrations of protestors. The riots completely para-
lysed the cities of Maputo and Matola for three days.7 The protests ended when 
the decision was taken to keep transport fares unchanged, which was possible 
after the government negotiated a series of compensatory benefits with the chapa 
operators, notably the removal of the 17 per cent value added tax on diesel.8
On 1–2 September 2010, after text messages again circulated calling for a greve, 
a second major outbreak of street protests occurred. This time the protests came 
in response to the announcement of an increase in the government-controlled 
price of bread and other basic goods and services.9 The prices of foodstuffs such 
as rice, tomatoes and onions had already seen significant rises, as had that of 
fuel. Similar patterns of violence to those observed in February 2008 were seen, 
this time with around ten deaths and hundreds of people injured, in addition 
to extensive material damage. And, just as in 2008, the government ended up 
reversing its decisions, freezing prices and announcing subsidies, among other 
measures.
On 15–16 November 2012, Maputo was paralysed again, this time for a day 
and a half due to the threat of riots following an announced increase in transport 
fares. However, the patterns of violence seen in 2008 and 2010 did not recur. 
Mobile phone communications were restricted, and a significantly strengthened 
police force maintained a heavy presence at all the critical points of the city that 
had acted as foci for previous protests.
These foci included neighbourhoods such as Inhagoia, Chamanculo, Benfica, 
Polana Caniço, Maxaquene and Magoanine, in which large numbers of people 
who feel trapped and cornered by poverty are found. In particular, they have 
large concentrations of young people in waithood, described by Honwana as a 
kind of “prolonged adolescence or an involuntary delay in attaining the adult 
state” (2013: 5). Waithood is experienced by youth who have precarious jobs or 
no formal employment and are unable to build, buy or rent a house, or to marry, 
form and feed a family. In the neighbourhoods where we conducted the fieldwork 
for this study, it was above all young people in waithood who had been involved 
in the protests.
The protests always had an anonymous origin. Mobilisation was achieved 
through messages which circulated virally across the mobile phone networks 
and on social media (in particular, Facebook), announcing the greve or ‘strike’. 
The use of the term greve, the word most frequently used by participants and by 
ordinary citizens to describe the protests, can be understood as identifying the 
movement as one which made claims upon a ‘boss’ – in this case the government, 
which was held responsible for guaranteeing all citizens the minimum conditions 
for a decent life.
As one interviewee in the neighbourhood of Chamanculo put it:
It so happens I received it by a text message. But if you ask me where the 
message came from, I won’t know how to answer. I just received the message. 
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That is to say there was a means of spreading people’s spirit of dissatisfac-
tion via messages. We also have the social networks. You have to know that 
these means are great platforms for spreading information. And the people, 
in these social networks, give their opinions about the cost of living . . . the 
spirit of the messages threw stones at the current government . . . they said it 
was a government of intransigent, intolerant individuals who had nothing to 
do with the cause of the people or with democracy, because one of the pillars 
of democracy is full respect for human rights. The right to health and the 
right to food are part of human rights.10
The authorities considered that the popularity of protest music had also been a 
factor in triggering the demonstrations. The public prosecutor’s office accused 
one musician, Azagaia, of inciting the 2010 greve with his song Povo no Poder 
(“Power to the People”), which deals with the difficult situation experienced by 
the Mozambican people faced with the increase in the cost of living. The lyrics of 
this song, recorded after the greve of 2008, include the following verse:
Mr President, you left the luxury of your palace
You finally noticed that life’s not easy here
Only now did you call a meeting of your Council of Ministers
But the people haven’t been sleeping, we came together a long time ago
We’ve barricaded the streets
We’ve halted the minibuses
No one is getting past
Even the shops are shut
If the police are violent
We’ll respond with violence11
Despite the visibility of young people at the forefront of the protests, they were 
by no means the only ones to take part. Our interviewees said that, directly or 
indirectly, a sizeable number of residents in the places that were the foci of the 
protests joined in, and that many households benefited from the foodstuffs looted 
from shops and warehouses, even including the (notoriously underpaid) police 
themselves. According to an interviewee from the neighbourhood of Ferroviário:
There are households here who went for months without buying rice, 
because they stole a lot of sacks. And some households sold the stolen rice at 
a cheaper price . . . This just showed that the price had to drop . . . The police 
are also human. They see that the people are right. It’s the situation . . . This 
is the reality. Some policemen also stole, because they needed to.12
Among our interviewees people’s participation in the protests was justified on the 
grounds that they were hungry, and blame for the greves was attributed largely to 
the government which did nothing to improve the situation; for example, by cre-
ating jobs for young people and ensuring that workers’ wages could keep up with 
the cost of living. However, in interviewees’ discourses, joining the protests (and 
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the looting) was presented a momentary solution to the problem of lack of food, 
rather than as a part of a more strategic or sustained attempt to address the causes 
of the problem. Despite the perceived success of the greves in securing temporary 
relief from worsening food insecurity, the lack of sustained engagement suggests 
that Mozambique has not embarked on the kind of historical pattern described 
by Bohstedt, under which “where the politics of provisions brought relief repeat-
edly . . . it contributed to regime stability by incorporating the interests of popular 
actors with leverage into the political process” (2016: 24). Although, as Bertelsen 
notes, the greves “generated novel collectivities” (2014: 21), they were above all 
ephemeral, unorganised phenomena, which did not result in any more durable 
form of organisation.
Nonetheless, in addition to their dimension of raising immediate claims, these 
revolts can be seen as a form of political expression, bringing new elements to 
the repertoire of political action in Mozambique (Chaimite 2014)13 – a repertoire 
that, as it becomes broader, shapes the strategies of both the potential partici-
pants and mobilisers and the political-administrative authorities. The repertoires 
of other segements of society have also been evolving: for example, after the vio-
lent demonstrations of 2008 and 2010, and the blocked attempt to stage another 
greve in 2012, a largely middle-class civil society protest against a crime wave 
and the threat to peace resulting from Frelimo’s escalating confrontation with 
Renamo in 2013 saw the first major peaceful demonstrations against the govern-
ment in Mozambique’s recent history. In the next section, we examine how the 
government’s own repertoire of responses has evolved since 2008.
From confrontation to authoritarian responsiveness
The authorities were apparently taken by surprise by the protests of 2008, and the 
police response was slow and ineffective. In 2010, the government moved more 
quickly when people began to flood onto the streets in response to text messages 
calling for a greve, but the indiscriminate violence of the police response served 
mainly to incense the protesters further, as the firing of live rounds into the crowd 
led to at least fourteen deaths and hundreds of injuries.
On the eve of the 2010 protests, the Ministry of the Interior had tried to demo-
bilise people by saying that the strike would not take place because there had 
been no notification of a demonstration as required by law. The President of the 
Republic called for vigilance against “agitators and the preparation or undertak-
ing of acts which constitute an assault against life or against order and public tran-
quility.”14 As the protests began to spread, the Minister of the Interior described 
them as “illegal”, “violent” and instigated by “adventurers, unemployed people 
and bandits” who were hiding behind “innocent citizens, mostly children.”15
The government ordered mobile phone network operators to suspend the 
pre-paid text message service and a few days later introduced a compulsory reg-
istration programme, “to promote the responsible use of SIM cards, thus con-
tributing to maintain public order and tranquillity.”16 Initially registration was 
required within a period of two months, after which unregistered numbers would 
be blocked.17 The measure was criticised by civil society groups as an attempt at 
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“repression of the freedom of expression which potentially contests social ine-
qualities” (CIP 2010). Although SIM card registration was common practice in 
many countries, the timing and the context of the decision to apply it in Mozam-
bique emphasised the potentially repressive character of the measure. This is 
borne out by the fact that although the government initially backed away from 
enforcing this measure as the memory of the 2010 greve receded, the registration 
deadline was reintroduced in 2012, when there were new threats of protests after 
the rise in public transport fares in Maputo.
During the greve of 2010, the Minister of the Interior insisted that the authori-
ties would not yield to pressure to reverse price hikes that he described as result-
ing inevitably from a global rise in the price of oil. But as the combination of 
aggressive rhetoric and violent police repression failed to demobilise the protest-
ers, coverage in the non-state media, social media discussion and even statements 
by Frelimo’s own local representatives began to signal widespread understanding 
of the reasons for the protests, given the evidence of the impacts of the rising cost 
of living on the poorest strata. Faced with the strength of the street protests and 
a rising tide of disapproval among the non-poor, the government switched – as it 
had in 2008 – from a strategy of confrontation to accommodation through con-
cessions and new policy announcements.
Since the trigger for the 2008 and 2010 riots had been a sudden hike in chapa 
fares, in the first instance the government froze the price rises and promised 
to compensate the transporters, provided they showed their operating licence, 
regularised their tax situation and registered their fuel consumption. The 2010 
concessions were more comprehensive. On 2 September 2010, at the end of the 
second day of violent rioting, President Guebuza not only announced immediate 
subsidies to transporters and bakers, but also a freeze on the wages and allowances 
of officials of state agencies and public companies.18 He explained that “to con-
tain the impact of these crises on the lives of citizens” and “stepping up its actions 
in the fight against poverty in the cities and the countryside”, the government 
would be implementing a food production action plan, introducing a “basic bas-
ket” of subsidised goods, increasing urban District Development Funds,19 reduc-
ing customs duties on the import of third grade rice and of sugar, and promoting 
the production and consumption of bread made from cassava flour. This became 
the ‘Package of Measures to Mitigate the Cost of Living’ approved by the Council 
of Ministers on 29 March 2011 (Governo de Moçambique 2011).
The Passenger Transport Subsidy Programme element of the package was a 
strategy “to liberalise gradually the transport fares paid by passengers, but seek-
ing to protect the most vulnerable strata of the population, and/or the produc-
tive functions which could suffer from an increase in fares” ibid. The programme 
emphasised both the government’s alignment with criticisms of subsidies by the 
international financial institutions and its paternal concern for the welfare of 
needy citizens, noting that the old subsidy model:
is not directed at those who need it most . . . it covers everyone, from the stu-
dent or worker going from home to work and back to the passenger going to 
Authoritarian responsivness 169
the beach or going shopping. This distorts the economy and could destabilise 
the macro-economic environment which determines growth and harmoni-
ous development of the country in all its dimensions, . . . even putting at risk 
justice in the distribution of income.
(ibid. p. 21)
Although the new subsidy system was to be introduced before December 2011, it 
was never implemented. Transport continued to be subsidised through payments 
to chapa fleet operators, but as the years went by, transporters were also required 
to pay increasing licence fees and taxes. The deputy chair of the Maputo Asso-
ciation of Road Transporters explained that this demand for formalisation meant 
that transporters were claiming the subsidy less and less: ‘it becomes a process 
whereby you take money out of one pocket and put it in another.”20 As a result, 
rising fuel prices once more led to chapa price increases in 2012, triggering calls 
for another greve; although (as noted previously) it was suffocated by a power-
ful and rapidly-mobilised police presence, the threat of a new greve nonetheless 
paralysed Greater Maputo for a day and a half as people stayed at home to avoid 
being caught up in confrontations.
Another measure promised by the March 2011 package was the subsidised 
‘basic basket’.21 Those who were to benefit were initially defined as formal sec-
tor workers living in the eleven provincial capitals who earned a wage equal to 
or lower than 2,000 meticais per month (then equivalent to roughly USD 65). 
Shortly afterwards, this was extended to include all informal sector workers and 
all those who received a monthly wage no larger than 2,500 meticais (USD 80). 
The measure envisaged that the beneficiaries could buy, at subsidised prices, a 
series of basic goods – namely rice, maize flour, vegetable oil, second grade fish, 
butter beans, sugar and bread.
This measure was criticised as inconsistent and unsustainable, since the exact 
number of beneficiaries was unknown and no feasibility study had been under-
taken; it was also attacked for being discriminatory since it would only benefit the 
inhabitants of urban areas, which had been the epicentres of the protests. In the 
end, the measure was never implemented; the government claimed in the period 
immediately after legislating for the ‘basic basket’ in 2011 that one of the pre-
conditions for its implementation – the occurrence of further increases in grain 
and fuel prices – had not been met. In fact, grain and transport prices did rise in 
Mozambique after 2011, despite the relative stabilisation of fuel prices on the 
international market. However, until recently these rises were relatively gradual, 
reflecting the government’s desire to avoid large and sudden price rises with their 
attendant potential for conflict. Even the acceleration of inflation in 2015–2016 
failed to reactivate debate on the ‘basic basket’ or government commitment to its 
application, suggesting that it has been comprehensively discredited as a policy 
response.
Government announcements of measures to improve food production, storage 
and use proved equally ineffective. In 2008, a strategic food storage programme 
based on grain silos located in key agricultural regions was announced, but by 
170 Luís de Brito et al.
2012 only two of the promised 39 silos had been built. At the time, domestic 
production of wheat in Mozambique was insignificant, but consumption was ris-
ing, particularly among the poorest strata of society in urban areas, with the result 
that variations in the price of bread had a significant impact on their lives. In 
2008, a Food Production Action Plan (PAPA)22 was introduced to reduce the 
country’s vulnerability to price variations on the international market. Accord-
ing to this plan, national wheat production should have increased fivefold by 
the 2010–2011 agricultural season, reducing the wheat deficit from 95 per cent 
to 20 per cent of total consumption. It was also hoped that cassava production 
would increase fivefold over the same period, while a new technique was to be 
developed to bake bread from a mixture of wheat and cassava flour.23 These efforts 
notwithstanding, the production of wheat and other grains remained virtually 
unchanged over the following five years. The deficit was made up through food 
imports, mainly from South Africa, and, in the case of wheat and rice, through 
food aid donations from the USA and Japan.24
In 2010, the national currency, the metical, fell by some 14 per cent against the 
dollar, with very strong effects on the price of fuel and grain on the domestic mar-
ket. The Bank of Mozambique moved to guarantee the foreign exchange needed 
to finance fuel and food imports at a more favourable exchange rate, and suc-
ceeded in shifting the metical/dollar exchange rate from 37 in late August 2010 
to 31 in March 2011.25 Tight control of the exchange rate came to operate from 
then on as an important instrument to keep food prices down, and remained 
effective until the debt crisis took hold in 2015–2016. While the metical/dollar 
rate was still around 34 at the start of 2015, by the beginning of 2017 it had risen 
above 70, signalling a fresh cycle of intense pressure on food and transport prices.
Considering both repression and accommodation, this section has shown the 
form taken by authoritarian responsiveness in Mozambique between 2008 and 
2012. The politics of provisions in this period saw a series of often-violent pro-
tests, repressed with ever greater force, balanced by what appeared to be increasing 
sensitivity to the concerns of the urban poor. This sensitivity was reflected both 
in policy announcements that were largely discursive performances with little or 
no tangible impact (classified as mentiras or ‘lies’ by many of our community-level 
interviewees) and in concrete measures to attempt to maintain price subsidies 
and a favourable exchange rate, even in the face of intense macroeconomic pres-
sures. In the next section, we examine the failure of other actors involved in 
Mozambique’s political and policy debates to press government to turn ad hoc 
responses to the greves into to a more institutionalised approach to preventing 
hunger and tackling gross income inequality in Mozambique.
Responses from political society
Bohstedt argues that a country’s “politics of provisions” is shaped by forms of 
bargaining between rulers and ruled that are marked by displays of force but 
may also be mediated by “existing networks – of solidarity among the common 
people and reciprocity between them and their rulers” (2016: 1). His examples 
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of reciprocity include basic welfare provision by elites in 18th century England 
and China, as well as the ‘bread bargain’ that shaped political relations in Arab 
countries between the 1970s and the uprisings of 2011. As discussed in earlier 
sections of this chapter, in Mozambique there is a popular imaginary of reciproc-
ity between rulers and ruled associated with memory of the post-independence 
socialist period; however, the expectation of reciprocity between government 
and citizenry has long since been undermined by rising inequality and ever-more-
visible corruption among the political elite.
Although all three main political parties – and in particular Frelimo – may 
sometimes make formal mention of agriculture as a priority area in their election 
manifestos, this is a purely rhetorical commitment rather than a genuine expres-
sion of social interests.26 As discussed previously, Mozambique’s political system 
as a whole is marked by the authoritarian political tradition that was inherited 
from the colonial period and further developed by Frelimo during the period of 
one-party rule. Frelimo’s historically vanguardist, elitist and top-down charac-
teristics are also evident in the political cultures of Mozambique’s other political 
parties (most of which were formed by breakaway groups of former Frelimo mem-
bers). As a result, party structures function basically as clientelistic networks and 
as transmission mechanisms for ‘guidance’ issued from the higher echelons to the 
lower, leading to a virtually nonexistent capacity to respond to citizens’ concerns 
and represent them effectively.
This situation is exacerbated by Mozambique’s parliamentary system, based on 
a form of proportional representation with closed party lists. This system displaces 
the focus of politicians’ energies away from developing relationships with voters 
(who are only called upon to vote for their preferred party once every five years, 
and are generally unaware of which candidates are actually on a given party’s list) 
towards developing relationships within the party, since it is party colleagues – 
and especially leaders – who will determine whether their name is placed close 
enough to the top of the party’s list of candidates for them to have a chance of 
winning a seat. The result of this combination of an authoritarian political tradi-
tion with a system of political representation controlled by the party machines is 
a drastic reduction in the scope for effective democratic representation.
The convergence of factors has resulted in a situation where political parties, 
far from providing the citizens of precarious urban neighbourhoods with an alter-
native to the greve, are a virtual irrelevance in Mozambique’s politics of provi-
sions. Although we do not go into it here, CSOs have also proven unable to 
represent and articulate demands for food rights, above all those of the urban 
poor. As Bertelsen puts it, “the notions of effervescence and ephemerality that 
characterised the popular uprisings are key aspects of a form of post-colonial poli-
tics . . . that is irreducible to the orderly world of representation (through NGOs, 
trade unions and political parties, for example)” (2014: 21). In Bohstedt’s terms 
(2016: 1035), within Mozambique’s politics of provisions, “solidarity among the 
common people” is expressed through powerful but ephemeral protests, and “reci-
procity between them and their rulers” is sought through a bargaining process 
centred on force rather than democratic mediation.
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Between responsiveness and repression
As we have seen, instead of the consolidation of a repertoire of peaceful and 
democratic modalities of citizen-state dialogue on poverty and food insecurity, 
the period since the greves of 2008 and 2010 has been marked by an unstable 
equilibrium between responsiveness and repression. This has persisted since the 
most recent episode of citizen-state confrontation around these issues, the abor-
tive greve of 2012, enduring through 2016 and into 2017 despite the ongoing 
deterioration in the living standards of the poorest segments of the urban popula-
tion, now intensified by the debt crisis and the resulting significant devaluation of 
the metical. The significant increase in levels of dissatisfaction among the urban 
poor has been met by a classic display of authoritarian responsiveness, as the gov-
ernment has combined measures intended to limit the social impact of the crisis 
with a significant investment in the state’s repressive capacity.
Although nothing has come of the longer-term responses to the deteriorating 
food security conditions of the urban poor outlined in this chapter – including 
the government’s promises to provide a subsidised ‘basic basket’ and to make 
food production a priority – there has been a concerted effort to hold down the 
prices of key commodities. This has included not only maintaining the subsidies 
on fuel for urban transport providers and wheat flour for bakeries, and blocking 
attempts to raise bread and transport prices, but also reducing import duties on 
basic foodstuffs in an attempt to offset the impact of the deteriorating exchange 
rate on food prices.
It is significant that although these policies directly contradict the standard 
policy recommendations of the World Bank and IMF, the latter – which has come 
to play an increasingly central role in attempts to tackle Mozambique’s ongoing 
debt crisis – has not pushed hard for their reversal. Although documents from 
the international financial institutions continue to make reference to the need 
to eliminate subsidies, this is offset by a simultaneous emphasis on the need to 
protect the poorest in society. Together with this tolerance on the part of the 
financial institutions, the willingness of donor countries to continue providing 
food aid has helped to reduce the pressure on the government.
The maintenance of such provisioning-oriented measures has not, however, 
been the principal element of the regime’s response to the greves. In fact, since 
2008, Frelimo has acted in line with the authoritarian logic that has charac-
terised most of its period in power and which has intensified over the course of 
the last decade, seeking to reinforce the repressive capacity of the state. This 
has centred on an accelerated process of development and equipping of para-
military police forces (some of which have been used in the armed confronta-
tion with Renamo in the central region of the country) and on reinforcing the 
security services and the Presidential Guard. It has also included efforts to exer-
cise preventive control over any attempts to organise a demonstration, which 
have included installing video surveillance cameras at strategic points across 
Maputo and forcing mobile phone companies to block all unregistered SIM 
cards. The growing strength and effectiveness of the security apparatus suggests 
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that Frelimo may be preparing for a shift away from authoritarian responsive-
ness – with its careful balancing of threats and concessions – towards a form of 
authoritarianism that relies on more effective repression to relieve it of the need 
to offer concessions at all.
The depth of the current financial crisis has pushed Mozambique back into a 
situation of heavy dependence on donor countries and the IMF, which is likely to 
last until the country’s oil, gas and coal revenues have grown enough to cover the 
financial needs of the state. This seems to have resulted in a kind of tacit bargain 
to internationalise accountability for hunger in Mozambique, catalysed by the 
threat that the explosive combination of intensified popular anger and stronger 
state capacity for repressive violence means that any new greve risks resulting in 
even worse bloodshed than the previous ones. Under this bargain, donors agree 
to allow the government the political and fiscal space to maintain some measures 
to cushion the impact on the urban poor of food and fuel price rises, and Frelimo 
agrees to preserve a minimum of democratic space.
In her analysis of authoritarian responsiveness, Froissart argues that “authori-
tarian regimes last in part thanks to certain forms of discontent by showing that 
the way they are expressed is an integral part of authoritarian governance” (2014: 
219). Mozambique’s regime, however, seems set on stamping out the space for any 
expressions of discontent, whether they take place via the street protests of the 
greve or within what Bertelsen calls the “orderly world of representation” (ibid.). 
This reversion to Mozambique’s cyclical pattern of periods of partial political 
opening followed by reassertion of an authoritarian governance model has been 
interrupted since 2016 by the debt crisis, with its accompanying internation-
alisation of the country’s politics of provisions. There is little evidence of the 
emergence of non-violent channels for pursuing accountability for hunger at the 
national level in Mozambique, but the space preserved through this temporary 
arrangement may yet allow such channels to become established; we must recog-
nise that the die is not yet cast.
Notes
 1 Primary and secondary data collection for this study was led by IESE, the Institute 
of Social and Economic Studies (Luís de Brito, Egídio Chaimite, Crescêncio Pereira, 
Lúcio Posse and Michael Sambo) with the support of IDS, the Institute of Devel-
opment Studies (Alex Shankland). Maputo data collection was also supported by 
Albino Xinavane, Elisa Machel and Halima Haji, three local young people who had 
been trained in audiovisual documentation by IDS researchers working with the 
DFID-funded Diálogo urban governance programme. The study was part of a four-
country project entitled ‘Food riots and food rights: the moral and political economy 
of accountability for hunger’, led by Naomi Hossain (IDS) with colleagues in Bang-
ladesh, India, Kenya and the UK and funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council / Department for International Development Joint Fund for Poverty Alle-
viation Research (Grant reference ES/J018317/1). We are grateful to participants in 
the national reference group meetings – especially Edgar Cossa, Márcia Cossa and 
Daniel de Sousa – for their invaluable input into the analysis process. We would also 
like to thank the many people in Maputo and Chókwe who gave up their time to be 
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interviewed and to join focus group discussions. Not all of these people can be named 
at this time for a number of reasons. We would also like to thank our colleagues from 
Kenya, India, Bangladesh and the UK for the valuable feedback and stimulating dis-
cussions in the project workshops in January 2013 and February 2014 and in many 
subsequent Skype and email discussions.
 2 This includes the national radio station (Radio Moçambique) and the public televi-
sion channel (Televisão de Moçambique), as well as the longest-established newspapers 
(Notícias and Domingo); the latter belong to a company in which the main shareholder 
is the Bank of Mozambique.
 3 Not only are the state and the public companies responsible for a significant part of 
the advertising, but Frelimo also has influence in other large companies, given the 
prominent positions that members of the Frelimo leadership occupy on their boards of 
directors, including of the major multinational companies working in the country.
 4 According to van den Boom (2011), after a reduction in poverty in the years immedi-
ately following the end of the civil war (from 69 per cent to 54 per cent between 1997 
and 2003), from 2004—2009, the levels of poverty remained practically unchanged 
(at 54 per cent).
 5 The agribusiness firm MIA succeeded in boosting rice production in Chókwe signifi-
cantly in 2008–2009, based on conditional provision of improved rice seeds to peasant 
farmers and a guarantee to purchase their output at a given price. There were also no 
floods during this growing season, which helped to guarantee a good harvest. How-
ever, there was heavy flooding the following season, leading to a fall in output from 
which rice production did not fully recover over the following seasons.
 6 Interview, Ferroviário, August 2013.
 7 Protest initiatives which broke out in some other towns and cities were immediately 
repressed and stifled by police action. Although there are no exact statistics, it is 
thought that at least 10 people died in the police action and that the cost of the dam-
age was in excess of 100 million meticais (USD 4.2 million).
 8 In principle, this measure applied only to operators who could prove they were 
licensed, had their tax situation regularised and recorded their fuel consumption. It is 
not clear how it was effectively applied to the large number of transporters whose situ-
ation was not fully regular. Apparently, the practice of ‘route shortening’ (interruption 
of the agreed journey before reaching the terminal), which has been growing since 
then, was the method the transporters found for compensating for the frozen fares.




 10 Interview, Chamanculo, July 2013.
 11 As published in the weekly newspaper Savana, 3 September 2010 (our translation).
 12 Interview, Ferroviário, August 2013.
 13 This is also the line of argumentation developed by Bertelsen (2014).
 14 Armando Guebuza, “The Government is aware of the situation in which our mar-
vellous people is living” (our translation), http://armandoguebuza.blogspot.com/2010_ 
09_01_archive.html.
 15 Speech by José Pacheco reported in O País, 2/09/2010. ‘Bandits’ is also a term tradi-
tionally used by Frelimo leaders to describe members of the armed opposition group 
Renamo.
 16 Article 4 of Ministerial Diploma no. 153/2010, Boletim da República, 1st Series, 
no. 37, 15/09/2010.
 17 The deadline for registering mobile phone numbers was extended from Novem-
ber 2010 to January 2013, after the operators complained that the period was too 
short for it to be feasible to register some 7 million mobile phone users.
 18 President of the Republic, Armando Guebuza, in O Pais, 2 September 2010.
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 19 The Strategic Urban Poverty Reduction Programme, commonly known as “the 7 Mil-
lion” after the value in local currency of the funds initially allocated to each rural dis-
trict, promised to expand the coverage of these funds to the cities. Its stated aims were 
to increase job opportunities, to improve the business environment and the employ-
ability of labor and to improve the social protection system.
 20 Baptista Macuvele, deputy chairperson of Maputo Association of Road Transporters, 
interviewed in Maputo, 29 November 2013.
 21 Ministry of Industry and Trade, Manual de Procedimentos Do Subsídio à Cesta Básica, 
Maputo, April 2011.
 22 PAPA was approved in June 2008 by the Inter-Ministerial Commission on Prices.
 23 People are not enthusiastic about cassava bread, they are concerned that the flour is 
difficult to store and there are also no guarantees that its price could be lower than 
wheat flour. Despite these uncertainties, the government has been encouraging the 
production and marketing of cassava while more in-depth studies are under way, but 
although an increase in production has been recorded in recent years, this is mainly 
due to increased demand resulting from a venture to brew beer using cassava as raw 
material that was set up in Nampula in 2012.
 24 A. Muianga, National Director of Trade, Interview, 4/12/2013, Maputo.
 25 Among the package of measures, there stood out: 1) the increase in the Bank of 
Mozambique’s interest rates for intervening in the money markets, namely the Stand-
ing Lending Facility and the Standing Deposit Facility, both by 100 base points, bring-
ing them to 16.5 per cent and 5 per cent respectively, and raising the Compulsory 
Reserves Coefficient by 24 base points to 9.0 per cent, as from the period of constitu-
tion that began on 7 February; 2) intervention on the Inter-Bank Exchange Market, 
providing foreign exchange to the market to a total of 162 million USD from the 
beginning of the year to 23 February. Of this sum, 57.1 million USD was destined to 
cover January’s fuel invoice.
 26 Of the manifestos prepared for the most recent general elections (2014), only Fre-
limo’s explicitly mentioned food security, while the issue was addressed only implicitly 
in the MDM manifesto and was completely absent from Renamo’s.
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9 How ‘food riots’ work, and why 
they matter for development
Naomi Hossain and Patta Scott-Villiers
Introduction
In this concluding chapter, we draw together the threads and themes of the 
arguments and evidence presented in this volume to arrive at two main con-
clusions. The first is a conclusion about how food riots worked, by which we 
mean how subsistence protests regularly served as critical junctures in political 
struggles over recent food price crises. In order to understand why such events 
created the conditions for changes in the political and policy conditions for food 
security, we follow McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) in dissecting these events 
until we properly understand their constituent elements. We then build them 
back up till we understand how these mechanisms interacted in the contentious 
politics of provisions of the recent global food price crisis. The deconstruction 
of these events allows us to identify common or recurring elements – particular 
ideas about food or the responsibilities of public authorities, highly specific mar-
ket conditions or political or policy responses often found around ‘food riots’. 
It helps to understand what features of these events are rightly understood as 
the natural or biophysical response of humans faced with subsistence stress, and 
what, by contrast, is the properly political behaviour of strategic, knowing agents 
disturbing the balance of power for the purposes of retaining or increasing their 
subsistence rights.
Deconstructed into their most commonly recurring mechanisms, we start to 
see that a reason why food riots have an apparently universal resonance is not 
that they are a physiological response to basic human need, but because such 
need is particularly successfully politicized. This appears to be especially true 
when political histories of dearth are part of public memory, and the eradication 
of dearth is part of the current mandate of the state. Food riots dramatize the 
moral priority of human eating over other laws or rules, challenging in particular 
the right to profit from speculation in the foodgrain trade. Our findings suggest 
that in those states that are most effective at addressing food crises, the rulers 
often substantially agree with those they rule on a key political principle: that a 
legitimate and effective state is one that at the least tries to protect its population 
against major subsistence crises.
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When we break subsistence protests down in this way, then, it is evident that 
the reconstructed contentious politics of provisions are, in the first instance, dis-
tinctly national struggles. They lock the rulers of nation-states and their popula-
tions into negotiations that relate each to the other as citizens and their states, 
in struggles over rights and duties, the means of provisioning and the substance 
and legitimation of public authority. The politics of provisions start to reveal 
themselves as substantive matters of state-citizen relationships, and of processes 
through which the state and its citizens come to know each other, to understand 
each other’s capacities and needs, and to find ways of shaping the behaviours and 
responses of each. Subsistence protests then stop appearing as the peripheral or 
momentary rumbles of the belly, and are shown to be more thoroughly constitu-
tive of core processes of socio-political and economic development in contem-
porary developing countries, just as they were for the state-citizen relation in the 
development of states in the now-advanced economies (C. Tilly 1975).
This brings us to the second main conclusion of the volume, which is about 
why such events matter for development. We argue here that food riots are criti-
cal junctures in political negotiations over food security, and that their preva-
lence and the form they take – whether wage strikes, ‘ration riots’ or bargaining 
over the rightful operation of food markets – closely reflect the type and degree 
of not only social and economic development, as Louise Tilly has argued (1983), 
but also of political development (Moore 2001). By this we mean that the means 
by which a state resolves the politics of provisions – how it structures the com-
munication of fundamental discontent, and its capacities to respond in a broadly 
satisfactory and socioeconomically developmental manner – is a powerful deter-
minant of state formation more generally. What a state does to ensure that its 
population – particularly its vocal, mobilized population – can be adequately fed 
determine whether it can protect national security, develop a functioning admin-
istrative capacity and accumulate the surpluses that will permit transition from 
agrarian to industrial economies.
A focus on food riots draws attention to how and whether the state-citizen 
relationship has developed the capacities to anticipate, listen and respond to 
mass food security concerns, and is therefore authoritative, effective and account-
able with respect to foundational problems of food insecurity. But the globalized 
nature of the world food system and of recent food riots raises questions about 
whether such capacities can realistically be nation-centered under conditions 
where economic development is inherently a matter of global integration. Such 
questions are particularly important as we face the immediate future challenge of 
climate change and its effects on world food security.
Some definitions
‘Food riots’ as rights-claiming protests
It is worth revisiting what we mean when we talk about ‘food riots’ now that we 
have examined evidence of the set of recent subsistence protests, and five country 
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cases in closer detail. By ‘food riots’, as we noted in the Introduction (Chapter 1, 
this volume), we have been referring to ‘unruly actions of the crowd to assert a 
right to food’. These are contentious political events that move beyond the for-
mal or customarily legitimate modes of political engagement by the masses, and 
in both the content of their claims and the manner of their claims-making, chal-
lenge the interests of powerful groups with respect to how food is marketed. ‘The 
crowd’ refers to non-elite groups – specifically here, groups with grievances about 
the food system. The manner of non-elite group assertions about the right to food 
may in practice take a wide range of forms, from the polite petitioning of organ-
ized civil society to the tire-burning of the apparently spontaneous Mozambican 
street battles of 2010. But the focus on unruly, or rule-breaking but ultimately 
state-rectifying, acts reflects that there is something specifically important about 
protests that escalate into social and then into political unrest. In other words, 
there are particular reasons why such types of transgression work to disrupt power 
relations around the food supply and to dislodge, if often only momentarily, poli-
cies that serve the interests of powerful groups, and why, therefore, our attention 
is drawn to such unruly acts, over and again, across world history and geography.
It is also important to clarify that when we define food riots as a process of 
claiming the right to food we are speaking of that right in a broad or ‘common’ 
sense, rather than as specifically in relation to that right as established under 
international law (Hossain, te Lintelo, and Wanjiku Kelbert 2015). It is true that 
the riots and protests illustrated in this volume called for a specific contemporary 
version of the right to food: the right to be protected against undue volatilities 
in the price of food, in a market-based food system. They assert a right to eat 
over a right to profit from food markets. But this claim to protection against mar-
kets is not, in the first instance, derived from a utilitarian calculus over the best 
means of legislating between different claims to maximize fairness so much as it 
is derived from the ethical principles of a natural right – in extremis, the right to 
be, “possessed simply by virtue of being a human being” (Donnelly 1982: 397). 
We are therefore referring to the right to food as “primarily a moral claim as to 
what should be valued, and what institutional structure we should aim for, and 
try to guarantee if feasible” (Sen 1988: 64; see also Sen 2004). We believe – and 
we believe that people in general believe – that if there is a claimable right to 
protection against shocks in the food system, it derives from the natural right for 
humans to be. This resort to natural rights as the source of the right to food gives 
it priority as a principle over other rights under the law; for instance, property 
rights. It also implies an adjudication between competing rights (Sen 1988; also 
Zuckert 1996 on the relationship between natural law and natural rights).
In our present empirical analysis of claims-making in relation to the right to 
food, we are directed to the natural status of the right to food as an empirical 
matter of how those at risk of hunger view the matter. The arguments of protes-
tors frequently include reference to natural rights and natural law in the idea that 
unruly protest (law-breaking, often) and the assumption of rights over food com-
modities (or property – taking over markets, looting, price-setting, blockades) is 
justified by a higher principle of the right to survival, or the right to be. That said, 
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protestors also articulate legal and instrumental bases for such claims, in contexts 
where a right to food has been established in law and/or where the smooth supply 
of food is presented as essential to the wider problem of a well-ordered society.1
‘Food riots’ as critical junctures
The right to food as manifested in claims to protection against the failures of food 
markets to enable secure access to food is articulated in what has been termed the 
‘moral economy’ in social historical studies of food riots in the periods of adjust-
ment to market economies in 17th and 18th century Europe (Thompson 1971, 
1991; Bohstedt 2010, 1992). There are many versions and views of the moral 
economy, but we take a comparatively narrow approach to the concept which 
is close to its original formulation in social history. We agree with Palomera and 
Vetta (2016) that the term has most power not as a generalized account of social 
values – that people value non-commodified relations in some spheres of life – 
but as a concept of the popular political response to changing class relations in 
(emerging) capitalist economies. We narrow it further by using the term with 
reference specifically to the politics of subsistence. The idea of a moral economy 
may inhere in a latent way in popular political ideologies of the rights of people 
and the responsibilities of their rulers more generally; whether, and the extent to 
which it does, is an empirical matter. But in our view, the moral economy is most 
visible and most programmatic at moments when markets substantially fail to 
assure basic subsistence, and when collective action articulates grievances about 
such market and regulatory failures. They resonate particularly loudly when 
arrangements for social reproduction are in transition towards greater commodi-
fication. With reference to the period 2007–2012, we treat the concept of the 
moral economy as helpful in understanding social and political perspectives on 
how food markets ought to work (Hossain and Kalita 2014). Our use of the idea 
of the moral economy enables us to access:
the political culture, norms and expectations of the various groups of peo-
ple involved in social reproduction, broadly speaking; the power relations 
between the governed and the elites; and the articulation of such disposi-
tions and relations with capitalist processes of continuity and change.
(Palomera and Vetta 2016: 3)
Expressions of the moral economy are a political critique of how emerging market 
relations in food systems disempower the consumer masses in favor of market 
actors such as food corporations, grain dealers and traders and (to a lesser degree) 
of retailers. It is not, our evidence suggests, a critique of smallholder or medium-
sized food producers so much as a challenge to the moral rightness of profit-making 
through the commodifying effects of trade and speculation.
The transgressive political actions on which we focus here legitimate their 
claims with reference to the moral economy – specifically, a shared understanding 
that food markets ought to work to enable people to eat at a standard they believe 
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to be consistent with their custom and status. But by no means do these specific, 
short-lived events, often in a brief and localized series of identifiably connected 
protests, tell us the entire story of the politics of provisions. But by rupturing poli-
tics as usual, these individual moments – spikes of violence – on which we centre 
our analysis in this book, indicate the core issues of power and material struggle 
that are in contention in that place at that time. These units of analysis build 
up into bigger episodes and processes, many of which combine in wider struggles 
over the responsibilities of states and the rights of markets and people, which 
together comprise the politics of provisions. So although we talk a great deal 
about food riots, because they give us something to grapple with, it is not only the 
spikes we are interested in. We are interested in making sense of them in light of 
the negotiations, and the material and institutional positions at stake in bringing 
about a system that is functional for human wellbeing at its most natural level.
How food riots ‘work’: Identifying mechanisms
How do these different elements fit together in wider sequences or recurrent pat-
terns that make a difference to the subsistence settlement? It is only possible to 
unearth this when we consider the wider cycles of contention and relationships 
between protestors and public authorities in the food system. McAdam, Tarrow 
and Tilly (2001) make a persuasive case that by studying how individual events 
shift, confirm or widen the focus of contention, connecting protestors of similar 
profiles with different or new articulations of the grievance, it is possible to see 
the longer socio-political changes relating to a right to food in the making. To 
do this it is important to uncover the mechanisms that more or less predictably 
work to bring about such change, and how these sequence and interact, within 
ongoing processes of social and economic adjustment (such as urbanization and 
de-agrarianization). The critical global event that was the sudden and sustained 
rise in staple food costs around the world in 2007–2008 accelerated the pace and 
drama of economic adjustment, with the usual bargaining over rights between 
citizens and state becoming especially fraught.
Following McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), we classify the mechanisms we 
identify from the case studies into environmental, relational and cognitive types 
of mechanisms. It is already clear that there are similarities between most of the 
food-related protests across the otherwise different settings we have included in 
this book. Sharp rises in the price of staple foods were a feature of the social and 
economic processes within which most of these protests took place. Chapter 2 of 
this volume confirms, as other studies (Berazneva and Lee 2013; Brinkman and 
Hendrix 2011; Hendrix and Haggard 2015; Bellemare 2015; Arezki and Brück-
ner 2011; Smith 2014) have shown, that food price rises during 2007–2012 were 
largely sudden and often unprecedented; while the concentration of protests 
around periods when prices peaked is in itself suggestive of food riots ‘working’ to 
force price controls or other actions to bring food costs down. The significance 
of food price spikes is also suggested by the counter-example of India, where food 
prices rose more gradually and were not subject to spikes emanating from the 
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global system (Chapter 6, this volume). Here, food-related protests focused on 
the implementation of specific policies relating to food provision, and were part 
of wider political struggles at the national and state levels, rather than focusing 
on food prices.
Protestor connections
Food price rises may in the first instance have been experienced by individuals, 
and their families. But by definition, protests are group actions. What united 
and enabled the mobilization of distinct groups? Why did some groups then take 
up protest actions, while others did not? Our cases suggest, as others have also 
argued (in particular, Bohstedt 1988), that protestors were already connected to 
each other, whether by occupation, proximity or through histories of community 
politics (see also the more contemporary cases in Auyero and Moran 2007). In 
Madhya Pradesh, for example, political events claiming the right to food were 
led by the Adivasi Adhikar Manch, an organization of indigenous people with at 
least a decade of mobilization over education provision, access to agricultural 
land and fair prices for forest produce. Protests about food prices sometimes built 
on pre-existing protest groups or organizations, as happened in Kenya when citi-
zen movements ‘hijacked’ national events with colourful protests. In Maputo in 
Mozambique, protests started in the areas around transport hubs, where commut-
ers were suddenly faced with sharp rises in fares to places of work, while garments 
workers near Dhaka in Bangladesh came together through their common places 
of work, often becoming mobilized by activists spreading the word on public 
transport.
An environmental mechanism of considerable and recurrent significance is 
the amplification of protestors’ grievances, in some cases facilitating the diffusion 
of protests to other settings. Social media was a factor enabling the expansion (or 
‘scale-shift’, as McAdam et al. [2001] put it) of localized food riots into a national 
movement in Cameroon (Chapter 5, this volume). In Kenya, innovative, theat-
rical protests eventually attracted the attention of the media, enabling the Bunge 
La Mwananchi group to reach a national audience with their protests. In all of 
these countries, the international media covered some of these protests, in par-
ticular those where violence and political unrest triggered state repression; this 
was particularly important in Bangladesh, Cameroon and Mozambique.
Behaviour of authorities
Another environmental mechanism that recurs in several instances is the local 
presence of a state actor with responsibilities for realizing the right to food. In West 
Bengal in India and in Ikutha and Mathare in Kenya, protests centred around 
public agencies or their contractors with responsibilities for delivering subsidized 
or free food. In each instance, protestors detected corruption and unfairness in 
the distribution of relief food, and sought to highlight this food injustice, or to 
reallocate it themselves. This mechanism highlights the importance of physical 
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proximity to meaningful objects of protest: there were no protests, to our knowl-
edge, against the global food system, although price rises were widely triggered 
by conditions at that level. Policy responses to the food price spike or protests 
also introduced new opportunities or threats, feeding into the amplification or 
diffusion of riot events, or new cycles of repression and response. This is in sharp 
contrast to the abstract, de-contextualized nature of the source of the global food 
crisis. It highlights the problems of scale in popular resistance to the downsides 
of globalization (Fraser 2012, 2011; Engels 2014) and explains why protesters 
focused their attentions strongly on the state, even when they were aware of the 
global forces that were at play.
Food-related protests were also connected with several shifts in relationships 
between protestors, states, markets and wider society. A key relational change 
was in how protestors sometimes sought to naturalize their concerns with ref-
erence to basic human needs and rights. The language of the moral economy 
made it possible for particular groups to articulate their own concerns and 
interests with reference to those of the wider society, drawing sympathy and/
or increasingly the likelihood that their protests would be ‘certified’ as legiti-
mate protests. The garments workers of Bangladesh are a good example of this. 
Although their struggles over low wages pre- and post-dated the 2008 food price 
shock, they articulated their concerns at that particular moment with reference 
to high food prices and the right to food, with slogans like ‘bring prices down, 
let us survive’.
Powerful markets
Food trade interests were regularly demonized, including both oligopolies or pow-
erful groups with the ear of policymakers, and more tangibly and more visibly to 
food shoppers and protestors, food or grain traders or ration-dealers. Those who 
profited from food trade – but had not grown it themselves – were often framed 
as exploitative. This created a target for and helped legitimate protests. In Kenya, 
the maize flour millers and brokers were seen to have benefited from the govern-
ment’s maize flour subsidy, supposedly intended to benefit the poor, entering “the 
lexicon of Kenyan scams in the media, on social media and the word on the street 
in the informal settlements” (Chapter 7, this volume). In an important sense, 
the demonization of food traders can be seen as an attempt to ‘de-certify’ their 
interests and concerns as legitimate in the politics of provisions.
Food price spikes produce a particularly rapid shift in what Araghi (2003) calls 
the value relations between labor and subsistence, moving against the interests of 
worker-consumers. Unless prices fairly rapidly drop back to ‘normal’ levels, wages 
quickly become inadequate. This means discontent spreads from what people 
are eating to the nature of the work they do, and the remuneration they earn. 
Other research into the effects of food price rises after 2012 in which the editors 
of this volume have been involved found increased precariousness in the kind of 
labor many people on low incomes were performing, as they found it impossible 
to make ends meet without doing more to earn more (Scott-Villiers et al. 2016). 
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Speaking about how the minimum wage had adjusted to the price rises, an official 
from the Mozambican Workers’ Organization (OTM) noted that:
The evolution of the minimum wages is not satisfactory, because it is still 
not enough to acquire the desirable basket of goods for a family of five peo-
ple. We see that the government does not take responsibility for protecting 
the producers of wealth. When the government presents us with data on 
jobs created, we ask “what kind of jobs?” What we want is to abandon the 
negotiation of wages on the basis of percentages, and move to negotiating 
on the basis of the basic basket. But the government insists on negotiating 
based on the average inflation and on the growth in GDP per sector. How 
many citizens are able to buy milk? How many kilos of rice are citizens able 
to buy? The government does not have an employment policy. Today jobs 
are allocated personally, and it’s full of corruption.
(de Brito et al. 2014, 15)
In articulating their grievances about price rises, labor organizers seek to chal-
lenge the delinking of labor from a reasonable living, and in so doing highlight 
the generally inadequate nature of the labor market and its regulations and pro-
visions, as was the case in Bangladesh. This shift in the value relations between 
labor and subsistence is a framing perhaps more latent than present in the other 
food riots we have considered here, but it may become a mechanism when this 
shifting value-relation is collectively attributed as a threat to the interests of 
labor (on the mechanism “threat attribution”, see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 
[2001]; Chapter 4, this volume).
The effect of food riots
States and rights
A strong emphasis on subsistence protection, often as a result of the damag-
ing political effects of past food crises or disasters, can create a relationship of 
accountability between citizens and the state in relation to protection against 
food shocks. This is true in both India and Bangladesh, with major famines at the 
heart of their national liberation struggles. But the mechanism works in different 
ways, depending on the institutional response to such accountability for food 
security, and on whether and how protestors are positioned to demand answers 
from the state. A final relational mechanism of great importance is brokerage, or 
the forging of new alliances that enable weaker or less organized groups to access 
the organizational resources of stronger ones. Most of the cases have instances 
in which protest groups were brokered into more effective or more powerful net-
works through connections made with external actors.
The idea that there is a ‘common sense’ (as distinct from a legal) right to 
food – and that sudden, high food price rises are unjust – can give rise to views 
that under such conditions, the state is responsible for action. This perception 
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means that if and when a political opportunity arises (a threat or opportunity is 
attributed to some action or inaction by the state), the state becomes the target of 
protests or claims relating to access to food. We have seen that elites, media and 
masses all tend to believe that food price rises lead to discontent, and expect food 
price rises to lead to food riots and political danger. This is a cognitive mecha-
nism of great significance, because it highlights the dynamic and circular nature 
of food riots, and the connections between protests in one period, protests in 
another, and how the behaviours of elites and protestors anticipate the responses 
of the other based on historical memory of subsistence crises past. We also know 
from the media analysis in Chapter 3 of this volume that elites typically expect 
diffusion of food riots from one place to another, and fear the unpredictability 
that they bring to the political situation, and may therefore be inclined to repress 
protest. This is always a risky strategy, it may deter protestors, but as in the Cam-
eroon case, violence against protestors perceived to have legitimate concerns can 
escalate the situation as protestors protest their right to make their claims.
How do the different elements combine in processes of political change? The 
country studies demonstrate the influence of local histories of subsistence poli-
tics, conjoined political and economic crisis, and past success with popular mobi-
lization around food; these can mix in combustible combinations in the political 
imagination when food prices spike too suddenly for ‘natural’ events to explain. 
These wider processes of food price struggles may be triggered specifically by food 
price spikes affecting groups that are already mobilizing around their rights, eco-
nomic and political. With McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), we find that static, 
single-shot analyses of food riots fail to capture the lessons of history and their 
institutionalization in policies, programs, moral economic ideas and beliefs, as 
well as expectations about the behaviour of the different stakeholders.
Figure 9.1 illustrates the previous discussion. Building on McAdam, Tarrow 
and Tilly’s (2001) “dynamic interactive framework for analysing mobilization in 
contentious politics”, we apply their mechanism-based explanation to contem-
porary food riots. The framework shows that food price rises are a key part of the 
wider social and economic processes within which food riots take place, but do 
not in any sense cause them. A mixture of the connections between those under 
stress, the behavior of authorities and market actors and beliefs about a moral 
economy combine to cause riots. In particular, where low income populations 
have been previously mobilized, live in proximity or share common occupations, 
it becomes easier for the collective attribution of threats and opportunities aris-
ing from food price rises and policy responses to them. Where there is a strong 
belief, based on past experience, that the state has reasons to take its responsi-
bilities to protect citizens against food crises seriously, and in particular where 
that has translated into the establishment of local food grain or ration dealers 
or officials tasked with realizing the right to food, protests may be ‘certified’ or 
rendered legitimate. States do not change because of riots, but are already always 
changing with global economic adjustment; riots and protests are part of that 
change. Based on past experience, elites (global and national) expect high food 
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(‘legitimate’) protests about food are perceived to easily escalate, particularly if 
and when the media amplifies the voices of protestors. Elite fears can lead to vio-
lent repression, which may further ramp up protests as rioters claim their rights 
to claim their rights at all. Other movements or civil or political society actors 
(trades unions, political parties, NGOs) may step in and consolidate the protes-
tors’ platform, building coalitions of greater strength and capacity, and potential 
threats to incumbent powers. A state that responds without repression but with 
price controls or subsidies reinforces the perception of state responsibility.
Do food riots indicate development failures?
We noted previously that our interest in food riots arose from the insights these 
events offered into the larger process of negotiations over food security between 
citizens and states. The prevalence and nature of such events (who protests, how 
frequently, about what, when and how, and who they target) both respond to 
and create the conditions for food policies and natural rights-bearing citizenship. 
This political sociological perspective on the significance of food riots for pro-
cesses of socioeconomic and political development follows Charles Tilly (1975) 
in emphasizing state-citizen relations and state capacity to enable food security, 
through the political capacities to anticipate, listen and respond to popular or 
moral economic concerns, but also the policy and infrastructural capacities nec-
essary to integrate and regulate food markets, including information and com-
munication networks.
Our key departure from other contemporary food riots analyses is that we do 
not see such protests as signs of dysfunction and systemic failure so much as evi-
dence of bargaining and negotiation during periods of structurally complex and 
difficult adjustment. They are, therefore, a variety of political struggle that is 
entirely necessary for states to learn how to anticipate, listen and respond to 
popular concerns about subsistence crises. By contrast, both major schools of 
thought on recent food riots, the development policy perspective and the food 
regimes view, see these as evidence of systemic failure. The question for us, then, 
is whether this bargaining can operate effectively within the increasingly com-
plex and increasingly globalized arena in which the politics of provisions must 
operate in the 21st century.
Security failures
In the development policy literature, recent food riots are a clear signal of 
momentary but major market failure. Development policy research is primarily 
concerned with food riots as social or civil unrest, with the potential to escalate 
further into violence and declines of law and order (Arezki and Brückner 2011; 
see also Chapter 3 in this volume, on responses of Bretton Woods institutional 
elites to food riots). Drawing on a half century of data from Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Hendrix and Brinkman (2013) characterize the relationship between food secu-
rity and conflict as circular, viewing food security as a “threat multiplier” (see also 
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O’Brien 2012). There is an understandable emphasis on the need to prevent such 
political violence: people die in food riots, mostly from official repression; liveli-
hoods that rely on the food trade may suffer, and property may be damaged. As 
we know from the classic Walton and Seddon (2008) account of the ‘IMF riots’ 
of the 1970s and 1980s, liberalizing economic policies may be derailed by politi-
cal elites keen to regain popular support in the wake of mass protests against the 
effects of economic adjustment.
Although prices are key variables, most development policy scholarship treats 
food riots and related protests as political acts, within the constraints of the data 
on which it typically relies. Berazneva and Lee, for instance, attempt to explore 
the extent to which ‘African food riots were a response to limited food availabil-
ity or to restricted access to food, or both’ (Berazneva and Lee 2013: 32). This fol-
lows Amartya Sen in shifting attention from the Food Availability Decline thesis 
of famine to a political-relational view of food insecurity as resulting from the 
erosion or abrogation of food entitlements (Sen 1981b, 1981a). They conclude 
that although food availability, levels of poverty, features of local food markets 
and urban and coastal location all helped determine the prevalence of food riots, 
more oppressive regimes and stronger civil societies also, somewhat paradoxi-
cally, meant food riots were more likely to occur (Berazneva and Lee 2013). They 
conclude that food riots are political signals that need to be addressed through 
politics and policies that redistribute power, and not just power over food:
African governments need to effectively deal with food access and distribu-
tion problems to avoid future food riots. By helping poor urban and rural 
households maintain access to food, energy and essential services, social pro-
tection programs . . . can reduce the impact of price shocks on health and 
education, as well as prevent social unrest . . . Dissatisfaction with govern-
ment policies and corruption, as well as desires for increased freedoms, were 
among the major complaints voiced by the public . . . Such discontent with 
matters of governance and political rights is not surprising in Africa.
(Berazneva and Lee 2013: 37)
Hendrix and Haggard take the political analysis further, testing a series of 
hypotheses about the political-institutional determinants of food riots on 
a dataset of urban Asian and African unrest since the 1960s. They conclude 
that (cf. Berazneva and Lee 2013) democracies and semi-democratic polities 
have seen more protests when food prices rise for two main reasons: because 
the political opportunities are greater than in more authoritarian regimes, and 
because more democratic polities tend to feature relatively less urban bias, and 
pro-farmer policies often mean higher prices, particularly for low-income urban 
populations (Hendrix and Haggard 2015). Analyses of this kind provide valu-
able frameworks for the analysis of what food riots mean for development, and 
Hendrix and Haggard and Bellemare are among scholars that call for deeper 
engagement with the dynamics of protests and protestor motivations of the kind 
we have aimed for here.
How ‘food riots’ work and why they matter 189
Food regime failures
The main alternative perspective on contemporary food riots is from food regimes 
thinking. This approach also treats food riots as evidence of failure, but for 
scholars like Raj Patel, Philip McMichael and Ray Bush, this failure is more sys-
temic and total, from the point of view of protestors, rather than the politically- 
inflected protests against market failures of development policy research. As 
discussed in the Introduction (Chapter 1, this volume), food regime theory offers 
a framework for understanding changes in the world food system in relation to 
how agriculture is integrated into and serves global processes of capital accumu-
lation (Friedmann 1980; Bernstein 2016; McMichael 2009a). The state of food 
security in any particular time and place reflects how it is incorporated into the 
regime. For food regimes theorists, the so-called global food crisis of the early 
21st century was ‘crisis as normal’ (for instance, Lang 2010; McMichael 2009b). 
In other words, the world food system was broken to the extent that the orienta-
tion of the current food regime towards serving the interests of corporate capital 
was no longer affording even a viable basic existence for labor.
For Bush, mass unrest relating to the food system is intrinsic to the gross injus-
tices and inequities of that system:
[F]ood insecurity and famine is an integral part of late capitalism. There 
should no longer be surprise that death by starvation and chronic malnutri-
tion are systemic features of capitalism and that people resist.
(Bush 2010: 119)
Food riots are “just one acute form of structural, historical patterns of underde-
velopment that are shaped by and in turn shape the political economy of food” 
(Bush and Martiniello 2017: 193). Struggles over the food system are necessar-
ily violent struggles over bare survival: for instance, for McMichael, the global 
wave of food riots and related protests was evidence that ‘agflation is generat-
ing elemental struggles around the question of social reproduction’ (McMichael 
2009b, 285–286). As with the development policy approach, food rioters are not 
spasmodic in their protest; although elemental struggles, these are also properly 
political responses, even if (in contrast to the development policy research) the 
response is to the deepening dependency on food trade rather than to its momen-
tary failure. For instance, the 2008 wave of food riots was:
an outcome of the policies embodied in the Bretton Woods Institutions’ eco-
nomic doctrine, insofar as they dismantled public capacity (specifically food 
reserves), and deepened food dependency across much of the global South 
through the liberalization of trade in foodstuffs.
(Patel and McMichael 2009: 10)
Food regime theory provides a robust framework for examining the significance 
of food riots for development, showing that the food riot is ‘not simply about the 
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price and accessibility of staple foods [but about the more complex matter of] the 
political economy of food provisioning’ (Patel and McMichael 2009, 12). ‘Food 
provisioning’, Patel and McMichael go on to argue, ‘serves as a lightning rod of 
contention over perceptions of just governance’ (pp. 24). ‘Food rebellions’ are 
important as evidence of significant popular alternatives to integration into the 
global food system, and in particular signs of mass support for more sustainable, 
agro-ecological and less commodified food systems; the international food sov-
ereignty movement is evidence of this politics of alternative food provisioning 
(Holt-Giménez and Patel 2009).
Food sovereignty and its transnational organizing may well provide the ideo-
logical alternative to a fully commodified global food system. But how and the 
extent to which nation-states are capable of establishing and protecting their 
own alternative food systems at least partially protected from the vicissitudes of 
the global economy will depend substantially on state capacities, as noted previ-
ously, to anticipate, listen and respond to popular concerns about the food supply. 
We recognize that the politics of provisions are about negotiations between states 
and citizens, and that the room for maneuvering of states facing contemporary 
food rioters is different to that faced by the British and French states in their own 
transitions to capitalism. The experiences of historical processes of state forma-
tion in now-developed countries are not, of course, identical or even broadly 
similar to their former colonies, the ‘developing’ economies of the present. There 
are many reasons for this, but the one that matters most directly in the discus-
sion of the historical development of state capacities to manage food security is 
the comparatively globalized nature of many contemporary developing countries’ 
food systems. As the Indian case study in this volume notes, a significant differ-
ence between India and the other country cases is its comparative autarky and 
capacity to make, rather than take, global (or at least regional) food prices. For 
the other countries in the set, integration into – and vulnerability to contagion 
from – different segments of the global food system was an important part of the 
environment within which the politics of provisions erupted in unrest during the 
2007–2012 period.
Globalizing times and the politics of being
The global wave of recent subsistence protests encourages us to view these 
struggles and the international policy responses they engendered as the nego-
tiations of a global politics of provisions. The wave of ‘food riots’ in the period 
2007–2012 reflects the incorporation of the universal everyday practice of eat-
ing in the early 21st century within an internationally integrated and interre-
lated system of food markets, policies, production and regulatory systems. When 
global food prices spike or slump, this affects almost everyone who eats – but it 
does so unevenly, depending on how populations have previously negotiated 
their rights to food, subsistence and, ultimately, status with their public authori-
ties. Whether or not they feel they need to or can usefully protest to reassert 
those rights in a sharply shifting food market depends on how successfully those 
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negotiations have tilted the balance of power towards those who eat as opposed 
to those who profit from food.
We have used the term ‘right to food’ and ‘food rights’ in an apparently casual 
and footloose manner, with little to no reference to constitutions or international 
law, other than in the interesting, contrasting cases of India and Kenya. But we 
hope it is clear that we see in this global wave of subsistence protests a politics of 
the right to food – even if such terms are not widely used, other than as specific 
expressions of international human rights law. But we do not only see this wave of 
subsistence protests as a global politics of provisions that has returned attention 
to the food insecurity embedded in a globalized, commodified world food order. 
We also recognize in the responses of the relevant institutions of global govern-
ance (such as they are) an acknowledgement of the right to food, even despite 
the colonization by the global economy of food systems everywhere and for eve-
ryone. The comparatively strong emphasis on agriculture, food security, nutrition 
and social protection in aid and development policy, and the relatively weak 
defence of the freedom of markets in food commodity trade is, we believe, an 
indication of the success of this multi-sited global struggle over the right to food.
A key point of difference in the view of food riots as strategic acts in a political 
drama of significance for the shaping of contemporary food systems is our view 
that such protests are productive political negotiations, and not signals of eco-
nomic or political failure. There is a risk here that by kicking out the hydraulic 
or spasmodic view of food riots we end up instead with an impression that they 
are highly deliberative political performances, riot as dance theater rather than 
as angry violence. But we want to steer clear of seeing food riots as staged events, 
with the suggestion of fakery; we know that protestors are frequently angry when 
they protest, and fearful that they and their families may face hunger if circum-
stances do not change. We are arguing instead that this anger is deployed politi-
cally and strategically in a spectacle of protest adopted with the tacit knowledge 
of the forms taken by popular protest over food crisis historically. The crowd 
is drawn together in the tense times of economic transition by the magnetic 
qualities of the hard-won knowledge of the collective power of the mob (Rudé 
1981) and of the idea (with a capital ‘I’) that things could be different and better 
(Badiou 2012).
The reach and effect of subsistence protests is causally and consequentially 
related to the level and type of political development with respect to food secu-
rity and citizen-state relations. These are productive protests – part of improving 
citizen-state relations, however frightening and regressive in the short term. But 
what positive role can protest make in the 21st century, given growing turbulence 
in the global economy, the subsistence crises that must result, and the subsequent 
world discontent that is sure to come? Can protest make a positive contribu-
tion given the vastly encompassing effects of dehumanized food regimes and the 
commodification of life? If the politics of provisions has shown us anything, it is 
that protest is adaptable to changing circumstances, and yet retains its political 
power across many contexts. It seems axiomatic that states and citizens that have 
developed the capacities to anticipate, listen and respond to their nation’s food 
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security needs will be those best equipped for the social and economic transitions 
from agrarian to complex industrial societies to becoming members of a globally 
negotiated mega-polity. These capacities will reflect the distinctively different 
political histories of dearth across countries, which in turn reflect in large part 
the agro-ecological conditions and geographies of different places. They will take 
different forms – more openness to global and local markets in the case of smaller 
economies, and big public systems of food and income transfers in larger ones, for 
instance. And they will also reflect politics proper, depending on which groups 
are incorporated into the political bargain, and on what terms. In this book we 
have shown how riots and protests allow unequivocal voices of suffering to be 
heard, voices which remind us of the meaning of the natural right to be, and insist 
on a politics of provision that simply will not stop provoking the food system at 
its most local and at its most global.
Note
 1 Although this is not the place for a lengthy discussion of the relationship between 
natural rights, natural law, human rights and the right to food, in developing our under-
standing of the right to food as an ideological and programmatic claim made by people 
at risk of hunger, we have drawn on arguments developed by Donnelly (1982) and 
Zuckert (1996); see also Sen (1988, 2004) on the right to protection from hunger 
specifically.
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